mixandClaude Opus 5
ab2cd885c4
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced. - bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere. - rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover both halves. - postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now capped at 4 MiB and report truncation. - spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked. - schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10, and three links pointed at deleted plan files. - internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set. - dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them). - plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the open CSRF-token question. Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
29 lines
1.1 KiB
Go
29 lines
1.1 KiB
Go
// Package configsafe holds the defence-in-depth check that every generated
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// configuration file shares: a value about to be written into a table line must
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// be non-empty and must not carry a character that could end the field, end the
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// line, or otherwise change what the file means (security.md).
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//
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// The forbidden set stays with the caller rather than living here, because what
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// breaks a line differs per format — a comma separates values in a Postfix map,
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// a colon separates fields in an OpenDKIM table — and the set belongs next to
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// the writer it protects, where a reviewer of that writer can see it.
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package configsafe
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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)
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// Token reports whether value is safe to interpolate into a config line. what
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// names the field for the error message ("domain", "login", …) and forbidden
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// lists the characters the format cannot carry.
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func Token(what, value, forbidden string) error {
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if value == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("empty %s", what)
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}
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if strings.ContainsAny(value, forbidden) {
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return fmt.Errorf("unsafe character in %s %q", what, value)
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}
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return nil
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}
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