Files
selfpost/internal/domain/keys.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 bde6a4000e import: bounds on a domain export (audit W4, W5, W8)
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings W4/W5/W8 (low), stage 4 - all
global-only and self-inflicted, but unbounded:
- W4: ImportKey took any RSA key; a 16 384-bit key makes every signature
  of the domain cost seconds. Now 1024-4096 bits (MinImportKeyBits,
  MaxImportKeyBits); under 1024 Go's parser already refuses.
- W5: an export's applications were unbounded, each a copy of sasldb2 and
  a saslpasswd2 run on the panel's one connection. Now at most 500
  (maxImportApplications).
- W8: an import named as the hostname silently replaced the server's own
  signing key while DNS still held the old record. Now refused with a
  sentence.

Tests: TestImportKeyRefusesAnOversizedKey (4104 bits); the import cases.
Docs: guide § Moving a domain; CHANGELOG; plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-17 22:27:21 +03:00

226 lines
8.0 KiB
Go

package domain
import (
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/configsafe"
)
// Keys manages the DKIM state on disk (architecture.md § DKIM signing): a
// signing key per name under keysDir, keysDir/<name>/<selector>.private, and
// the selector table that says, for every name the server signs, which of its
// keys signs. The panel's signer (internal/milter, SignKeys) reads both; it
// reads no database, so a page's long query never holds up a message.
type Keys struct {
keysDir string
selectorsPath string
}
// NewKeys builds a manager rooted at dir (typically /data/dkim), the layout
// entrypoint.sh prepares.
func NewKeys(dir string) *Keys {
return &Keys{
keysDir: filepath.Join(dir, "keys"),
selectorsPath: filepath.Join(dir, "selectors"),
}
}
// SigningDomain is one row's worth of signing configuration.
type SigningDomain struct {
Name string
Selector string
}
// KeyPath is the private-key file of a name and selector.
func KeyPath(keysDir, domainName, selector string) string {
return filepath.Join(keysDir, domainName, selector+".private")
}
func (o *Keys) keyPath(domainName, selector string) string {
return KeyPath(o.keysDir, domainName, selector)
}
// EnsureKey makes sure a signing key exists for the domain. An existing key is
// reused untouched — critical because overwriting it would silently invalidate
// the DKIM record already published in DNS (architecture.md § DKIM signing).
// Returns whether a new key was generated.
func (o *Keys) EnsureKey(domainName, selector string) (bool, error) {
if err := assertConfigSafe(domainName, selector); err != nil {
return false, err
}
path := o.keyPath(domainName, selector)
if _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {
return false, nil // reuse existing key
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return false, fmt.Errorf("stat dkim key: %w", err)
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("create key dir: %w", err)
}
key, err := generateDKIMKey()
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if err := writePrivateKeyPEM(path, key); err != nil {
return false, err
}
return true, nil
}
// RemoveKey deletes a domain's key directory (architecture.md § DKIM
// signing). A missing directory is not an error.
func (o *Keys) RemoveKey(domainName string) error {
if err := assertConfigSafe(domainName, "x"); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.RemoveAll(filepath.Join(o.keysDir, domainName)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("remove key dir for %s: %w", domainName, err)
}
return nil
}
// KeyDomains lists the names that have a key directory.
func (o *Keys) KeyDomains() ([]string, error) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(o.keysDir)
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list key dirs: %w", err)
}
var out []string
for _, e := range entries {
if e.IsDir() {
out = append(out, e.Name())
}
}
return out, nil
}
// ExportKey returns a domain's DKIM private key as PKCS#1 PEM, for carrying in
// a domain export so the receiving instance signs with the same key and the
// DNS TXT record never has to change (architecture.md § Persistence). It
// re-marshals the parsed key rather than returning the raw file, so a
// malformed on-disk key is caught here.
func (o *Keys) ExportKey(domainName, selector string) ([]byte, error) {
if err := assertConfigSafe(domainName, selector); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
key, err := loadPrivateKeyPEM(o.keyPath(domainName, selector))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
block := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)}
return pem.EncodeToMemory(block), nil
}
// The sizes of an imported DKIM key ImportKey takes.
const (
MinImportKeyBits = 1024
MaxImportKeyBits = 4096
)
// ImportKey writes an imported DKIM private key to disk for a domain
// (architecture.md § Persistence). The PEM is parsed and re-marshalled through
// the same writer used for generated keys, so only a well-formed PKCS#1 RSA
// key is ever stored. Unlike EnsureKey it overwrites: an import (re-)creates
// the domain with exactly this key, which is the whole point of keeping the
// published DNS record valid.
func (o *Keys) ImportKey(domainName, selector string, pemKey []byte) error {
if err := assertConfigSafe(domainName, selector); err != nil {
return err
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(pemKey)
if block == nil || block.Type != "RSA PRIVATE KEY" {
return fmt.Errorf("import dkim key for %s: not a PKCS#1 RSA private key", domainName)
}
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("import dkim key for %s: %w", domainName, err)
}
// Within what receivers verify and what signing can afford: RFC 8301 §
// 3.2 asks for at least 1024 bits, and a key far above 4096 makes every
// signature of the domain cost seconds (security audit 2026-10-17, W4).
if bits := key.N.BitLen(); bits < MinImportKeyBits || bits > MaxImportKeyBits {
return fmt.Errorf("import dkim key for %s: a %d-bit key; SelfPost signs with keys of %d to %d bits", domainName, bits, MinImportKeyBits, MaxImportKeyBits)
}
path := o.keyPath(domainName, selector)
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create key dir: %w", err)
}
return writePrivateKeyPEM(path, key)
}
// Record returns the published DKIM DNS record for a domain, recomputed from the
// private key on disk (product.md).
func (o *Keys) Record(domainName, selector string) (DKIMRecord, error) {
key, err := loadPrivateKeyPEM(o.keyPath(domainName, selector))
if err != nil {
return DKIMRecord{}, err
}
return dkimRecord(selector, domainName, &key.PublicKey)
}
// Rebuild rewrites the selector table from the full domain set. Full
// regeneration (rather than incremental edits) keeps the file a pure function
// of the registry, so add and delete share one idempotent path. The signer
// reads the file again when it changes; nothing is reloaded.
func (o *Keys) Rebuild(domains []SigningDomain) error {
table, err := renderSelectors(domains)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return writeFileAtomic(o.selectorsPath, table, 0o600)
}
// renderSelectors builds the selector table for a domain set, a line
// "<name> <selector>" each, sorted by name so the output is deterministic.
// Every domain is re-checked for config-injection safety before being written
// (security.md) — validation upstream already guarantees this, but the table
// writer refuses to emit anything unsafe as a hard backstop.
func renderSelectors(domains []SigningDomain) ([]byte, error) {
sorted := append([]SigningDomain(nil), domains...)
sort.Slice(sorted, func(i, j int) bool { return sorted[i].Name < sorted[j].Name })
var sb strings.Builder
for _, d := range sorted {
if err := assertConfigSafe(d.Name, d.Selector); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "%s %s\n", d.Name, d.Selector)
}
return []byte(sb.String()), nil
}
// keyForbidden is what may never appear in a name or a selector: white space
// and the newline that would end the selector table's field or line, and the
// path separators - the name and the selector are also the key's path - with
// the colon, which no DNS name holds either.
const keyForbidden = " \t\r\n:/\\"
// assertConfigSafe rejects any domain/selector value that could break out of a
// single table line or out of the key directory. Domains are already
// whitelisted to [a-z0-9.-] and selectors to a similar set before they reach
// here (security.md); this is defence in depth against a validation gap ever
// letting whitespace, a newline or a path separator through. A name of dots
// alone - ".." - would also climb out of keysDir.
func assertConfigSafe(domainName, selector string) error {
for _, f := range []struct{ what, value string }{
{"domain", domainName},
{"selector", selector},
} {
if err := configsafe.Token(f.what, f.value, keyForbidden); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dkim: %w", err)
}
if strings.Trim(f.value, ".") == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("dkim: unsafe %s %q", f.what, f.value)
}
}
return nil
}