Decided by the owner on 2026-10-13 (out of preflight); the sender is his
choice of 2026-10-16 ("Да, адрес годится"); mockups e92769f, e3b2501,
8f0ccf9, the route guard 75f97c9.
Card 09 on Health, in the right stack's static end (the left stack is
polled whole): one recipient and Send. HandleTestMessage (global role)
takes one address (validate.AccountEmail - no list, nothing that reads as
an option), at most ten an hour counted from the send log, writes the
message's send-log row first (store.InsertTestMessage: queued, the
hostname as domain, no application, no queue id), awaits its Message-ID
(logtail.AwaitMessageID) and hands it to sendmail as notifications go
(notify.Mailer.SendWithID: postmaster@ the hostname, signed by the local
socket with the key of the server's own name). The browser lands on the
row; the tailer gives it its queue id from cleanup's message-id= line
(src/cleanup/cleanup_message.c:639) and from then on its delivery lines
its status. Postfix refusing the hand-over removes the row; sendmail out
of time keeps it (postdrop may have queued it). The sweep closes a row
whose id was never seen once it is no longer awaited
(CloseUnmatchedTestMessages); an id awaited past ten minutes is not taken.
Reviewed for security before the commit (2026-10-17): no high or medium;
its three low findings are fixed in this commit (the unmatched row's
close, the awaited id's age, the timeout keeping the row) and the
security.md bullet says how the queue id is matched.
Tests: TestTestMessage (refusals, the row and the page, Postfix refusing,
the hourly ten), TestTestMessageTimeoutKeepsTheRow, TestTestMessageRows,
TestCloseUnmatchedTestMessages, TestAwaitedMessageID,
TestRunGivesTheTestMessageItsQueueID, TestHealthTestMessageCard; e2e sends
one to the sink: the row is sent with a long queue id, the sink has it
signed d=mail.e2e.test. go vet + go test (26 packages) and make e2e on the
test server for this tree.
Docs: help (word for word with the mockup), guide § Overview and Health,
architecture § Log tailer, security.md, CHANGELOG [Unreleased] § Added,
roadmap row done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
364 lines
17 KiB
Go
364 lines
17 KiB
Go
// Package web implements the SelfPost control panel's HTTP surface: the
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// one-time administrator setup flow (security.md), login/session handling
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// (security.md) and the authenticated shell the later phases build on.
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package web
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import (
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"log"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/app"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/dmarc"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/dnscheck"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/domain"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/health"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/inbound"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/legal"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/postfix"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/auth"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/handlers"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/view"
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)
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// Config holds the panel's HTTP-facing configuration.
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type Config struct {
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// Hostname is the server's external hostname, used to build the absolute
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// setup link shown in the logs (security.md; guide § Environment
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// variables for SELFPOST_HOSTNAME).
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Hostname string
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// CookieSecure sets the Secure attribute on the session cookie. It defaults
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// to true (security.md); it exists as a knob only so the panel can be tested
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// over plain HTTP in development, never for production.
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CookieSecure bool
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// SubmissionEnabled mirrors SUBMISSION_ENABLE: whether this deployment also
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// runs the 587/STARTTLS submission listener next to the primary 465 one
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// (architecture.md § Mail path). The panel only reports it on the domain
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// page's connection settings; it is a deploy-time flag, not something the
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// panel can verify.
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SubmissionEnabled bool
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// MailLogPath is where Postfix's delivery log lives, read by the mail.log
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// monitoring view (architecture.md § Panel HTTP surface). It is the same path
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// the log-tailer role follows in cmd/panel.
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MailLogPath string
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// DataDir and DBPath locate the persistent state a full backup archives
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// (architecture.md § Persistence); DeployRoot is the operator project
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// directory (docker-compose.yml, .env, certs/); Version is stamped into
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// the backup manifest. They mirror the panel's own configuration.
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DataDir string
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DBPath string
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DeployRoot string
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Version string
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// TrustedProxyCIDRs are the reverse-proxy addresses allowed to supply
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// X-Forwarded-For (env TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR). A request whose
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// direct peer (RemoteAddr) is not in this list never has its XFF header
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// honoured, so the header can't be spoofed by anyone but a trusted proxy.
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// Empty (the default) keeps rate-limiting keyed on RemoteAddr only.
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TrustedProxyCIDRs []*net.IPNet
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// TLSCertFile is the mounted certificate (guide § Environment variables);
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// TLSServedCertFile is Postfix's copy of it, the one served on 465/587,
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// and TLSReloadInterval how often that copy is refreshed. Health reads
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// the served one and names the mounted one while they differ
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// (health.CheckServedCertificate).
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TLSCertFile string
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TLSServedCertFile string
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TLSReloadInterval time.Duration
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// SMTPBanner is Postfix's smtpd_banner as postconf expands it, "" when
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// it could not be read (health.SMTPBanner).
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SMTPBanner string
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// SignSocket and SignLocalSocket are the DKIM signer's two milter
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// sockets, applications' mail and the panel's own; JournalSocket is the
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// journal-milter's. The status page dials them: the signer's are required
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// for mail to leave at all (default_action=tempfail), the journal's only
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// for the send log (the journal-milter fails open).
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SignSocket string
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SignLocalSocket string
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JournalSocket string
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// SenderSocket is the sender check's socket, attached strictly.
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SenderSocket string
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// SessionIdleDays is the sliding inactivity window after which a login
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// session expires (env PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, plan B.1). Non-positive
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// falls back to the 7-day default.
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SessionIdleDays int
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// DNSResolvers are the recursive resolvers the deliverability checks query
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// (env SELFPOST_DNS_RESOLVERS). Empty uses dnscheck.DefaultResolvers. The
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// checks must not go through the system resolver — see dnscheck's
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// externalResolver — so this is how a closed network points them at its own.
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DNSResolvers []string
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// RateLimitMessagesPerIP and RateLimitWindowSeconds are the level-1
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// Postfix anvil backstop (env RATE_LIMIT_*), mirrored into the panel for
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// display and to cap domain/app level-2 ceilings (guide § Rate limiting).
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RateLimitMessagesPerIP int
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RateLimitWindowSeconds int
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// RetryPolicy is this Postfix's deferred-mail timings, snapshotted once
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// when the HTTP role starts. Handlers read the cache; they never call
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// postconf (architecture.md).
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RetryPolicy postfix.RetryPolicy
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// InboundEnabled mirrors INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE.
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InboundEnabled bool
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// InboundAntispamMilter mirrors INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER (inet:host:port or
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// unix:/path) and InboundAntispamAction INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER_ACTION
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// ("accept" or "tempfail", "" when the variable holds anything else): the
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// panel only reports them.
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InboundAntispamMilter string
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InboundAntispamAction string
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// DMARCEnabled mirrors DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE.
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DMARCEnabled bool
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// SendLogRetentionEnvDefault is SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS at panel start.
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SendLogRetentionEnvDefault int
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// InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault is INBOUND_SPAM_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS at
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// panel start.
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InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault int
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}
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// Server is the panel HTTP application.
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type Server struct {
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cfg Config
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auth *auth.Module
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handlers *handlers.Handlers
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}
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// New builds the panel server. setupTokenPath is where the current setup token
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// is mirrored on disk (security.md); domains is the sending-domain service
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// that owns DKIM keys and the selector table (architecture.md § DKIM signing);
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// apps owns application SASL accounts and the Postfix sender map
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// (architecture.md § Mail path).
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func New(st *store.Store, domains *domain.Service, apps *app.Service, inboundSvc *inbound.Service, lists *inbound.Lists, dmarcSvc *dmarc.Service, cfg Config, setupTokenPath string) (*Server, error) {
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v, err := view.New(cfg.Version)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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v.SetInboundEnabled(cfg.InboundEnabled)
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v.SetDMARCEnabled(cfg.DMARCEnabled)
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a := auth.New(st, auth.Config{
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CookieSecure: cfg.CookieSecure,
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Hostname: cfg.Hostname,
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SessionIdleDays: cfg.SessionIdleDays,
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TrustedProxyCIDRs: cfg.TrustedProxyCIDRs,
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}, v, setupTokenPath)
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h := handlers.New(st, domains, apps, inboundSvc, lists, dmarcSvc, handlers.Config{
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Hostname: cfg.Hostname,
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SubmissionEnabled: cfg.SubmissionEnabled,
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MailLogPath: cfg.MailLogPath,
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DataDir: cfg.DataDir,
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DBPath: cfg.DBPath,
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DeployRoot: cfg.DeployRoot,
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Version: cfg.Version,
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TLSCertFile: cfg.TLSCertFile,
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TLSServedCertFile: cfg.TLSServedCertFile,
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SMTPBanner: cfg.SMTPBanner,
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TLSReloadInterval: cfg.TLSReloadInterval,
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SignSocket: cfg.SignSocket,
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SignLocalSocket: cfg.SignLocalSocket,
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JournalSocket: cfg.JournalSocket,
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SenderSocket: cfg.SenderSocket,
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RateLimitMessagesPerIP: cfg.RateLimitMessagesPerIP,
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RateLimitWindowSeconds: cfg.RateLimitWindowSeconds,
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RetryPolicy: cfg.RetryPolicy,
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InboundEnabled: cfg.InboundEnabled,
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InboundAntispamMilter: cfg.InboundAntispamMilter,
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InboundAntispamAction: cfg.InboundAntispamAction,
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DMARCEnabled: cfg.DMARCEnabled,
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SendLogRetentionEnvDefault: cfg.SendLogRetentionEnvDefault,
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InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault: cfg.InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault,
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}, v, dnscheck.New(cfg.DNSResolvers), &health.MachineSampler{}, a)
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return &Server{cfg: cfg, auth: a, handlers: h}, nil
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}
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// Start performs first-run bootstrapping: if there is no administrator yet, it
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// generates and announces the setup link (security.md). Safe to call once at
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// server startup.
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func (s *Server) Start() error {
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return s.auth.Bootstrap()
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}
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// Handler returns the panel's HTTP handler (router).
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func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
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mux, authed := s.muxes()
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mux.Handle("/", s.auth.RequireAuth(authed))
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return s.secure(mux)
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}
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// muxes registers every route: the public ones, and the ones behind a session.
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// Both muxes are flat — one pattern per route, nothing mounted as a sub-router —
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// and building them only takes method values, it never calls into s.auth or
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// s.handlers: the route guard test (guard_routes_test.go) runs this on a bare
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// Server and asks each mux which pattern answers a path.
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func (s *Server) muxes() (public, authed *http.ServeMux) {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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h := s.handlers
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mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", handleHealth)
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mux.HandleFunc("/license", handleLicense)
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mux.Handle("/static/", view.StaticHandler())
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mux.HandleFunc("/setup/", s.auth.HandleSetup)
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mux.HandleFunc("/login", s.auth.HandleLogin)
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mux.HandleFunc("/logout", s.auth.HandleLogout)
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authed = http.NewServeMux()
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// A URL reads like the menu: /<group>/<page>, an entity under its list, an
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// action under the thing it changes (docs/plans/panel-redesign.md §
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// Routes). The pre-2.0 paths are gone, not redirected.
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", redirectHome)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /help", h.HandleHelp)
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// Account: every signed-in user's own.
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /account", h.HandleAccount)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /account/profile", h.HandleAccountProfile)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /account/password", h.HandleAccountPassword)
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// Overview. Its handler checks the role itself: the page is global-only
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// but does not live under /server/.
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /overview", h.HandleOverview)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /overview/fragment", h.HandleOverviewFragment)
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// Outbound: checked per domain in the handlers (lookupDomain,
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// lookupApplication), adding and deleting by role.
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains", h.HandleDashboard)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains", h.HandleAddDomain)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}", h.HandleDomainDetail)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/dns-recheck", h.HandleDomainDNSRecheck)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleDeleteConfirm)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleDeleteDomain)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/settings", h.HandleDomainSettings)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/reports", h.HandleDomainDMARC)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/ratelimit", h.HandleDomainRateLimit)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/ratelimit/recalc", h.HandleDomainRateLimitRecalc)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/export", h.HandleExportDomain)
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// An application lives under its domain, and its form is one POST: sender,
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// client IPs and rate limit are saved together. The page that shows a new
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// password is the response to its POST and has no GET path.
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/new", h.HandleApplicationNew)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/new", h.HandleApplicationCreate)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}", h.HandleApplicationEdit)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}", h.HandleApplicationSave)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}/password", h.HandleRegenPassword)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}/ratelimit/recalc", h.HandleAppRateLimitRecalc)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}/delete", h.HandleDeleteApplication)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/log", h.HandleDeliveries)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/log/fragment", h.HandleDeliveriesRows)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/log/{id}", h.HandleDelivery)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/queue", h.HandleMailQueue)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/queue/fragment", h.HandleMailQueueBody)
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if s.cfg.DMARCEnabled {
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/dmarc", h.HandleDMARCList)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/dmarc/reports/{id}", h.HandleDMARCReport)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/dmarc/domains/{id}", h.HandleDMARCDomain)
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}
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// Inbound: checked per inbound domain (requireInboundDomain).
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if s.cfg.InboundEnabled {
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/domains", h.HandleInboundList)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains", h.HandleAddInbound)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/domains/{id}", h.HandleInboundDetail)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/dns-recheck", h.HandleInboundDNSRecheck)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/upstream", h.HandleInboundTransport)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/recipients", h.HandleInboundRecipients)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleInboundDeleteConfirm)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleInboundDelete)
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// The log is for everyone who reaches an inbound domain (scoped to
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// theirs); the lists are the instance's, so the handlers keep the
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// global role's check (requireInboundGlobal) and answer 404 to the rest.
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/log", h.HandleInboundLog)
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authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/filter-lists", h.HandleFilterLists)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/filter-lists", h.HandleFilterListAdd)
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authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/filter-lists/{id}/delete", h.HandleFilterListDelete)
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}
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// Server: everything under /server/ is for the global role, so the subtree
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// is guarded once, here, by server() — a route added to this group cannot
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// forget the check. The handlers keep their own requireGlobal as well.
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server := func(pattern string, handler http.HandlerFunc) {
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if _, path, _ := strings.Cut(pattern, " "); !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/server/") {
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panic("web: server() registers routes under /server/ only: " + pattern)
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}
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authed.HandleFunc(pattern, globalOnly(handler))
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}
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server("GET /server/health", h.HandleHealth)
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server("GET /server/health/fragment", h.HandleHealthFragment)
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server("POST /server/health/recheck", h.HandleHealthRecheck)
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server("POST /server/health/reload", h.HandleReload)
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server("POST /server/health/test-message", h.HandleTestMessage)
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server("GET /server/log", h.HandleSystemLog)
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server("GET /server/log/fragment", h.HandleSystemLogBody)
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server("GET /server/backup", h.HandleBackupPage)
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server("POST /server/backup", h.HandleBackup)
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server("POST /server/backup/import", h.HandleImportDomain)
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server("GET /server/users", h.HandleUsers)
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server("GET /server/users/new", h.HandleUserNew)
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server("POST /server/users/new", h.HandleUserNew)
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server("GET /server/users/{uid}", h.HandleUserEdit)
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server("POST /server/users/{uid}", h.HandleUserEdit)
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server("GET /server/users/{uid}/delete", h.HandleUserDeleteConfirm)
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server("POST /server/users/{uid}/delete", h.HandleUserDelete)
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server("GET /server/settings", h.HandleServerSettings)
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server("POST /server/settings", h.HandleServerSettings)
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server("POST /server/settings/dns-recheck", h.HandleSettingsDNSRecheck)
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server("GET /server/components", h.HandleComponents)
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return mux, authed
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}
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// globalOnly answers 404 to anyone but the global role before the wrapped
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// handler runs — the same answer a missing page gets, so the panel does not
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// confirm to a domain administrator that the Server pages exist.
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func globalOnly(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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p, ok := auth.PrincipalFromRequest(r)
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if !ok || !p.IsGlobal() {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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next(w, r)
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}
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}
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func redirectHome(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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p, ok := auth.PrincipalFromRequest(r)
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if ok && !p.IsGlobal() {
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// A domain administrator lands on what they reach: their sending
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// domains, or the inbound ones when that is all they are assigned.
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if !p.HasOutbound() && p.HasInbound() {
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/inbound/domains", http.StatusSeeOther)
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return
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/outbound/domains", http.StatusSeeOther)
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return
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/overview", http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
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func handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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if err := health.Liveness(); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "unhealthy\n", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
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}
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func handleLicense(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead {
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http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
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return
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}
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_, _ = w.Write(legal.License)
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}
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func logf(format string, args ...any) {
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log.Printf(format, args...)
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}
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