a7a5ad3f91
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10). internal/domain: - Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation. - KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile: with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4). - Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid. - Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries. Infra: - Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim (reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design. - opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s). - entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership, setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing after a restore. - supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel can request the reload. web/store: - Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2 labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2). - Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12, OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5). - Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard patterns. Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering + injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain, DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and tables persist across a restart). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
128 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
// Package web implements the SelfPost control panel's HTTP surface: the
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// one-time administrator setup flow (spec 7.6.1), login/session handling
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// (spec 7.6.5-6) and the authenticated shell the later phases build on.
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package web
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import (
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"embed"
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"log"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/domain"
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"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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//go:embed templates/*.html static/*
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var assetsFS embed.FS
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// Config holds the panel's HTTP-facing configuration.
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type Config struct {
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// Hostname is the server's external hostname, used to build the absolute
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// setup link shown in the logs (spec 7.6.1, 8: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME).
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Hostname string
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// CookieSecure sets the Secure attribute on the session cookie. It defaults
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// to true (spec 7.6.6); it exists as a knob only so the panel can be tested
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// over plain HTTP in development, never for production.
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CookieSecure bool
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}
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// Server is the panel HTTP application.
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type Server struct {
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store *store.Store
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domains *domain.Service
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cfg Config
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tmpl *templates
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sessions *sessionStore
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setup *setupManager
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loginLimiter *rateLimiter
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setupLimiter *rateLimiter
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}
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// New builds the panel server. setupTokenPath is where the current setup token
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// is mirrored on disk (spec 7.6.1); domains is the sending-domain service that
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// owns DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables (spec 6).
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func New(st *store.Store, domains *domain.Service, cfg Config, setupTokenPath string) (*Server, error) {
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tmpl, err := loadTemplates()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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s := &Server{
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store: st,
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domains: domains,
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cfg: cfg,
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tmpl: tmpl,
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sessions: newSessionStore(),
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// Setup: a handful of attempts per minute per IP is plenty for a
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// legitimate admin and blunts automated probing (spec 7.6.1).
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setupLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, time.Minute),
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// Login: throttle brute-force by IP (spec 7.6.5).
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loginLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
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}
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s.setup = newSetupManager(st, cfg.Hostname, setupTokenPath)
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return s, nil
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}
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// Start performs first-run bootstrapping: if there is no administrator yet, it
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// generates and announces the setup link (spec 7.6.1). Safe to call once at
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// server startup.
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func (s *Server) Start() error {
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return s.setup.bootstrap()
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}
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// Handler returns the panel's HTTP handler (router).
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func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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// Health check stays unauthenticated for the container/orchestrator.
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mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", handleHealth)
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// Vendored static assets (HTMX). Served from the embedded FS.
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mux.Handle("/static/", http.FileServer(http.FS(assetsFS)))
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// One-time administrator setup (spec 7.6.1).
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mux.HandleFunc("/setup/", s.handleSetup)
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// Authentication.
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mux.HandleFunc("/login", s.handleLogin)
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mux.HandleFunc("/logout", s.handleLogout)
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// Authenticated panel. Everything not matched by a more specific pattern
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// above falls through to this sub-mux, wrapped once in the auth middleware.
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authed := http.NewServeMux()
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", s.handleDashboard)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains", s.handleAddDomain)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains/{id}", s.handleDomainDetail)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains/{id}/delete", s.handleDeleteConfirm)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/delete", s.handleDeleteDomain)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /reload", s.handleReload)
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mux.Handle("/", s.requireAuth(authed))
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return mux
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}
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func handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
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}
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// clientIP extracts the peer IP for rate-limiting. It uses the transport peer
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// (RemoteAddr), not client-supplied headers, so it cannot be spoofed; behind a
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// reverse proxy this is the proxy address, which is an acceptable backstop for
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// a single-admin panel.
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func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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return host
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}
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// logf is a thin wrapper so handlers log with a consistent prefix.
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func logf(format string, args ...any) {
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log.Printf(format, args...)
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}
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