Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/ratelimit.go
T
mix 7ef7f75246 release: 1.9.2: Review pass: port-25 milters, DMARC validation, rate-limit fix
Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump.
Added:
  - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` —
  - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML
  - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration
Changed:
  - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the
Fixed:
  - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other
  - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now
  - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of
  - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was
  - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second
  … (11 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code
  - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character
  - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived
  - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through
  - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and
  … (7 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs
  - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`,

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2).
2026-09-22 15:24:53 +03:00

136 lines
3.4 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"sync"
"time"
)
const defaultMaxBuckets = 4096
// blockedBucketCeiling is how far past maxBuckets the map may grow while every
// bucket in it is blocked. Blocked buckets are normally protected from
// eviction (see evictNearest), but protecting them unconditionally would let
// an attacker with many source addresses grow the map without bound — each
// address only has to fail max times. Past the ceiling blocked buckets are
// evicted too, nearest expiry first: bounded memory wins over holding every
// block, and the addresses that lose their bucket have to spend max attempts
// again to get back to blocked.
const blockedBucketCeiling = 4
// rateLimiter is a simple fixed-window per-key counter used to throttle the
// setup and login routes (security.md). Keys are client IPs.
type rateLimiter struct {
max int
window time.Duration
maxBuckets int
mu sync.Mutex
buckets map[string]*rlBucket
lastOverflow time.Time
}
type rlBucket struct {
count int
windowEnds time.Time
}
func newRateLimiter(max int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
return &rateLimiter{
max: max,
window: window,
maxBuckets: defaultMaxBuckets,
buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) startSweeper() {
go func() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(r.window)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
r.mu.Lock()
r.sweep(time.Now())
r.mu.Unlock()
}
}()
}
func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
now := time.Now()
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
b := r.buckets[key]
if b == nil || now.After(b.windowEnds) {
r.makeRoom(now)
r.buckets[key] = &rlBucket{count: 1, windowEnds: now.Add(r.window)}
r.sweep(now)
return true
}
if b.count >= r.max {
return false
}
b.count++
return true
}
func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
return
}
r.sweep(now)
hardCap := r.maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
for len(r.buckets) >= r.maxBuckets {
if r.evictNearest(false) {
continue
}
// Nothing evictable is left: every remaining bucket is blocked. Hold
// them until the map reaches the hard ceiling, then start evicting
// blocked buckets as well so memory stays bounded.
if len(r.buckets) < hardCap {
break
}
if !r.evictNearest(true) {
break
}
if now.Sub(r.lastOverflow) >= r.window {
r.lastOverflow = now
logf("panel: login rate limiter holds %d blocked buckets (cap %d) — evicting blocked entries; "+
"this means many distinct client addresses are failing authentication", len(r.buckets), r.maxBuckets)
}
}
}
// evictNearest removes the bucket whose window ends soonest and reports whether
// it removed one. Blocked buckets (count >= max) are skipped unless evictBlocked
// is set, so an attacker cannot flush active rate-limit state by filling the map
// with new keys.
func (r *rateLimiter) evictNearest(evictBlocked bool) bool {
var bestKey string
var bestEnds time.Time
first := true
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if !evictBlocked && b.count >= r.max {
continue
}
if first || b.windowEnds.Before(bestEnds) {
bestKey = k
bestEnds = b.windowEnds
first = false
}
}
if bestKey == "" {
return false
}
delete(r.buckets, bestKey)
return true
}
func (r *rateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if now.After(b.windowEnds) {
delete(r.buckets, k)
}
}
}