4761991dd5
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
The level-2 limiter counted stored plus in-flight messages and reserved its own slot in two critical sections, so SMTP sessions that overlapped could each take the last free slot; tryAdmit now does both under one lock. A session that cannot be written no longer yields a cookie the browser would carry while every request bounced to /login. Deleting an application clears its SASL account before its registry row, matching domain delete, so a saslpasswd2 failure leaves a retryable application rather than an account that still authenticates. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
101 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
101 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package milter
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import (
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"log"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// overLimit reports whether the message currently being received should be
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// refused under a level-2 differentiated limit (guide § Rate limiting).
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//
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// Trusted application IPs (app limit active and client IP listed) use only the
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// app ceiling and skip the domain check. Everyone else is under the domain
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// ceiling when one is configured; otherwise only level 1 applies.
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//
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// It is deliberately fail-open: any store error, or the absence of a usable
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// limit, is treated as "not over limit" so a malfunction of the level-2
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// limiter can never block mail — Postfix's level-1 anvil limit
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// (architecture.md § Mail path) remains the backstop, and it does not depend
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// on this milter at all. Only a clean count at or above a configured ceiling
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// returns true.
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//
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// A message that passes reserves a slot per applicable limit, released once it
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// reaches the send log (or is abandoned) — see inflight for why the stored
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// count alone is not enough.
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func (s *session) overLimit() bool {
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if s.clientIP == "" {
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return false // no client IP to key on; level-2 does not apply
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}
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if s.login != "" {
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rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup application %q: %v (fail-open)", s.login, err)
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} else if ok && rl.Active() && rl.AllowsIP(s.clientIP) {
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return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login, rl)
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}
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}
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domain := domainOf(s.from)
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if domain == "" {
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return false
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}
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rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup domain %q: %v (fail-open)", domain, err)
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return false
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}
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if !ok || !rl.Active() {
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return false
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}
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return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain, rl)
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}
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// enforceLimit counts recent messages for scope/ref and refuses when at or
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// above the ceiling. The stored count and the in-flight slots are weighed and
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// the admitted message's own slot is taken in one atomic step (tryAdmit), so
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// two sessions racing at MAIL FROM cannot both claim the last free slot.
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func (s *session) enforceLimit(scope, ref string, rl store.RateLimit) bool {
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since := time.Now().Add(-time.Duration(rl.WindowSeconds) * time.Second)
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stored, err := s.rec.CountMessages(scope, ref, since)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit count %s %q: %v (fail-open)", scope, ref, err)
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return false
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}
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r, n, ok := s.flight.tryAdmit(scope+"|"+ref, since, stored, int64(rl.MaxMessages))
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if !ok {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: %s %q over limit: %d/%d in %ds from %s — refusing 4xx",
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scope, ref, n, rl.MaxMessages, rl.WindowSeconds, s.clientIP)
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return true
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}
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s.reserved = append(s.reserved, r)
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return false
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}
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// releaseReservations gives back every slot this message holds. It runs once
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// the message is in the send log (where the stored count sees it), and whenever
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// the transaction ends without getting there.
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func (s *session) releaseReservations() {
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for _, r := range s.reserved {
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s.flight.release(r)
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}
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s.reserved = nil
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}
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// recordRejected writes a send-log row for a message refused by a level-2
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// limit (guide § Rate limiting — refusals are recorded too), so the rejection
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// shows up in the monitoring screen. Only MAIL-stage fields are known; the
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// write is best-effort and never affects the response.
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func (s *session) recordRejected() {
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err := s.rec.InsertRejected(store.SendLogEntry{
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Domain: domainOf(s.from),
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AppLogin: s.login,
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From: s.from,
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})
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: record rejected %s: %v", s.from, err)
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}
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}
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