mixandClaude Opus 5
ab2cd885c4
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced. - bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere. - rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover both halves. - postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now capped at 4 MiB and report truncation. - spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked. - schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10, and three links pointed at deleted plan files. - internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set. - dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them). - plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the open CSRF-token question. Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
26 lines
989 B
Go
26 lines
989 B
Go
package configsafe
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import "testing"
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// The check is the last line of defence before a value reaches a config file,
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// so it must reject both halves of the problem: an empty value that would write
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// a malformed line, and any character from the caller's forbidden set.
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func TestToken(t *testing.T) {
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if err := Token("domain", "example.com", " \t\r\n,\\"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("clean value rejected: %v", err)
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}
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if err := Token("domain", "", " "); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("empty value accepted")
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}
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for _, bad := range []string{"a b", "a\tb", "a\rb", "a\nb", "a,b", "a\\b"} {
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if err := Token("domain", bad, " \t\r\n,\\"); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("Token(%q) = nil, want error", bad)
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}
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}
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// A character outside the caller's set is that format's business, not this
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// function's: a colon is fatal in an OpenDKIM table and fine in a texthash.
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if err := Token("domain", "a:b", " \t\r\n,\\"); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("character outside the forbidden set rejected: %v", err)
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}
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}
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