Files
selfpost/test/e2e/limit_reserve_test.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 4433688500 findings of the security review of stage 1
The review of d254a99..fd29468 (read-only, a separate agent) found all
five fixes sound and nothing above low. Fixed here:

- The M1 e2e step passed on the unfixed code: the stranger's RSET between
  MAIL FROMs ends the transaction, Postfix's mail_reset() calls
  milter_abort(), and the old code released the slot too. The stranger now
  keeps one MAIL FROM open (strangerHoldsMailFrom) while the domain's own
  application sends; under the old code that slot was the domain's one.
- A domain import could still store a report address on the server's own
  name (W1's form rule only): checkDomainImport refuses one that is not
  the domain's own hosted address. Not a mailbox either way, but the
  panel would show an address the server refuses. Cases in
  TestDomainImportIsCheckedLikeTheForms.
- DeleteDomain matches the reports' domain without regard to case.
- A cut that fails after the journal rows were written says the rows were
  written.
- dmarc.Service.Resync and inbound.Service.Resync are serialised like
  app.Service.Resync (W3's shape, outside its diff).

Left as the review's nit: three ApplicationByLogin lookups for a refused
MAIL FROM (a refusal is rare; the store is local).

go test ./internal/dmarc ./internal/inbound ./internal/store; the import
test; GOOS=linux go vet ./test/e2e.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-17 22:13:36 +03:00

100 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package e2e
import (
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/smtp"
"net/url"
"testing"
"time"
)
// limitDomain is a sending domain of its own for the domain-limit case, so
// that its ceiling of one touches no other step.
const limitDomain = "limit.e2e.test"
// testDomainLimitNotReservedByAStranger is the "done when" of the security
// audit's M1 (2026-10-17): the level-2 domain limit is the login's domain's.
// MAIL FROM reaches the journal milter before Postfix holds it to a login, so
// a client with no login naming a domain there used to take one of that
// domain's slots and hold it for as long as its transaction stayed open.
// Here a domain has a limit of one message an hour; a stranger opens the
// submission port, names the domain in MAIL FROM without signing in and
// keeps the transaction open, and meanwhile the domain's own application
// sends its one message - and is refused the second, so the limit is in
// force. (A RSET between the stranger's MAIL FROMs would end the
// transaction, which releases the slot under the old code as well: the
// review of stage 1 found the first version of this step passing on it.)
func testDomainLimitNotReservedByAStranger(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
domainID, err := sc.panel.addDomain(limitDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("add %s: %v", limitDomain, err)
}
login, password, err := sc.panel.addApplication(domainID, "limit-app", "wildcard", "")
if err == nil {
err = waitForSenderMap(login, password, "alerts@"+limitDomain)
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("add the application: %v", err)
}
resp, body, err := sc.panel.postForm("/outbound/domains/"+domainID+"/settings/ratelimit", url.Values{
"mode": {"manual"}, "max_messages": {"1"}, "window_seconds": {"3600"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK || resp.Request.URL.Path != "/outbound/domains/"+domainID {
t.Fatalf("save the domain limit: status %d, landed on %s:\n%.800s", resp.StatusCode, resp.Request.URL.Path, body)
}
stranger, err := strangerHoldsMailFrom("x@" + limitDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the stranger's MAIL FROM: %v", err)
}
defer stranger()
send := func(token string) sendResult {
return attemptSend(sendAttempt{
authLogin: login, authPassword: password,
from: "alerts@" + limitDomain, to: recipient, subject: "e2e " + uniqueToken(token), body: "ok",
})
}
if res := send("m1-own"); !res.ok() {
t.Fatalf("the domain's own message after a stranger's MAIL FROM: %v", res.firstErr())
}
if err := send("m1-second").refusedAt("MAIL", 451, "4.7.1 Service unavailable"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the second message over the domain's limit of one: %v", err)
}
}
// strangerHoldsMailFrom opens the implicit-TLS submission port, says EHLO
// and MAIL FROM:<from> without signing in, and leaves the transaction open
// until the returned func is called. The MAIL FROM is answered 250: the
// journal milter continues, and Postfix refuses such a client only at RCPT
// (smtpd_delay_reject).
func strangerHoldsMailFrom(from string) (func(), error) {
conn, err := tls.DialWithDialer(&net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}, "tcp", smtpsAddr, &tls.Config{
InsecureSkipVerify: true,
ServerName: selfpostHostname,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, selfpostHostname)
if err != nil {
_ = conn.Close()
return nil, err
}
if err := c.Hello("stranger.e2e.test"); err != nil {
_ = c.Close()
return nil, err
}
if err := c.Mail(from); err != nil {
_ = c.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("MAIL FROM: %w", err)
}
return func() { _ = c.Quit(); _ = c.Close() }, nil
}