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selfpost/build/opendkim.conf
T
mix 8ce050ef7f release: 0.1.0: Phases 0-11: panel, Postfix/DKIM, milter, backup, Docker image
Initial feature-complete implementation of the v1.0 specification (phases 0-11 of `docs/implementation-plan.md`).
Added:
  - Panel (Go, single static binary) with SQLite persistence, one-time
  - Domain management with per-domain DKIM (RSA-2048, generated in pure Go) and
  - Application (sender identity) management: SASL credentials via `sasldb2`,
  - Full Postfix relay config generated from env at container start: SMTPS 465,
  - Journal milter (pure Go, `go-milter`) recording every send to `send_log`;
  … (6 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.1.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

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# OpenDKIM — per-domain signing (spec 6).
#
# Signing is strictly per-domain: each sending domain has its own key pair and
# selector. The panel generates keys under /data/opendkim/keys/<domain>/ and
# keeps KeyTable/SigningTable in sync as domains are added or removed, then asks
# supervisord to send this process SIGUSR1 to reload the tables (spec 6.2, 6.5).
#
# Both table files are created (empty) by entrypoint.sh before OpenDKIM starts,
# so the daemon comes up cleanly on a fresh /data with no domains yet and simply
# signs nothing until the first domain is added.
Syslog no
UMask 007
Mode s
# SigningTable uses refile: so the "*@example.com" left-hand patterns match any
# local-part for a domain; KeyTable maps each domain to its key and selector.
KeyTable /data/opendkim/KeyTable
SigningTable refile:/data/opendkim/SigningTable
# The private keys are owned by `panel` and read by `opendkim` through the shared
# `selfpost` group, so they are deliberately group-readable (mode 0640). That is
# safe on this single-tenant, private bind mount, but it trips OpenDKIM's default
# key-safety check, so the check is disabled here by design.
RequireSafeKeys no
Socket local:/run/opendkim/opendkim.sock
PidFile /run/opendkim/opendkim.pid
UserID opendkim
Background no