Files
selfpost/internal/milter/milter_test.go
T
mix a92d583053 feat: log-tailer offset persistence + in-flight L2 rate-limit accounting (code-review.md § Phase 3)
- logtail: persist the read position (offset + fingerprint of the log's
  first 512 bytes) in a new logtail_state table (migration 0003) and
  resume from it on start, so delivery lines written while the panel was
  down are parsed instead of skipped and their send-log rows no longer
  stay "queued" forever. Fingerprint mismatch (rotated/recreated while
  down) reads the file from the start — re-parsing is idempotent; a
  first-ever start with nothing stored still begins at end-of-file.
  Writes are throttled to one per 5s, forced on rotation and shutdown.

- milter: count messages that passed the level-2 check but have not
  reached the send log yet (internal/milter/inflight.go), so concurrent
  SMTP sessions cannot each spend the same last slot. A literal
  count+insert transaction, as the review suggested, is not possible:
  the count happens at MAIL FROM and the insert at end-of-message.
  Reservations are released after the insert, on ABORT, and after a
  10-minute TTL — a client that drops mid-transaction must not be able
  to hold a slot, since the limiter is fail-open by design.

Docs: architecture.md (log tailer, persistence, L2 counting),
security.md and roadmap.md (restart gap closed, container recreate
remains), CHANGELOG, progress.md, code-review.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 17:12:37 +03:00

471 lines
16 KiB
Go

package milter
import (
"errors"
"net"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/emersion/go-milter"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// fakeRecorder captures inserts and can be made to fail, to prove the milter
// swallows recorder errors and still accepts the message. By default it reports
// no configured rate limit, so the level-2 check is inert unless a test sets
// limits (see fakeRecorder fields).
type fakeRecorder struct {
entries []store.SendLogEntry
rejected []store.SendLogEntry
fail bool
// limits, keyed by "scope|ref", drive the level-2 rate-limit tests. counts
// gives the recent-message count returned for a "scope|ref". lookupErr and
// countErr force the store errors that must fail open.
limits map[string]store.RateLimit
counts map[string]int64
lookupErr error
countErr error
}
func (f *fakeRecorder) InsertQueued(e store.SendLogEntry) error {
if f.fail {
return errors.New("boom")
}
f.entries = append(f.entries, e)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeRecorder) InsertRejected(e store.SendLogEntry) error {
f.rejected = append(f.rejected, e)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeRecorder) RateLimit(scope, ref string) (store.RateLimit, bool, error) {
if f.lookupErr != nil {
return store.RateLimit{}, false, f.lookupErr
}
rl, ok := f.limits[scope+"|"+ref]
return rl, ok, nil
}
func (f *fakeRecorder) CountMessages(scope, ref string, _ time.Time) (int64, error) {
if f.countErr != nil {
return 0, f.countErr
}
return f.counts[scope+"|"+ref], nil
}
func mods(kv map[string]string) *milter.Modifier {
return &milter.Modifier{Macros: kv}
}
// drive replays a typical message through one session and returns the recorder.
func drive(t *testing.T, rec Store) *session {
t.Helper()
s := &session{rec: rec}
if _, err := s.Connect("localhost", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP("203.0.113.7"), mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err)
}
if _, err := s.MailFrom("noreply@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"})); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err)
}
if _, err := s.RcptTo("<a@example.net>", mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RcptTo: %v", err)
}
if _, err := s.RcptTo("b@example.net", mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RcptTo: %v", err)
}
if _, err := s.Header("Subject", "Hello there", mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Header: %v", err)
}
if _, err := s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "ABC123"})); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Body: %v", err)
}
return s
}
func TestSessionRecordsRowPerRecipient(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{}
s := drive(t, rec)
if s.clientIP != "203.0.113.7" {
t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.7", s.clientIP)
}
if len(rec.entries) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 entries, got %d: %+v", len(rec.entries), rec.entries)
}
got := rec.entries[0]
want := store.SendLogEntry{
QueueID: "ABC123",
Domain: "example.com",
AppLogin: "app1",
From: "noreply@example.com",
To: "a@example.net", // angle brackets stripped
Subject: "Hello there",
}
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("entry[0]\n got %+v\nwant %+v", got, want)
}
if rec.entries[1].To != "b@example.net" {
t.Fatalf("entry[1].To = %q", rec.entries[1].To)
}
}
// A subject in any non-ASCII alphabet reaches the milter as RFC 2047
// encoded-words; the journal stores the text, not the encoding.
func TestHeaderDecodesEncodedSubject(t *testing.T) {
long := strings.Repeat("я", subjectMaxRunes+10)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, raw, want string
}{
{"plain", "Hello there", "Hello there"},
{"utf8 q", "=?utf-8?Q?=D0=9F=D1=80=D0=BE=D0=B2=D0=B5=D1=80=D0=BA=D0=B0?=", "Проверка"},
{"utf8 b, folded across two words", "=?utf-8?B?0J/RgNC40LLQtdGC?=\r\n =?utf-8?B?INC80LjRgA==?=", "Привет мир"},
// No decoder for the legacy single-byte charsets: keep the header as
// sent rather than losing the subject entirely.
{"unknown charset", "=?windows-1251?B?z/Do4uXy?=", "=?windows-1251?B?z/Do4uXy?="},
{"too long", long, strings.Repeat("я", subjectMaxRunes) + "…"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := &session{rec: &fakeRecorder{}}
if _, err := s.Header("Subject", tc.raw, mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Header: %v", err)
}
if s.subject != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("subject = %q, want %q", s.subject, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestBodyAcceptsEvenWhenRecorderFails(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{fail: true}
s := &session{rec: rec}
_, _ = s.MailFrom("x@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"}))
_, _ = s.RcptTo("y@example.net", mods(nil))
resp, err := s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q9"}))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Body returned error, must fail open: %v", err)
}
if resp != milter.RespAccept {
t.Fatalf("Body response = %v, want Accept", resp)
}
}
// A single connection may carry several messages; the second must not inherit
// the first's recipients or subject.
func TestSessionResetsBetweenMessages(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{}
s := &session{rec: rec}
_, _ = s.MailFrom("a@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"}))
_, _ = s.RcptTo("one@example.net", mods(nil))
_, _ = s.Header("Subject", "first", mods(nil))
_, _ = s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q1"}))
_, _ = s.MailFrom("b@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app2"}))
_, _ = s.RcptTo("two@example.net", mods(nil))
_, _ = s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q2"}))
if len(rec.entries) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("want 2 entries, got %d", len(rec.entries))
}
second := rec.entries[1]
if second.QueueID != "Q2" || second.To != "two@example.net" || second.Subject != "" || second.AppLogin != "app2" {
t.Fatalf("second message leaked state: %+v", second)
}
}
// Postfix sends multi-character macro names wrapped in braces ({auth_authen},
// {i} for some versions), so the milter must resolve those too — this is the
// case the SASL-less spike missed and that produced empty app_login at first.
func TestBracedMacros(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{}
s := &session{rec: rec}
_, _ = s.MailFrom("app@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"{auth_authen}": "app1"}))
_, _ = s.RcptTo("to@example.net", mods(nil))
_, _ = s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"{i}": "QBRACE"}))
if len(rec.entries) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want 1 entry, got %d", len(rec.entries))
}
e := rec.entries[0]
if e.AppLogin != "app1" {
t.Fatalf("AppLogin = %q, want app1 (braced {auth_authen} not resolved)", e.AppLogin)
}
if e.QueueID != "QBRACE" {
t.Fatalf("QueueID = %q, want QBRACE (braced {i} not resolved)", e.QueueID)
}
}
// limitAt is the client IP the rate-limit tests connect from; the limits below
// register it so the differentiated check applies.
const limitIP = "203.0.113.7"
func activeLimit(ips ...string) store.RateLimit {
return store.RateLimit{AllowedIPs: ips, MaxMessages: 5, WindowSeconds: 3600}
}
// mailFrom drives just the connect + MAIL FROM stages and returns the response,
// which is where the level-2 limit is enforced.
func mailFrom(t *testing.T, rec Store, ip, from, login string) milter.Response {
t.Helper()
s := &session{rec: rec}
if _, err := s.Connect("h", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP(ip), mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err)
}
resp, err := s.MailFrom(from, mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": login}))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err)
}
return resp
}
func TestRateLimitRefusesWhenDomainOverLimit(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 5}, // == max
}
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail {
t.Fatalf("over-limit MAIL FROM = %v, want TempFail (4xx)", resp)
}
if len(rec.rejected) != 1 || rec.rejected[0].Domain != "example.com" {
t.Fatalf("want one rejected send-log row for example.com, got %+v", rec.rejected)
}
}
func TestRateLimitRefusesWhenAppOverLimit(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": 9}, // over max
}
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail {
t.Fatalf("over app limit = %v, want TempFail", resp)
}
}
func TestRateLimitAllowsUnderLimit(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 4}, // < max
}
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("under limit = %v, want Continue", resp)
}
if len(rec.rejected) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("under limit must not record a rejection: %+v", rec.rejected)
}
}
func TestRateLimitIgnoresUnregisteredIP(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit("198.51.100.1"), // not limitIP
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 999},
}
// The sender's IP is not in the domain's registered set, so level-2 does not
// apply even though the count is huge (level-1 anvil would still cover it).
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("unregistered IP = %v, want Continue (level-2 n/a)", resp)
}
}
func TestRateLimitInactiveWithoutCeiling(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
// IP registered but no ceiling/window: an inert draft, must not enforce.
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": {AllowedIPs: []string{limitIP}},
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 999},
}
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("inactive limit = %v, want Continue", resp)
}
}
func TestRateLimitFailsOpenOnLookupError(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{lookupErr: errors.New("db down")}
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("lookup error = %v, want Continue (fail-open)", resp)
}
}
func TestRateLimitFailsOpenOnCountError(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
countErr: errors.New("db down"),
}
if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("count error = %v, want Continue (fail-open)", resp)
}
}
func TestRateLimitNoIPKeyDoesNotApply(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 999},
}
// A session with no client IP (e.g. local submission) cannot be keyed.
s := &session{rec: rec}
resp, err := s.MailFrom("a@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"}))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err)
}
if resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("no-IP session = %v, want Continue", resp)
}
}
// mailFromIn is mailFrom with an explicit shared in-flight registry, so a test
// can play several concurrent SMTP sessions of one process against each other.
func mailFromIn(t *testing.T, rec Store, fl *inflight, ip, from, login string) (*session, milter.Response) {
t.Helper()
s := &session{rec: rec, flight: fl}
if _, err := s.Connect("h", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP(ip), mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err)
}
resp, err := s.MailFrom(from, mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": login}))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err)
}
return s, resp
}
func limitedRecorder(count int64) *fakeRecorder {
return &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": count},
}
}
// Messages between MAIL FROM and end-of-message are not in the send log yet, so
// counting the stored rows alone lets concurrent sessions each pass the same
// check and overshoot the ceiling. The last free slot may only be taken once.
func TestRateLimitCountsInFlightMessages(t *testing.T) {
rec := limitedRecorder(4) // one below the ceiling of 5
fl := &inflight{}
if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("first message = %v, want Continue (4/5 stored)", resp)
}
// Same window, nothing written yet: the first message holds the fifth slot.
if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "b@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail {
t.Fatalf("concurrent message = %v, want TempFail (would overshoot)", resp)
}
if len(rec.rejected) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("want one rejected send-log row, got %+v", rec.rejected)
}
}
// Once the message is recorded the stored count sees it, so its reservation
// must be given back — otherwise it would be counted twice and the ceiling
// would drift closed.
func TestReservationReleasedAtEndOfMessage(t *testing.T) {
rec := limitedRecorder(4)
fl := &inflight{}
s, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1")
if resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("first message = %v, want Continue", resp)
}
if _, err := s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q1"})); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Body: %v", err)
}
if n := fl.count(store.RateLimitScopeDomain+"|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("in-flight count after EOM = %d, want 0", n)
}
}
// A transaction the client abandons (RSET, or a Postfix-side rejection) never
// reaches the send log, so its slot must not stay claimed.
func TestReservationReleasedOnAbort(t *testing.T) {
rec := limitedRecorder(4)
fl := &inflight{}
s, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1")
if resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("first message = %v, want Continue", resp)
}
if err := s.Abort(mods(nil)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Abort: %v", err)
}
if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "b@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue {
t.Fatalf("after abort = %v, want Continue (slot released)", resp)
}
}
// A refused message must not leave the slots it claimed for the limits checked
// before the one that tripped, or every refusal would tighten the ceiling.
func TestRefusalReleasesEarlierReservation(t *testing.T) {
rec := &fakeRecorder{
limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP),
store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": activeLimit(limitIP),
},
counts: map[string]int64{
store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 0, // domain: plenty of room
store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": 5, // app: at the ceiling
},
}
fl := &inflight{}
if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail {
t.Fatalf("app over limit = %v, want TempFail", resp)
}
if n := fl.count(store.RateLimitScopeDomain+"|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("domain reservation left behind after refusal: %d", n)
}
}
// The in-flight count only covers the limit's own window: a reservation older
// than it (a session stuck mid-DATA for longer than the window) must not be
// counted against a window it no longer belongs to.
func TestInflightIgnoresReservationsOutsideWindow(t *testing.T) {
fl := &inflight{}
r := fl.reserve("domain|example.com")
r.at = time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)
if n := fl.count("domain|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("count inside window = %d, want 1", n)
}
if n := fl.count("domain|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Second)); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("count outside window = %d, want 0", n)
}
// Past the TTL the reservation is dropped even for a wide window, so a
// client that vanished after MAIL FROM cannot hold a slot forever.
r.at = time.Now().Add(-2 * reservationTTL)
if n := fl.count("domain|example.com", time.Now().Add(-3*reservationTTL)); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expired reservation still counted: %d", n)
}
}
func TestDomainOf(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"user@Example.COM": "example.com",
"no-domain": "",
"": "",
"a@b@c.com": "c.com",
}
for in, want := range cases {
if got := domainOf(in); got != want {
t.Fatalf("domainOf(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
}