Files
selfpost/internal/dmarc/parse.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 cad1182150
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
audit 2c: what only the stand could answer, measured and written down
All 2026-10-15; each written beside the code or text it settles.

- A-43: /usr/sbin/postlog is -rwxr-xr-x root:root in the image (postfix
  3.7.11-0+deb12u1; dpkg-statoverride lists postdrop and postqueue only):
  Debian does not install it set-gid, so it is no use to dmarc-ingest
  (cmd/panel/dmarc_ingest.go).
- C-X1: OpenSSL 3.0.22 in the image prints the same public key from
  `x509 -pubkey` and `pkey -pubout` for RSA-2048, P-256, P-384 and a SEC1
  P-256 key - cert-reload's same_pair holds for certbot's ECDSA keys.
- C-K5, D-guide:933/:233: on the live server (Docker 29.6.1, userland
  proxy on 0.0.0.0 and ::, no IPv6 on the network) an outside IPv4 client
  and the host's own public IPv4 address are logged as themselves; the
  host's IPv6 address and 127.0.0.1 arrive as 172.18.0.1. Over IPv6 every
  client is the gateway: one level-1 budget, an application IP list cannot
  name them, rspamd sees the gateway. Guide paragraph under level 1, notes
  at the milter and allow-list, comments at the anvil setup and authip.go,
  and a Security entry in the CHANGELOG (an allow-list naming the gateway
  would admit every IPv6 client).
- D-guide:61: a published port nothing listens on (a throwaway container,
  -p 20999:25) is refused from outside over IPv4 and from the host's public
  IPv4, accepted and closed through 127.0.0.1 - Docker's proxy, which IPv6
  goes through too (not probed over IPv6 for this).
- C-M8: the live installation has received one DMARC report, of one
  record: nothing to set maxReportRecords by yet - said at the constant.
- D-S7, D-arch:516, D-arch:532: a new database filled through the store to
  120 days at 1 900 messages a day (228 000 messages, 1.37 million lines,
  464 MB) on the test server (2 cores): the longest write is the line prune
  after a 30-day gap, 1.9 s for 342 000 lines (0.4 s with nothing to
  delete); the send-log delete 0.6 s; 2 000 lines of a tailer pass 18 ms;
  VACUUM INTO 1.7 s; a second connection writing every 50 ms waited 1.8 s
  at most, no SQLITE_BUSY - inside busy_timeout's 5 s. architecture.md's
  "about a second per million lines" was five times too fast; its "six to
  ten lines of 200 bytes" is 6.0 lines of 146 bytes on the live data.
- D-B16: which favicon is fetched, by the probe server's log: Edge 155
  the SVG, the desktop app's embedded Chromium 152 the PNG, with or
  without sizes="any" - layout.html's "vector wins where supported, raster
  catches the rest" holds; Firefox and Safari not measured.
- D-arch:121: the allow/deny trial again, in rspamd/rspamd:3.11.1-3 with
  today's multimap.conf: every mix of allow and deny entries matching one
  message ended reject; a changed map was used about 10 s later.
- D-sec:424: rspamd runs as _rspamd, uid 11333; the panel is uid 999.

Stand: go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages); make
e2e exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 02:14:58 +03:00

267 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

package dmarc
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"encoding/xml"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
)
// ParsedReport is the structured form of a DMARC aggregate XML payload.
type ParsedReport struct {
Reporter string
ReportID string
ContactEmail string
PeriodBegin time.Time
PeriodEnd time.Time
Domain string
PolicyP string
PolicySP string
PolicyPct int
PolicyADKIM string
PolicyASPF string
Records []ParsedRecord
PassCount int
FailCount int
}
// ParsedRecord is one <record> row from the aggregate XML.
type ParsedRecord struct {
SourceIP string
Count int
Disposition string
SPFResult string
DKIMResult string
HeaderFrom string
}
// feedbackXML follows RFC 7489, Appendix C. The schema's targetNamespace is
// "http://dmarc.org/dmarc-xml/0.1"; a tag without a namespace matches the
// local name in any namespace (Go, src/encoding/xml/read.go: the namespace is
// compared only when the tag names one), so a report that declares one is
// read the same.
type feedbackXML struct {
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"feedback"`
Metadata struct {
OrgName string `xml:"org_name"`
Email string `xml:"email"`
ReportID string `xml:"report_id"`
DateRange struct {
Begin int64 `xml:"begin"`
End int64 `xml:"end"`
} `xml:"date_range"`
} `xml:"report_metadata"`
Policy struct {
Domain string `xml:"domain"`
P string `xml:"p"`
SP string `xml:"sp"`
Pct *int `xml:"pct"`
ADKIM string `xml:"adkim"`
ASPF string `xml:"aspf"`
} `xml:"policy_published"`
Records []struct {
Row struct {
SourceIP string `xml:"source_ip"`
Count int `xml:"count"`
Policy struct {
Disposition string `xml:"disposition"`
DKIM string `xml:"dkim"`
SPF string `xml:"spf"`
} `xml:"policy_evaluated"`
} `xml:"row"`
Identifiers struct {
HeaderFrom string `xml:"header_from"`
} `xml:"identifiers"`
} `xml:"record"`
}
// What a report may hold. The XML comes from anyone who knows a report address,
// and eight megabytes of it (maxAggregateXML) fit some 160 000 empty records or
// one name of eight megabytes - every one of them a row or a table cell later.
// A real report has tens of records, a few thousand from the largest
// receivers, and no field longer than a line - an estimate: the live
// installation had received one report by 2026-10-15, of one record, which
// says nothing yet about the largest (assumptions C-M8: keep this ten times
// above the largest seen).
const (
maxReportRecords = 5000
maxFieldLen = 255
maxRecordCount = 1_000_000_000
)
// field trims a text value of the report and cuts it to maxFieldLen bytes, on
// a character boundary.
func field(s string) string {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
if len(s) <= maxFieldLen {
return s
}
s = s[:maxFieldLen]
for len(s) > 0 && !utf8.ValidString(s) {
s = s[:len(s)-1]
}
return s
}
// ParseAggregate decodes gzip- or zip-compressed, or raw, DMARC aggregate XML.
func ParseAggregate(raw []byte) (ParsedReport, error) {
data, err := decompress(raw)
if err != nil {
return ParsedReport{}, err
}
var doc feedbackXML
if err := xml.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %w", err)
}
if doc.Metadata.ReportID == "" || doc.Policy.Domain == "" {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: missing report_id or domain")
}
if len(doc.Records) > maxReportRecords {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %d records, more than the %d a report may hold", len(doc.Records), maxReportRecords)
}
// Cut, not refused: a domain name is at most 253 bytes, so a longer one
// names nothing this relay sends for and is turned away as such.
out := ParsedReport{
Reporter: field(doc.Metadata.OrgName),
ReportID: field(doc.Metadata.ReportID),
ContactEmail: field(doc.Metadata.Email),
PeriodBegin: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.Begin, 0).UTC(),
PeriodEnd: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.End, 0).UTC(),
Domain: strings.ToLower(field(doc.Policy.Domain)),
PolicyP: field(doc.Policy.P),
PolicySP: field(doc.Policy.SP),
PolicyADKIM: field(doc.Policy.ADKIM),
PolicyASPF: field(doc.Policy.ASPF),
}
// RFC 7489 § 6.3: pct is "between 0 and 100, inclusive", 100 when absent.
// An explicit 0 is a policy applied to no message, and stays 0; only a
// report without the element gets the default (assumptions C-M7).
out.PolicyPct = 100
if doc.Policy.Pct != nil {
out.PolicyPct = *doc.Policy.Pct
}
for _, rec := range doc.Records {
row := ParsedRecord{
SourceIP: field(rec.Row.SourceIP),
Count: rec.Row.Count,
Disposition: field(rec.Row.Policy.Disposition),
SPFResult: field(rec.Row.Policy.SPF),
DKIMResult: field(rec.Row.Policy.DKIM),
HeaderFrom: field(rec.Identifiers.HeaderFrom),
}
if row.Count <= 0 {
row.Count = 1
}
// Bounded so that the sums of a report cannot wrap around.
if row.Count > maxRecordCount {
row.Count = maxRecordCount
}
if dmarcRecordPasses(row) {
out.PassCount += row.Count
} else {
out.FailCount += row.Count
}
out.Records = append(out.Records, row)
}
return out, nil
}
// dmarcRecordPasses: RFC 7489, Appendix C, PolicyEvaluatedType - dkim and spf
// are "The DMARC-aligned authentication result"; § 4.2: DMARC passes when one
// supported mechanism passes aligned.
func dmarcRecordPasses(r ParsedRecord) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(r.SPFResult, "pass") || strings.EqualFold(r.DKIMResult, "pass")
}
// maxAggregateXML bounds the decompressed payload, so a small archive cannot
// expand into an unbounded allocation.
const maxAggregateXML = 8 << 20
// decompress unwraps the container the reporter used. Both are seen in the
// wild: most senders gzip the XML, some (notably several Microsoft and Yahoo
// endpoints) ship it as a single-entry zip. (A sighting: where and when not
// recorded. RFC 7489 § 7.2.1.1 names gzip only.)
func decompress(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch {
case len(raw) >= 2 && raw[0] == 0x1f && raw[1] == 0x8b:
return gunzip(raw)
case len(raw) >= 4 && raw[0] == 'P' && raw[1] == 'K' && raw[2] == 0x03 && raw[3] == 0x04:
return unzip(raw)
}
return raw, nil
}
func gunzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
zr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip: %w", err)
}
defer zr.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(zr, maxAggregateXML))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip read: %w", err)
}
return data, nil
}
// unzip returns the first .xml entry of a zip archive. Directories and any
// other members are skipped rather than trusted.
func unzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw), int64(len(raw)))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: %w", err)
}
for _, f := range zr.File {
if f.FileInfo().IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(f.Name), ".xml") {
continue
}
rc, err := f.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip open %q: %w", field(f.Name), err)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rc, maxAggregateXML))
rc.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip read %q: %w", field(f.Name), err)
}
return data, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: no xml entry")
}
// TightenPolicyHint summarises whether raising p= looks reasonable.
func TightenPolicyHint(pass, fail int, sources []SourceHint) string {
total := pass + fail
if total == 0 {
return "No messages in the reporting window yet."
}
failPct := float64(fail) * 100 / float64(total)
if fail > 0 {
for _, s := range sources {
if s.FailCount > 0 && !s.ThisRelay {
return "A third-party source is not aligned. Do not tighten p= until that sender is fixed or removed."
}
}
}
if failPct <= 2 && pass > 0 {
return "Alignment looks strong. Tightening p= may be reasonable."
}
if fail > 0 {
return "Some failures remain. Review sources before tightening p=."
}
return "Alignment looks clean for this window."
}
// SourceHint is a panel-facing rollup row with relay detection.
type SourceHint struct {
SourceIP string
PassCount int
FailCount int
ThisRelay bool
}