test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced. - bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere. - rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover both halves. - postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now capped at 4 MiB and report truncation. - spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked. - schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10, and three links pointed at deleted plan files. - internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set. - dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them). - plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the open CSRF-token question. Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
136 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
136 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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const defaultMaxBuckets = 4096
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// blockedBucketCeiling is how far past maxBuckets the map may grow while every
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// bucket in it is blocked. Blocked buckets are normally protected from
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// eviction (see evictNearest), but protecting them unconditionally would let
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// an attacker with many source addresses grow the map without bound — each
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// address only has to fail max times. Past the ceiling blocked buckets are
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// evicted too, nearest expiry first: bounded memory wins over holding every
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// block, and the addresses that lose their bucket have to spend max attempts
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// again to get back to blocked.
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const blockedBucketCeiling = 4
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// rateLimiter is a simple fixed-window per-key counter used to throttle the
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// setup and login routes (security.md). Keys are client IPs.
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type rateLimiter struct {
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max int
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window time.Duration
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maxBuckets int
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mu sync.Mutex
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buckets map[string]*rlBucket
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lastOverflow time.Time
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}
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type rlBucket struct {
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count int
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windowEnds time.Time
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}
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func newRateLimiter(max int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
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return &rateLimiter{
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max: max,
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window: window,
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maxBuckets: defaultMaxBuckets,
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buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
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}
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) startSweeper() {
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go func() {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(r.window)
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defer ticker.Stop()
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for range ticker.C {
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r.mu.Lock()
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r.sweep(time.Now())
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r.mu.Unlock()
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}
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}()
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
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now := time.Now()
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r.mu.Lock()
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defer r.mu.Unlock()
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b := r.buckets[key]
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if b == nil || now.After(b.windowEnds) {
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r.makeRoom(now)
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r.buckets[key] = &rlBucket{count: 1, windowEnds: now.Add(r.window)}
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r.sweep(now)
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return true
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}
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if b.count >= r.max {
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return false
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}
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b.count++
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return true
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
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if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
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return
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}
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r.sweep(now)
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hardCap := r.maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
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for len(r.buckets) >= r.maxBuckets {
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if r.evictNearest(false) {
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continue
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}
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// Nothing evictable is left: every remaining bucket is blocked. Hold
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// them until the map reaches the hard ceiling, then start evicting
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// blocked buckets as well so memory stays bounded.
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if len(r.buckets) < hardCap {
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break
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}
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if !r.evictNearest(true) {
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break
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}
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if now.Sub(r.lastOverflow) >= r.window {
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r.lastOverflow = now
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logf("panel: login rate limiter holds %d blocked buckets (cap %d) — evicting blocked entries; "+
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"this means many distinct client addresses are failing authentication", len(r.buckets), r.maxBuckets)
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}
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}
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}
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// evictNearest removes the bucket whose window ends soonest and reports whether
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// it removed one. Blocked buckets (count >= max) are skipped unless evictBlocked
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// is set, so an attacker cannot flush active rate-limit state by filling the map
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// with new keys.
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func (r *rateLimiter) evictNearest(evictBlocked bool) bool {
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var bestKey string
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var bestEnds time.Time
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first := true
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for k, b := range r.buckets {
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if !evictBlocked && b.count >= r.max {
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continue
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}
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if first || b.windowEnds.Before(bestEnds) {
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bestKey = k
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bestEnds = b.windowEnds
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first = false
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}
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}
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if bestKey == "" {
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return false
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}
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delete(r.buckets, bestKey)
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return true
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
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for k, b := range r.buckets {
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if now.After(b.windowEnds) {
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delete(r.buckets, k)
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}
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}
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}
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