Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/handlers.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 07be0cfb58
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
audit 4: sign-in timing and sessions, server timeouts, polling that recovers
Steps 1-3 of stage 4, tested together (their docs share files).

Step 1 (M8, L15, L16): an unknown name pays a bcrypt comparison at the
panel's work factor too (noSuchUserHash, made once) -
TestLoginTakesAsLongForAnUnknownName holds the medians within a factor of
two; the Account form's current-password check has its own limiter, per
user (AllowPasswordChange); a sign-in destroys every session the request
presents before it issues its own.

Step 2 (L14): newHTTPServer - ReadTimeout 30 s, WriteTimeout 60 s,
IdleTimeout 2 min beside ReadHeaderTimeout; the full backup moves its write
deadline to two hours through http.ResponseController (e2e: the log shows
no failure to move it).

Step 3 (M11), read in htmx 2.0.4's source (dev/upstream/htmx-2.0.4, the npm
build byte-equal to the shipped htmx.min.js): the poll passes source: box,
and the next refresh is scheduled from htmx:afterRequest, which htmx fires
on load, error, abort and timeout, and after a swap on the nearest parent
left (the box found by detail.target's id); failures in a row double the
wait to 60 s. RequireAuth answers htmx with 401 + HX-Redirect: /login,
which htmx follows before it looks at the status. testdata/poll_test.js
runs panel.js in node against a stand-in DOM and clock (TestPanelJS; skipped
without node, which the test server lacks - run here, and it fails on the
old panel.js).

Also measured: the stage-3 e2e regression for H1 fails as it should on HEAD
with the old entrypoint ("check data/postfix/e2e_extra_map: permission
denied", the panel restarting).

Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 639 s) on this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 11:07:02 +03:00

272 lines
8.3 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/validate"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/view"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
// draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis § 4.1.3.2: a cookie named __Host- is accepted
// only with Secure, Path=/ and no Domain, from a secure origin - so no other
// host can set or overwrite it, and clearing it needs Secure as well.
const (
sessionCookieBase = "selfpost_session"
sessionCookiePrefixed = "__Host-" + sessionCookieBase
)
// BcryptCost is the work factor for every panel password hash — the setup
// account created here and the ones the settings and user pages write
// (security.md). bcrypt records the cost inside the hash, so raising it only
// affects passwords set from now on; existing hashes keep verifying at the
// cost they were written with.
const BcryptCost = 12
func (m *Module) sessionCookie() string {
if m.cfg.CookieSecure {
return sessionCookiePrefixed
}
return sessionCookieBase
}
func (m *Module) sessionToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
name := m.sessionCookie()
var token string
var n int
for _, c := range r.Cookies() {
if c.Name == name {
n++
token = c.Value
}
}
switch n {
case 0:
return "", false
case 1:
return token, true
default:
// RFC 6265 § 5.4: the Cookie header carries every cookie that
// matches, a parent domain's of the same name included. The prefixed
// name cannot be planted that way (see sessionCookiePrefixed).
logf("panel: %s %s carries %d cookies named %q — treating the request as signed out; "+
"another host on this domain is overwriting the session cookie, clear the cookies for the parent domain",
r.Method, r.URL.Path, n, name)
return "", false
}
}
func (m *Module) clearSessionCookies(w http.ResponseWriter) {
for _, name := range []string{sessionCookieBase, sessionCookiePrefixed} {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: name,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: m.cfg.CookieSecure || name == sessionCookiePrefixed,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
}
// HandleLogin serves the login form (GET) and authenticates (POST).
func (m *Module) HandleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
exists, err := m.store.UserExists()
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if !exists {
m.view.Render(w, http.StatusOK, "login", view.NewLoginSetupHint(m.cfg.Hostname))
return
}
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusOK, "")
case http.MethodPost:
m.submitLogin(w, r)
default:
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, POST")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
}
func (m *Module) renderLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, formErr string) {
m.view.Render(w, status, "login", view.NewLogin(m.cfg.Hostname, formErr))
}
func (m *Module) submitLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !m.loginLimiter.Allow(clientIP(r, m.trustedProxies)) {
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "Too many attempts. Please wait and try again.")
return
}
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid form submission.")
return
}
username := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("username"))
password := r.PostFormValue("password")
user, err := m.store.GetUserByUsername(username)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrUserNotFound) {
logf("panel: login: get user failed: %v", err)
}
// A comparison anyway, so an unknown name is refused in the time
// a wrong password is: the answer's delay told which names exist
// (audit 2026-10-12, M8).
_ = bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(noSuchUserHash(), []byte(password))
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid username or password.")
return
}
if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(user.PasswordHash), []byte(password)); err != nil {
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid username or password.")
return
}
// The session the browser presents, if any, ends here: a sign-in issues
// a new token and leaves no other behind it - one planted before the
// sign-in is worth nothing after (audit 2026-10-12, L16).
name := m.sessionCookie()
for _, c := range r.Cookies() {
if c.Name == name {
m.sessions.Destroy(c.Value)
}
}
token, err := m.sessions.Create(user.ID)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: login: create session failed: %v", err)
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error. Please try again.")
return
}
m.setSessionCookie(w, token)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// noSuchUserHash is a hash of the panel's work factor, compared against when
// a sign-in names no user.
var noSuchUserHash = sync.OnceValue(func() []byte {
h, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("selfpost: no such user"), BcryptCost)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return h
})
// setSessionCookie sets the session cookie. SameSite=Lax withholds it from a
// cross-site request unless that is a top-level navigation with a safe method
// (rfc6265bis § 5.8.3, § 5.6.7.1), so a cross-site POST arrives without it.
func (m *Module) setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, token string) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: m.sessionCookie(),
Value: token,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: m.sessions.MaxAge(),
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: m.cfg.CookieSecure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
// HandleLogout destroys the session and clears the cookie.
func (m *Module) HandleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
w.Header().Set("Allow", "POST")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
name := m.sessionCookie()
for _, c := range r.Cookies() {
if c.Name == name {
m.sessions.Destroy(c.Value)
}
}
m.clearSessionCookies(w)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// HandleSetup serves the one-time administrator creation flow at
// /setup/<token> (security.md).
func (m *Module) HandleSetup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !m.setupLimiter.Allow(clientIP(r, m.trustedProxies)) {
http.Error(w, "too many requests", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
token := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/setup/")
if token == "" || strings.Contains(token, "/") {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
if !m.setup.validate(token) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusOK, token, "")
case http.MethodPost:
m.submitSetup(w, r, token)
default:
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, POST")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
}
func (m *Module) renderSetupForm(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, token, formErr string) {
m.view.Render(w, status, "setup", view.NewSetup(token, formErr))
}
func (m *Module) submitSetup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token string) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusBadRequest, token, "Invalid form submission.")
return
}
username := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("username"))
password := r.PostFormValue("password")
confirm := r.PostFormValue("password_confirm")
if err := validate.Username(username); err != nil {
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusBadRequest, token, err.Error())
return
}
if password != confirm {
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusBadRequest, token, "Passwords do not match.")
return
}
if err := validate.AdminPassword(password); err != nil {
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusBadRequest, token, err.Error())
return
}
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), BcryptCost)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: setup: hashing password failed: %v", err)
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, token, "Internal error. Please try again.")
return
}
if err := m.store.CreateGlobalUser(username, string(hash)); err != nil {
if exists, _ := m.store.UserExists(); exists {
m.setup.complete()
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
logf("panel: setup: create user failed: %v", err)
m.renderSetupForm(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, token, "Internal error. Please try again.")
return
}
m.setup.complete()
logf("panel: administrator %q created; setup link is now disabled", username)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
}