selfpost/docs/architecture.md

SelfPost — architecture (as-built)

Source of truth: the code tree, not historical specs. Synchronise this file when env keys, routes, or mail-path behaviour change. Verification method: development.md § «Verifying docs against code».

User install/operations: README.md, guide.md. Product boundaries: product.md.

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Image and processes

Single Debian slim image. entrypoint.sh (root) fixes /data ownership and milter socket directories, requires SELFPOST_HOSTNAME (FQDN with at least one dot; no scheme, port, or spaces — invalid or empty value → exit 1 before Postfix config or supervisord), then execs supervisord as PID 1.

The hostname is not a tunable default: it must match PTR/rDNS, TLS CN/SAN, and SASL realm together. Soft fallbacks (localhost in the panel vs container ID in Postfix) split realms and break SMTP AUTH with a silent 535 in clients while the panel looks healthy. Shipped docker-compose.yml already requires the variable; the entrypoint gate catches docker run, custom compose, and k8s.

Managed programs (build/supervisord.conf):

Program	User	Priority	Role
opendkim	root → opendkim (UserID in opendkim.conf)	100	DKIM signing milter
panel	panel	200	HTTP UI + journal-milter + log-tailer + rate-limit recalc; with the inbound relay on also the inbound journal milter
postfix	root (wrapper)	300	MTA — started only after the milter sockets exist (OpenDKIM's, the journal milter's and, with the inbound relay on, the inbound journal milter's)
postfix-reload	root	—	On-demand postfix reload (autostart off)
cert-reload	root	400	Daily postfix reload for renewed TLS certs
logrotate	root	400	Periodic mail.log rotation

Start order: OpenDKIM → panel (opens journal-milter socket) → Postfix wrapper polls unix sockets (timeout MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT, default 30s) then postfix start-fg.

crashexit event listener exits the container on any managed process FATAL so Docker restart: unless-stopped recreates a broken instance.

Liveness: GET /healthz (unauthenticated) returns 200 when opendkim, panel, and postfix are RUNNING; Docker HEALTHCHECK uses the same probe.

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Mail path

Client ──TLS+SASL──► Postfix (465 smtps, optional 587 submission)
                         │
                         ├─► OpenDKIM milter (sign, tempfail on failure)
                         ├─► journal-milter (send log + L2 rate limits, fail-open)
                         └─► outbound MX delivery (port 25 client)

Internet ──► Postfix smtp inet :25  (when INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true
                         │           and/or DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true)
                         │
                         ├─► optional antispam milter (inbound relay only)
                         ├─► DMARC aggregate ingest (pipe → dmarc-ingest)
                         └─► smtp:[upstream]:port  (inbound relay only;
                             transport_maps; no local delivery)

The smtp/inet listener is absent when both flags are off (postconf -MX smtp/inet removes Debian's stock smtpd). Outbound delivery still uses the smtp unix client; it is not the same service.

Postfix (build/postfix-config.sh)

• 465/smtps — implicit TLS, SASL required; primary listener.
• 587/submission — only when SUBMISSION_ENABLE=true; STARTTLS with smtpd_tls_security_level=encrypt.
• 25/smtp inet — when INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true and/or DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true. No SASL, no OpenDKIM, no journal-milter — smtpd_milters is always overridden on this service, because main.cf's submission chain would otherwise let a signing outage defer relayed mail and would file inbound mail into the outbound send log under the sender's domain. With the inbound relay on the chain is the optional antispam milter, then the panel's inbound journal milter (unix socket INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET, default /run/selfpost/inbound-journal.sock, default_action=accept); with DMARC ingest alone it is empty. Postfix hands a message to its milters one after another at end-of-message, each seeing what the one before added, so the journal milter sees only mail the filter let through and reads the filter's verdict headers (X-Rspamd-Action, X-Spamd-Result) off it. It writes one inbound_spam_log row per recipient at an inbound domain - a DMARC report address is not one - and never refuses anything (internal/milter/inbound.go). The headers are read only while a filter is attached, and only next to the filter's signature: a third header, X-SelfPost-Filter, the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id under the key in /data/antispam/filter.key (inbound.FilterKey makes it on first start; rspamd reads it through the mounted directory and signs in a custom routine of milter_headers.conf). With the filter down - it is attached fail-open - a sender's own verdict headers carry no signature and the row is that of mail nobody judged. Refused mail never reaches this milter. Refusals come from mail.log: this listener logs as postfix/inbound (syslog_name), and the log tailer turns a reject: line of postfix/inbound/smtpd (Postfix's own policy) and a milter-reject / milter-hold / milter-discard line of cleanup (the filter's verdict, counted only for a queue id that listener opened) into a row, dated by the line, when the recipient is at an inbound domain (internal/logtail/inbound.go). A line names one recipient, so a message refused at end-of-message is one row whatever its recipient count. The tailer saves its place every five seconds, so after an unclean stop it reads some lines again; the lines it reads on start are written only if the same row is not there already. The journal is pruned every six hours: rows older than the inbound_spam_log_retention_days setting, then down to 10 000. Filter lists (inbound_spam_list): allow and deny entries for the external filter - sender address, sender domain, client address or network - validated and normalised by internal/inbound (lists.go) and written as six map files under /data/antispam/ (ANTISPAM_DIR), each atomically, on every change and on every start with the relay on. SelfPost never consults them. The sidecar mounts the directory and rspamd's multimap rules (deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf) read them: a deny entry is a prefilter reject, an allow entry a symbol weighing -100. Allow is deliberately not a prefilter accept: with two prefilters rspamd lets the one that ran first decide, and deny then won or lost by rule order (seen on rspamd 3.11). A refusal by the deny list overrides any score, so deny wins whichever entries match. How often an entry decided a message is not stored: Lists.Usage reads it off the journal on each view of Filter lists - the rows a list decided (the deny rule's reply, the allow rule's symbol, which the journal milter keeps ahead of its six-symbol cap) matched against the entries as rspamd matches them. When that stops being good enough is written in plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md § Filter list usage. Inbound relay (INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true): accepts only relay_domains + relay_recipient_maps (reject_unauth_destination, reject_unlisted_recipient). Maps under /data/postfix/ (relay_domains, transport, relay_recipients, tls_policy), written atomically by internal/postfix/inbound.go. Domains with an empty upstream host are omitted from the maps. Optional INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER only when inbound relay is enabled (not on DMARC-only port 25); default milter_default_action is fail-open (accept). DMARC ingest (DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true): allow-listed report addresses via check_recipient_access on postfix/dmarc_recipients; messages pipe to dmarc-ingest (symlink to panel). When both flags are on, one listener serves both paths; per-IP rate uses INBOUND_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP and message size uses the greater of INBOUND_MESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT and DMARC_MESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT.
• No open relay — permit_sasl_authenticated, reject_unauth_destination; smtpd_sender_login_maps + reject_sender_login_mismatch.
• Level-1 rate limit — smtpd_client_message_rate_limit / anvil_rate_time_unit from RATE_LIMIT_* env vars; independent of milter.
• Chroot disabled for all services (DNS/TLS inside container).
• TLS certs — read-only mount at TLS_CERT_FILE / TLS_KEY_FILE; daily reload via cert-reload.

OpenDKIM

Per-domain keys under /data/opendkim/keys; KeyTable / SigningTable maintained by the panel. Socket /run/opendkim/opendkim.sock.

The server's own name (SELFPOST_HOSTNAME) has a key and a line in both tables too, without being a row of the registry (domain.Service.SetServerName): the panel's notifications are sent as postmaster@ that name and signed with it. No application can use it as an envelope sender - the sender map is built from the registry - but the From: header is not held against the login, so an application can still have a message signed as the server (security.md § Accepted risks). A sending domain of the same name shares its key and selector with the server; deleting that domain leaves the server signed under the default selector, which is the same key only if that was the domain's. At its start the notifier makes sure the tables have the line and name the selector the panel shows (EnsureServerSigned): tables are otherwise rebuilt only when a domain is added or deleted.

Panel binary (cmd/panel)

One process, five roles (six with the inbound relay on):

1. HTTP server — :8080 (PANEL_HTTP_ADDR); HTTPS terminated by reverse proxy only. On start it runs postconf -h once for the deferred-mail retry parameters (queue_run_delay, minimal_backoff_time, maximal_backoff_time, maximal_queue_lifetime, bounce_queue_lifetime, delay_warning_time) and caches the snapshot on the handlers config. The Outbound queue box and a delivery's deferred / bounced history print those numbers; they never call postconf per request. If postconf is missing, the panel logs a warning and uses Postfix 3.x compiled-in defaults (300s / 4000s / 5d / 0) with a muted note on the box.
2. journal-milter — unix socket JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET; records From/To/ Subject/SASL user at DATA; enforces level-2 rate limits; fail-open (default_action=accept) so milter failure does not stop mail. Domain ceilings apply to every client IP; an application ceiling overrides the domain one for that login, higher or lower (guide § Rate limiting). Since 1.9.0 the client IP allow-list is a separate, restrictive control on the application (applications.auth_ip_restrict), checked here at MAIL FROM and fail-open like the rest of this milter — not an authentication boundary. The level-2 count is the stored send-log rows plus the messages this process has admitted but not yet written (internal/milter/inflight.go), so concurrent sessions cannot each spend the same last slot; a reservation is released at end-of-message, on ABORT, or after a 10-minute TTL.
3. log-tailer — follows MAIL_LOG, updates send-log delivery status by queue-id. Send-log queued → sent transitions depend on this goroutine alone (UpdateStatus is only called from internal/logtail). It also keeps the lines Postfix writes under a queue id, for the message's page (§ Log tailer, Stored lines).
4. rate-limit recalc — every six hours (and on demand from Domain settings and the application form), recomputes level-2 Auto rate limits from send-log statistics.
5. notifier — writes to the panel's users when something needs them (§ Notifications below).

Milter chain in Postfix: OpenDKIM (tempfail) then journal (accept on failure). Mail submitted locally with sendmail(1) — the notifier's — passes OpenDKIM alone (non_smtpd_milters): it is signed, and it is not an application's mail to be journalled or limited. Bounces Postfix generates pass no milter.

Notifications

internal/notify reports four things to the users of the panel: a sending domain's DNS record that stopped matching, a level-2 rate limit that refused mail, the TLS certificate about to expire, a message more than three days in the queue. The rules of when a message goes out are the owner's and are written in plans/panel-notifications.md § When a message is sent; the operator's view is guide § Notifications.

• Readings. Once an hour, starting three minutes after the process does: every sending domain's records through a DNS checker of the notifier's own, forced past the cache (cmd/panel/notifier.go builds the same query a domain's page does); the certificate file; postqueue -j for the arrival time of each queued message. Once a minute: the send log's rejected rows of the last day, through a partial index of their own.
• A refused row is not believed whole. Its domain is the one in MAIL FROM, which the client typed and Postfix has not yet held against the login when the milter refuses; the same status is written when an application is refused for its client address. So refusals are counted by the domain the login is registered under, only for logins that exist, and only while a level-2 limit is set on the login or its domain (Store.LimitRefusalsSince). One subject per sending domain, whichever of its applications are refused.
• State is a row per subject in notify_state (dns:<domain>, cert, queue, limit:<domain>), which is what makes each thing be said once and a restart say nothing again. A DNS subject goes pending on the first bad check and open, with a message, on a later one at least 45 minutes after it - a count alone would let the last check before a restart and the first after it stand for "an hour apart"; back the same way. The certificate's row remembers which threshold was said for which expiry. A deleted domain's row goes with it.
• Said means sent. A problem that arises while no user can be told, or while Postfix does not take the message, stays unsaid and is told at a later check. Its ending, with nobody left to tell, is simply over. If one recipient's copy fails and another's goes out, the subject is said.
• The notifier's own mail is not a subject. A notification waiting for a mailbox that does not answer, or its bounce coming back to postmaster@<hostname> - which receives no mail - is left out of the queue check.
• A ceiling of 60 messages an hour stands over all of it.
• No information is not a finding. A lookup that did not answer, a queue that cannot be listed, a certificate that cannot be read move no state.
• Recipients come from the store at the moment of sending: global users for everything, domain users for subjects that are a domain's; only users with an e-mail and their own switch on. One message per recipient, so users do not see each other's addresses.
• The instance switch (settings key notifications, on unless turned off) stops the checks themselves, not only the mail: no state moves while it is off.
• Sending is sendmail -i -f postmaster@<hostname> -- <address> as the unprivileged panel user, which is a member of postdrop and so can write the maildrop directory without the setgid bit no-new-privileges forbids. A message that could not be handed over leaves the state where it was and is tried at the next check. The text names the page to open and has no link: the panel does not know its own address.

Log tailer and mail.log rotation

mail.log lives at /data/log/mail.log — inside the persistent bind mount, so the delivery lines that resolve a queued send-log row are not lost when the container is recreated. postlogd writes it as user postfix; the panel reads it through the shared selfpost group (directory 2750 postfix:selfpost, file 0640, both normalised on every start by build/entrypoint.sh). The path is one default in two places, maillog_file in build/postfix-config.sh and MAIL_LOG in cmd/panel/main.go. Backups exclude log/: it is diagnostic output, not state to restore.

Rotation uses rename + postfix reload (build/logrotate-mail.conf), not copytruncate — the latter can drop status=sent lines and leave send-log rows stuck at queued. After rename, logrotate runs create 0640 postfix selfpost (postlogd recreates the file lazily on first write as mode 0600, which the unprivileged panel user cannot read). follow() drains the old inode once more before switching descriptors; the panel treats a missing log file as an empty tail, not an error.

Read offset is persisted (logtail_state table, in the baseline schema): the tailer stores its position plus a fingerprint of the log's first 512 bytes, and on start resumes from it, parsing the tail written while the panel was down. If the fingerprint no longer matches (rotated or recreated in the meantime) it reads the current file from the start; re-parsing lines is harmless because UpdateStatus writes the same status onto the same row. Only a first-ever start, with nothing stored, begins at end-of-file, so installing the panel does not replay a pre-existing log.

Queue reconcile is the backstop for what the log cannot explain at all: a row still queued more than two minutes after it was accepted, whose queue id postqueue -p no longer lists, is marked bounced (swept every five minutes, internal/logtail, postfix.QueueIDs). Postfix having dropped the message means nothing more will ever be reported about it, so the row can only be closed on an assumption, and it is closed as a failure because a delivery the panel cannot evidence must not be shown as one. Three things keep the sweep from guessing where it need not: it starts only after the tailer has read to end-of-file once (on a restart the log itself holds the answer), the two-minute grace covers messages merely in flight, and a postqueue that cannot be read leaves every row untouched rather than closing them all. Now that the log survives the container, reaching this path means the lines are gone for good — rotated past fourteen files while the panel was down, or deleted.

Stored lines (send_log_lines, since 2.2.0; internal/logtail/lines.go). A send-log row lives for the retention window, ninety days by default, and mail.log for a day before it is rotated; a message's page (/outbound/log/{id}) shows what Postfix wrote about it, so the tailer keeps those lines in the database as it reads them:

• What is kept: a line headed by a queue id — after the timestamp, the host name and program[pid]: — with that id, the line's own time and the line as written, cut to 4096 bytes. The id is read from the head of the line only: the tail is the far end's text. NOQUEUE and warning stand in the same place and are not ids; the pattern accepts Postfix's short form (capital hexadecimal) and its long form (no vowels).
• Port-25 mail is left out. A queue id opened by postfix/inbound/smtpd is a stranger's message and never gets a send-log row; none of its lines are stored, up to qmgr's removed or until another listener opens a message under the id (4096 such ids are remembered). What a stranger can make Postfix log is therefore not written to the database at his rate.
• No check for a row at write time. A message's first lines (client=, message-id=) are logged before the journal milter writes its row at end-of-message, so the tailer cannot ask whether the id is in the send log. Lines that never get a row — bounces Postfix generates, port-25 mail met in mid-flight after a restart — are kept for a while.
• Written per pass, not per line: the lines of one pass over the log go in one transaction (InsertSendLogLines), 500 at most, before the read offset is saved. A commit per line would be a disk sync per line on the connection the journal milter shares.
• Retention is one rule: a line older than an hour whose queue id no send-log row carries is deleted (PruneSendLogLines), at start and after every six-hourly send-log sweep. That removes the lines of rows the sweep deleted and the lines that never had a row. The send log is asked once per queue id; the statement still walks the table, about a second per million lines, with the connection taken meanwhile.
• Which lines are a row's. Postfix reuses a queue id once the message has left the queue, and a row outlives that by months. SendLogLines gives a row the lines of its queue id dated from one hour before the row was written to the queue lifetime (the larger of maximal_queue_lifetime and bounce_queue_lifetime) plus a day after it. That limits a chance reuse of the id to those days; it does not exclude it. A message with several recipients is several rows under one id, and each row's page shows all of the message's lines.
• Read twice, stored once. The read offset is saved every few seconds, so after an unclean stop some lines are read again; while the tailer is catching up at start it writes a line only if the same line is not there.
• Not stored: what the tailer never read — the tail of a file rotated away while the panel was down.
• Size: six to ten lines of about 200 bytes per message — more than the row itself. The table is in the database and therefore in a full backup, which log/ is not (security.md § Backup and domain export).

Two one-shot reads sit beside the follow loop and are unrelated to it, both serving panel pages on request: TailLines (the last n lines, for /server/log) and QueueLines (the lines carrying one queue-id). QueueLines is what a message's page falls back to when no lines are stored for its row — a message accepted before 2.2.0. It scans a bounded tail of the current file — finding a message's lines means reading rather than seeking — and matches the id anchored on the character before it, since queue ids are hexadecimal runs and a shorter one is regularly the tail of a longer one. For such a message an empty result is the expected end state once the log has rotated, and the page reports it as such, not as a failure.

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Panel HTTP surface

Canonical routes: internal/web/web.go. The router is two flat http.ServeMuxes built by muxes() — one pattern per route, method included (GET /outbound/log/{id}), nothing mounted as a sub-router, and building them only takes method values, so the route guard test can run it on a bare Server and ask which pattern answers a path:

• public — /healthz (liveness), /license (the embedded LICENSE), /static/, /setup/, /login, /logout;
• authenticated — everything else, behind RequireAuth: a request without a live session is redirected to /login.

Both sit inside secure(), which sets the security headers and runs the origin check on every state-changing request (see below).

Routes

A path reads like the menu: /<group>/<page>, an entity under its list, an action under the thing it changes. Every state change is a POST; a GET only reads (the delete confirmation at GET …/delete renders a form).

Group	Routes
Home	GET / → /overview, or for a user with the domain role to the first list they reach (/outbound/domains, or /inbound/domains when that is all)
Overview	GET /overview, GET /overview/fragment
Outbound › Domains	GET, POST /outbound/domains · /outbound/domains/{id} · POST …/dns-recheck · GET, POST …/delete · GET …/settings · POST …/settings/reports, …/ratelimit, …/ratelimit/recalc, …/export
Outbound › Applications	GET, POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/new · GET, POST …/applications/{aid} · POST …/applications/{aid}/password, …/{aid}/ratelimit/recalc, …/{aid}/delete
Outbound › Log, Queue	GET /outbound/log · /outbound/log/fragment · /outbound/log/{id} · GET /outbound/queue · /outbound/queue/fragment
Outbound › DMARC reports	GET /outbound/dmarc · …/dmarc/domains/{id} · …/dmarc/reports/{id} — registered only with DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true
Inbound › Domains	GET, POST /inbound/domains · /inbound/domains/{id} · POST …/dns-recheck, …/upstream, …/recipients · GET, POST …/delete — registered only with INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true
Server	GET /server/health (+ /fragment) · POST /server/health/recheck, /server/health/reload · GET /server/log (+ /fragment) · GET, POST /server/backup · POST /server/backup/import · /server/users, …/new, …/{uid}, …/{uid}/delete · GET, POST /server/settings · GET /server/components
Account	GET /account · POST /account/profile, /account/password
User menu	GET /help · POST /logout (public mux)

An application is addressed under its domain, and an application id that does not belong to the domain in the path is a 404. The application form is one POST: sender, client IPs and rate limit are validated and saved together or not at all, also at creation. The page that shows a new password is the response to the POST that created or regenerated it; it has no GET path and carries Cache-Control: no-store.

The pre-2.0 paths are not served and not redirected (/status, /domains/…, /inbound/{id}/…, /deliveries, /mail-queue, /system-log, /backup, /users/…, /settings, /reload, /dmarc/…, and /account as a redirect): each answers 404 once signed in. TestRoutesFollowNavigation (internal/web/guard_routes_test.go) holds the table: every path is registered with its methods, every menu entry points at a registered path, every old path answers 404, and no template contains an old path.

Who may open what

Authorization is by tree where the tree is the boundary, and by object where it is not.

• /server/ is guarded once. Routes under it are registered through server() in web.go, which wraps the handler in globalOnly (404 for anyone but the global role — the answer a missing page gets, so the panel does not confirm the page exists) and panics at start-up for a pattern outside /server/. The handlers also call requireGlobal() themselves.
• Overview and the Outbound queue are global-only but not under /server/, so their handlers call requireGlobal().
• Outbound is checked per domain. lookupDomain resolves {id} and answers 404 for a missing domain and for one the principal may not reach alike (handlers/handlers_domains.go); application routes go on to check the application belongs to that domain. Lists and the log are filtered by assignment in the query (ListDomainsForUser), not in the template. Adding and deleting a domain is requireGlobal().
• Inbound is checked per inbound domain, separately from outbound (handlers/handlers_inbound.go): requireInbound (the list), requireInboundDomain (one domain — page, upstream, recipients, DNS re-check) and requireInboundGlobal (add, delete). All three answer 404 alike.
• The DMARC hub is open to anyone with outbound reach for the reports of their own domains; the Ingest box (server-wide statistics) is rendered for the global role only.
• Account and Help are open to every signed-in user.
• The principal (web/auth/principal.go) carries the role, the assigned outbound and inbound domain ids and the two All flags; CanAccessDomain and CanAccessInboundDomain are the only predicates. The reach, not the role, decides which menu groups exist.

Routes marked global are tested per path for a user with the domain role, including another tenant's domain id (handlers/handlers_delegation_test.go, authz_test.go).

Polled fragments

A polled page answers its refresh at <page>/fragment (/overview/fragment, /outbound/log/fragment, /server/health/fragment, …). The fragment is the same {{define}} block that renders the page's own box, so the first paint and a refresh cannot differ. HTMX refreshes them every 5 s while the operator is active on the page, every 30 s when the tab is visible but idle, and not at all when it is hidden — scheduled in panel.js via data-poll, not hx-trigger="every …", because a trigger filter is evaluated with new Function, which the CSP forbids. Polling does not extend the session idle timeout (only non-HX-Request GETs and mutating requests count as activity). The Outbound queue's retry-policy box is outside the polled region: it is the start-up postconf -h snapshot (see Panel binary), not a live re-read.

View engine and component kit

Pages are rendered by internal/web/view. There is one layout and one way to render.

• One layout. Every page is parsed with layout.html (the shell: brick navbar with the wordmark, the perforated edge, the strip of sibling pages, user menu, footer) and components.html (the partials), then its own file. layout_signed_out is the same document without navigation, used for sign-in and setup; Engine.Render picks it when the page data names no user. The page's file defines content; pageFiles in view.go lists the files of each page, and fragments are listed in fragmentFiles and rendered by RenderFragment with no layout.
• Typed page data. A page's data is a struct that embeds Meta (title, user, the viewer's reach, the menu group and page it sits in) and carries the page's boxes and rows as fields, built by a constructor in the view package (NewOutDomain, NewHelp, …) that the handler fills. The shell is derived from Meta and the feature flags (SetInboundEnabled, SetDMARCEnabled) in one place, Engine.shell, so which entries the menu has is decided once. No template reads a map[string]any; the one map left in the handlers is the health sampler's, which is turned into a typed Health before rendering.
• The component kit. components.html holds one {{define}} per partial (page head, postmark, box and its head and foot, flash, health card, DNS record, facts, side menu, timeline, log pane, empty state, confirm list, help topic, form rows) and is the only file that writes their sp- markup. components.go is the typed input of each (Head, Box, Record, Fact, SideMenu, …), so a page passes a struct, never a dict. Template functions: status_tag (a status → Bulma's tag classes, once), wbr_at (a break after the @ in a table cell). A page that needs a component the kit lacks is a design change made in the mockups first (plans/panel-redesign.md § The contract).
• Help. help.go is the Help page's data: topics grouped by section of the panel. A box's head links to its topic with Box.Help (/help#<topic>), and the page lists only the sections the viewer's menu shows.
• Assets. static/ is embedded (//go:embed): vendored bulma.min.css and a Tabler icon subset (checksummed), panel.css (the mockups' stylesheet, rule for rule), htmx.min.js, panel.js, the IBM Plex subset and the logo files. Served with a content-derived ETag, and /static/ does not list its files. The kit page GET /server/components renders every partial in every state from fixtures (global role only).

Guard tests hold the design in place; they run in go test ./... and CI. They read their rules from the accepted mockups (docs/assets/panel-redesign/panel/) rather than keep a copy: TestPanelClassVocabulary (only the Bulma subset and the sp- classes of panel.css; every sp- class defined, used and shown on the components page), TestPanelCSSIsTheMockupStylesheet, TestPanelCSSContract (no !important, no id or page selector, type floor, widths), TestTemplatesUseComponents (no hand-written component markup in a page), TestPanelOutlinesMatchMockups and TestPanelPageStructure (each rendered page has the component skeleton of its mockup), TestRedesignedPagesLoadOnlyTheKit, TestVendoredAssetsArePinned, TestStaticHoldsOnlyTheKnownAssets, TestRoutesFollowNavigation, TestNoTemplateUsesInlineScriptOrStyle. The ratchet list internal/web/view/legacy_pages.txt is empty and can only shrink; the CI step design-first rejects a commit that changes a guard together with the code it judges, and a template that is a byte-for-byte return of one from history. The design contract and the process are in plans/panel-redesign.md § Enforcement.

Security headers, CSP and scripts

secure() (internal/web/security.go) puts these on every response: Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none', X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, and Strict-Transport-Security when the cookie is Secure. Because the policy has no exemptions, no template carries an inline <script>, an event-handler attribute or style="…" — the page's behaviour is htmx.min.js plus panel.js (copy and fill buttons, the data-confirm prompt on destructive forms, conditional field visibility, adaptive polling), both optional: every form works as a native HTML POST with scripts off. htmx is told not to inject its indicator stylesheet (htmx-config meta), which the CSP would otherwise have to allow.

State-changing requests (every non-GET/HEAD/OPTIONS) pass originAllowed first: Sec-Fetch-Site must say same-origin, or Origin must name the panel's host; a request with neither header is let through (an accepted risk). There are no CSRF tokens — see security.md.

Errors shown to users

A validation refusal is shown as the text the validator wrote (on the form, next to the field, or in a notice above the first box). Anything else — a database error, saslpasswd2, a Postfix reload — is logged and the page gets a fixed sentence saying so; the error text never reaches the browser. A template error renders a bare 500 rather than a half-written page (Engine.Render buffers).

Sessions

Stored in SQLite (sessions table of the baseline, 0001_init.sql): the cookie holds a random token; the database stores SHA-256 of the token, not the token itself — a stolen DB or backup archive does not alone grant login, but a browser that still holds the cookie works after process restart, redeploy, or full backup restore.

• A session belongs to a user by id (sessions.user_id, ON DELETE CASCADE). Deleting a user ends their sessions; renaming one keeps them; RequireAuth loads the user on every request, so a session whose user is gone is a redirect to /login.
• Idle timeout — sliding window, PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS (default 7); no absolute cap (regular use keeps the session alive indefinitely).
• Renewal — the DB expires_at and the cookie Max-Age update at most once per hour (renewThreshold in internal/web/auth/session.go).
• Password change on Account — deletes every other session of that user; the current one stays active (internal/store/sessions.go, handlers_account.go).
• A password set by a global user on the user form deletes all of that user's sessions (DestroyUserSessions); set for oneself, it keeps the current one (handlers_users.go, endSessionsAfterPasswordSet).

Restoring an older backup also restores session rows: a session removed after that backup was taken can become valid again if the browser still holds the cookie and the restored row's expires_at has not passed.

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Code layers

Multi-store writes that must land in more than one place (SQLite row, sasldb2 entry, Postfix map, OpenDKIM table) go through a service, which is also where the rollback of a partial failure lives. Handlers may call store directly for single-table reads and simple writes (sessions, users, send-log queries); the first-run setup-token file is read and written in web itself. The adapters below the services are the only code that knows about Postfix, OpenDKIM, DNS or the log file, which is what makes them substitutable in tests — milter.Store, app.SenderMaps and logtail.StatusStore are the seams the unit tests replace with fakes.

flowchart TB
  subgraph cmd ["cmd — composition root"]
    panel["panel: HTTP + journal-milter + log-tailer"]
    backupcli["selfpost-backup CLI"]
  end
  subgraph web ["internal/web — HTTP surface"]
    webRoot["web.go — router, security"]
    viewPkg["web/view — templates, static"]
    authPkg["web/auth — session, login, setup"]
    handlersPkg["web/handlers — authenticated pages"]
    webRoot --> viewPkg
    webRoot --> authPkg
    webRoot --> handlersPkg
    handlersPkg --> authPkg
    handlersPkg --> viewPkg
  end
  subgraph services ["Services — multi-store operations + rollback"]
    domainSvc["internal/domain"]
    appSvc["internal/app"]
    inboundSvc["internal/inbound"]
    dmarcSvc["internal/dmarc"]
  end
  subgraph persistence ["Persistence"]
    store["internal/store — SQLite, embedded schema"]
  end
  subgraph adapters ["Adapters — the only infrastructure-aware code"]
    postfix["internal/postfix"]
    milterPkg["internal/milter"]
    logtail["internal/logtail"]
    dnscheck["internal/dnscheck"]
    backupPkg["internal/backup"]
    health["internal/health"]
    secretfile["internal/secretfile"]
  end
  panel --> web
  panel --> milterPkg
  panel --> logtail
  backupcli --> backupPkg
  backupcli --> secretfile
  web --> store
  web --> domainSvc
  web --> appSvc
  web --> inboundSvc
  web --> dmarcSvc
  web --> backupPkg
  web --> dnscheck
  web --> health
  web --> secretfile
  domainSvc --> store
  appSvc --> store
  inboundSvc --> store
  dmarcSvc --> store
  milterPkg --> store
  logtail --> store
  domainSvc --> postfix
  appSvc --> postfix
  inboundSvc --> postfix
  dmarcSvc --> postfix

The four roles inside the panel process (HTTP server, journal-milter, log-tailer, rate-limit recalc) share one binary and one SQLite handle on purpose — see Panel binary for why, and Persistence below for the single-connection trade-off that follows from it.

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Persistence (/data bind mount)

Path	Contents
selfpost.db	SQLite panel state (users, sessions, domains, apps, send log, L2 limits, log-tailer offset, inbound relay, DMARC reports) — see Database and schema-migrations.md
setup-token	First-run setup token file
opendkim/	DKIM keys + tables
sasl/sasldb2	Application SASL credentials
postfix/sender_login_maps	Login → From binding
postfix/relay_domains	Inbound domains accepted on port 25
postfix/transport	Inbound next-hop smtp:[host]:port
postfix/relay_recipients	Inbound recipient allow-list or @domain catch-all
postfix/tls_policy	TLS policy for inbound next hops
postfix/dmarc_recipients	Allow-listed DMARC aggregate report addresses
postfix/dmarc_transport	Pipe transport for report ingest
postfix/dmarc_relay_domains	Domains accepted for DMARC report delivery
postfix/queue/	Postfix transit mail (deferred/active); survives container recreate
log/mail.log	Postfix delivery log + rotated copies (excluded from backups)
manifest.json	Backup version stamp (consumed on restore)

Not in /data: TLS certificates for the panel (reverse-proxy mount) — though full backups also archive the operator's ./certs PEM files when present.

Database

The schema is an embedded baseline, internal/store/migrations/0001_init.sql, and the migrations after it (0002_inbound_spam_log.sql), applied by store.Open in file order; PRAGMA user_version counts the files applied and PRAGMA application_id is 0x53503230 ("SP20"). There is no 1.x migration chain. 2.0 starts from an empty data directory: a database with a schema version but without the 2.x application_id — what every 1.x file looks like — is refused at start with ErrForeignSchema and left untouched, as is one whose version is newer than the build knows. A restored 1.x backup fails the same way. Domains are carried across with a domain export, whose format is not the database. A schema change is a new file; the baseline has not been edited since 2.0.0. History and the per-table list: schema-migrations.md.

The tables that carry the panel's model:

• users — role is global or domain (a reach, not a rank); email is the user's own address, edited on Account and set by the global role on the user form; all_domains / all_inbound_domains widen a domain user to every domain of that direction, including ones added later (with a flag set the assignment rows are ignored).
• user_domains and user_inbound_domains — the outbound and inbound domains assigned to a domain user. Separate tables: the same name on both is two assignments, and a sending domain gives no inbound access or the other way round.
• sessions — token_hash, user_id (ON DELETE CASCADE), expires_at. Keyed by user id, not by name.
• domains — dmarc_rua is the whole of a domain's report-address choice: '' is no reports (a new domain), the address SelfPost derives for the domain and the server's hostname is the hosted choice, anything else is an address typed for the domain. Nothing refers to a user, and deleting one changes no domain.
• settings — key/value, what holds for the instance whoever is signed in (send-log retention). Nothing that belongs to a user.
• applications (with auth_ip_restrict / auth_allowed_ips), application_addresses, rate_limits (no allowed_ips column), send_log, send_log_lines (what Postfix logged under a queue id — § Log tailer), logtail_state, inbound_domains, inbound_transports, inbound_recipients, dmarc_reports, dmarc_report_records.

The panel is the only writer; SQLite runs in WAL mode on one connection (see Panel binary), which is why a full backup snapshots with VACUUM INTO instead of copying the file.

Rotation: send-log retention SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90), which the stored log lines follow; mail.log via logrotate (14 rotated files, check every 6h, rename + postfix reload in postrotate — see § Log tailer above).

Restore: panel button or selfpost-backup CLI — self-contained archive: data/ (SQLite snapshot + tree minus log/, the setup token and any tls/ under /data), docker-compose.yml, .env, and certs/ when present; version check on restore. Requires the project directory mounted read-only at SELFPOST_DEPLOY_ROOT (/selfpost-deploy in the default compose file). On the first successful boot after restore, the panel runs one Resync — OpenDKIM's tables, Postfix's sender map, inbound relay maps (when INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true), and DMARC maps (when DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true) are re-derived from SQLite and both daemons are reloaded, so drift between the extracted archive and the database is healed before mail flows. Manual POST /server/health/reload (the Reload configuration button on Server › Health) resyncs OpenDKIM, the sender map, and inbound maps only — not DMARC maps. Stopped-container tar of ./data alone remains possible for state-only copies (see guide).

Optional encryption of the two secret-bearing downloads (internal/secretfile): password → scrypt → AES-256-GCM over 64 KiB chunks, each authenticated with the header, its counter and an end-of-stream flag (so truncation and reordering fail to open). Full backup .tar.gz → .spbk (SelfPost backup), domain export .json → .spde (SelfPost domain export). In the panel the Encrypt with a password box is ticked by default on both downloads and the plain form is what an unticked box gives; the selfpost-backup CLI stays plain unless it is given a password. Domain import detects the envelope by magic bytes; an encrypted full backup is converted back with selfpost-backup -decrypt before restore.

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Security (summary)

Mandatory checklist: security.md. Accepted trade-offs (CSRF origin check, no CSRF tokens) are documented there separately.

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Configuration

Public env vars: guide § Environment variables. Regression test: cmd/panel/envdoc_test.go.

Internal env vars. The following are read by the panel or startup scripts but are not part of the operator interface — not meant to be changed in a normal deployment; documented here so an accidental override reads as unsupported rather than as a missing doc:

• Panel paths and tuning: SELFPOST_DATA_DIR (/data), SELFPOST_DB_PATH (/data/selfpost.db), SELFPOST_SETUP_TOKEN_FILE (/data/setup-token), PANEL_HTTP_ADDR (:8080), JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET (/run/selfpost/journal.sock), MAIL_LOG (/data/log/mail.log — read by the panel and written by Postfix, so a change here has to be matched in build/postfix-config.sh), PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE (true), OPENDKIM_SOCKET (/run/opendkim/opendkim.sock), OPENDKIM_DIR (/data/opendkim), DKIM_SELECTOR_DEFAULT (selfpost), SASL_DB_PATH (/data/sasl/sasldb2), SASL_REALM (defaults to SELFPOST_HOSTNAME), POSTFIX_DIR (/data/postfix), POSTFIX_SENDER_LOGIN_MAPS (/data/postfix/sender_login_maps — read by Postfix config only; the panel always writes <POSTFIX_DIR>/sender_login_maps, so overriding this env alone desyncs the map Postfix reads from the file the panel maintains), POSTFIX_RELAY_DOMAINS (/data/postfix/relay_domains), POSTFIX_TRANSPORT_MAPS (/data/postfix/transport), POSTFIX_RELAY_RECIPIENTS (/data/postfix/relay_recipients), POSTFIX_TLS_POLICY_MAPS (/data/postfix/tls_policy) — same desync if overridden without matching the panel writer in internal/postfix/inbound.go, POSTFIX_DMARC_RECIPIENTS (/data/postfix/dmarc_recipients), POSTFIX_DMARC_TRANSPORT (/data/postfix/dmarc_transport), POSTFIX_DMARC_RELAY_DOMAINS (/data/postfix/dmarc_relay_domains), POSTFIX_QUEUE_DIR (/data/postfix/queue — set in build/postfix-config.sh), SELFPOST_DEPLOY_ROOT (/selfpost-deploy — operator project directory for full backups; mount .:/selfpost-deploy:ro in compose).
• Milter and Postfix startup: MILTER_CONNECT_TIMEOUT (15s), MILTER_COMMAND_TIMEOUT (15s), MILTER_CONTENT_TIMEOUT (30s), MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT (30 seconds).
• Background maintenance: TLS_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS (86400 — daily postfix reload to pick up renewed certificates), LOGROTATE_INTERVAL_SECONDS (21600 — check mail.log rotation every six hours; logrotate keeps 14 rotated files on a daily schedule, and each rotation triggers postfix reload).