Files
selfpost/internal/web/validate.go
T
mix 8ce050ef7f release: 0.1.0: Phases 0-11: panel, Postfix/DKIM, milter, backup, Docker image
Initial feature-complete implementation of the v1.0 specification (phases 0-11 of `docs/implementation-plan.md`).
Added:
  - Panel (Go, single static binary) with SQLite persistence, one-time
  - Domain management with per-domain DKIM (RSA-2048, generated in pure Go) and
  - Application (sender identity) management: SASL credentials via `sasldb2`,
  - Full Postfix relay config generated from env at container start: SMTPS 465,
  - Journal milter (pure Go, `go-milter`) recording every send to `send_log`;
  … (6 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.1.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

102 lines
3.3 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"unicode"
)
// minAdminPasswordLen is the floor for the administrator password. The panel is
// public (spec 7.6), so this is deliberately not tiny.
const minAdminPasswordLen = 12
const (
minUsernameLen = 3
maxUsernameLen = 64
)
// validateUsername enforces a strict server-side whitelist (spec 7.6.2):
// letters, digits, dot, dash, underscore. Client validation is never trusted.
func validateUsername(u string) error {
if len(u) < minUsernameLen || len(u) > maxUsernameLen {
return fmt.Errorf("username must be %d-%d characters", minUsernameLen, maxUsernameLen)
}
for _, r := range u {
if r > unicode.MaxASCII || (!isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_') {
return fmt.Errorf("username may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateAdminPassword enforces a minimum length. Composition rules beyond
// length tend to reduce entropy in practice, so length is the sole gate.
func validateAdminPassword(p string) error {
if len(p) < minAdminPasswordLen {
return fmt.Errorf("password must be at least %d characters", minAdminPasswordLen)
}
return nil
}
func isASCIILetterOrDigit(r rune) bool {
return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
}
const maxDomainLen = 253 // RFC 1035 limit on a fully-qualified name
// normalizeDomain lower-cases and trims a domain name. Domain names are
// case-insensitive, and the generated OpenDKIM tables/keys use the canonical
// lower-case form, so we normalise before both validation and storage.
func normalizeDomain(name string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
}
// validateDomain enforces a strict server-side whitelist for sending-domain
// names (spec 7.6.2). The result is safe to write verbatim into the OpenDKIM
// KeyTable/SigningTable and to use as a filesystem path segment: only
// lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-' are allowed, in valid DNS label
// shape. Input must already be normalised with normalizeDomain.
//
// This is deliberately stricter than "any string DNS might accept" — no
// leading/trailing dots or hyphens, no empty or over-long labels, and at least
// two labels so single-word hostnames cannot be registered as sending domains.
func validateDomain(name string) error {
if name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("domain is required")
}
if len(name) > maxDomainLen {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must be at most %d characters", maxDomainLen)
}
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
if len(labels) < 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must include at least one dot (e.g. example.com)")
}
for _, label := range labels {
if err := validateDomainLabel(label); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func validateDomainLabel(label string) error {
if len(label) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must not contain an empty label")
}
if len(label) > 63 {
return fmt.Errorf("each domain label must be at most 63 characters")
}
if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain labels must not start or end with '-'")
}
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
c := label[i]
lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
if !lower && !digit && c != '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-'")
}
}
return nil
}