Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/session.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 4f999f4f95 auth, docs: a session from a longer window is cut; the remaining nits (audit A6, A7, A10, W7)
Security audit 2026-10-17, stage 6.

A10: a session created under a longer PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS kept its old
expiry after the setting was lowered (the renewal arithmetic took
ExpiresAt minus the new window for the last renewal). Touch now cuts such
a session to now plus the window at once. TestSessionMadeUnderALongerWindowIsCut.

A6, A7, W7 - security.md now says what the code does, which is what it
should do: a wrong method answers 405 with Allow from the router before the
role is looked at (the routes are public source); the setup token is made
anew at the first /setup/ request after expiry, a stranger's included, and
logged where only the operator reads it; two GETs make what must exist,
the server's own DKIM key on Settings and Health. README's local trial
says the compose file is the hardened deployment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-17 22:38:52 +03:00

144 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
const renewThreshold = time.Hour
// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
// cookie.
type sessionStore struct {
store *store.Store
idle time.Duration
}
func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
}
// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
// server would have expired it anyway. RFC 6265 § 5.2.2: Max-Age sets the
// expiry to now plus that many seconds, and a cookie set again under the same
// name, domain and path replaces the old one (§ 5.3 step 11), so each renewal
// slides it.
func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
return int(s.idle.Seconds())
}
func hashToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// Create issues a new session for the user and returns its token. It fails
// closed: if the row cannot be written the caller gets an error and must not
// hand out a cookie, because a token that is not in the database looks like a
// signed-in browser while every request it makes bounces back to /login.
func (s *sessionStore) Create(userID int64) (string, error) {
token := randomToken(32)
now := time.Now()
if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), userID, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Pruning is housekeeping: the new session is already valid, so a failure
// here is logged and does not fail the login.
if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
}
return token, nil
}
// Lookup returns the id of the user a token's session belongs to, if the
// session exists and is unexpired.
func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (int64, bool) {
if token == "" {
return 0, false
}
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
return 0, false
}
if !found {
return 0, false
}
if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
}
return 0, false
}
return row.UserID, true
}
// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so.
func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
return false
}
if !found {
return false
}
now := time.Now()
// A session made under a longer PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS expires later
// than today's window allows: it is cut to the window at once, rather
// than keep the old expiry until it passes (security audit 2026-10-17,
// A10).
if row.ExpiresAt.After(now.Add(s.idle)) {
if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: shorten failed: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
return false
}
if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
// DestroyOthers invalidates every session of the user except keep.
func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(userID int64, keep string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(userID, hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
}
}
// DestroyAll invalidates every session of the user.
func (s *sessionStore) DestroyAll(userID int64) {
if err := s.store.DeleteUserSessions(userID); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy all failed: %v", err)
}
}
// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
}
}