test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
All 2026-10-15; each written beside the code or text it settles. - A-43: /usr/sbin/postlog is -rwxr-xr-x root:root in the image (postfix 3.7.11-0+deb12u1; dpkg-statoverride lists postdrop and postqueue only): Debian does not install it set-gid, so it is no use to dmarc-ingest (cmd/panel/dmarc_ingest.go). - C-X1: OpenSSL 3.0.22 in the image prints the same public key from `x509 -pubkey` and `pkey -pubout` for RSA-2048, P-256, P-384 and a SEC1 P-256 key - cert-reload's same_pair holds for certbot's ECDSA keys. - C-K5, D-guide:933/:233: on the live server (Docker 29.6.1, userland proxy on 0.0.0.0 and ::, no IPv6 on the network) an outside IPv4 client and the host's own public IPv4 address are logged as themselves; the host's IPv6 address and 127.0.0.1 arrive as 172.18.0.1. Over IPv6 every client is the gateway: one level-1 budget, an application IP list cannot name them, rspamd sees the gateway. Guide paragraph under level 1, notes at the milter and allow-list, comments at the anvil setup and authip.go, and a Security entry in the CHANGELOG (an allow-list naming the gateway would admit every IPv6 client). - D-guide:61: a published port nothing listens on (a throwaway container, -p 20999:25) is refused from outside over IPv4 and from the host's public IPv4, accepted and closed through 127.0.0.1 - Docker's proxy, which IPv6 goes through too (not probed over IPv6 for this). - C-M8: the live installation has received one DMARC report, of one record: nothing to set maxReportRecords by yet - said at the constant. - D-S7, D-arch:516, D-arch:532: a new database filled through the store to 120 days at 1 900 messages a day (228 000 messages, 1.37 million lines, 464 MB) on the test server (2 cores): the longest write is the line prune after a 30-day gap, 1.9 s for 342 000 lines (0.4 s with nothing to delete); the send-log delete 0.6 s; 2 000 lines of a tailer pass 18 ms; VACUUM INTO 1.7 s; a second connection writing every 50 ms waited 1.8 s at most, no SQLITE_BUSY - inside busy_timeout's 5 s. architecture.md's "about a second per million lines" was five times too fast; its "six to ten lines of 200 bytes" is 6.0 lines of 146 bytes on the live data. - D-B16: which favicon is fetched, by the probe server's log: Edge 155 the SVG, the desktop app's embedded Chromium 152 the PNG, with or without sizes="any" - layout.html's "vector wins where supported, raster catches the rest" holds; Firefox and Safari not measured. - D-arch:121: the allow/deny trial again, in rspamd/rspamd:3.11.1-3 with today's multimap.conf: every mix of allow and deny entries matching one message ended reject; a changed map was used about 10 s later. - D-sec:424: rspamd runs as _rspamd, uid 11333; the panel is uid 999. Stand: go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages); make e2e exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
267 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
267 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
package dmarc
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"archive/zip"
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"compress/gzip"
|
|
"encoding/xml"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"io"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
"unicode/utf8"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ParsedReport is the structured form of a DMARC aggregate XML payload.
|
|
type ParsedReport struct {
|
|
Reporter string
|
|
ReportID string
|
|
ContactEmail string
|
|
PeriodBegin time.Time
|
|
PeriodEnd time.Time
|
|
Domain string
|
|
PolicyP string
|
|
PolicySP string
|
|
PolicyPct int
|
|
PolicyADKIM string
|
|
PolicyASPF string
|
|
Records []ParsedRecord
|
|
PassCount int
|
|
FailCount int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ParsedRecord is one <record> row from the aggregate XML.
|
|
type ParsedRecord struct {
|
|
SourceIP string
|
|
Count int
|
|
Disposition string
|
|
SPFResult string
|
|
DKIMResult string
|
|
HeaderFrom string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// feedbackXML follows RFC 7489, Appendix C. The schema's targetNamespace is
|
|
// "http://dmarc.org/dmarc-xml/0.1"; a tag without a namespace matches the
|
|
// local name in any namespace (Go, src/encoding/xml/read.go: the namespace is
|
|
// compared only when the tag names one), so a report that declares one is
|
|
// read the same.
|
|
type feedbackXML struct {
|
|
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"feedback"`
|
|
Metadata struct {
|
|
OrgName string `xml:"org_name"`
|
|
Email string `xml:"email"`
|
|
ReportID string `xml:"report_id"`
|
|
DateRange struct {
|
|
Begin int64 `xml:"begin"`
|
|
End int64 `xml:"end"`
|
|
} `xml:"date_range"`
|
|
} `xml:"report_metadata"`
|
|
Policy struct {
|
|
Domain string `xml:"domain"`
|
|
P string `xml:"p"`
|
|
SP string `xml:"sp"`
|
|
Pct *int `xml:"pct"`
|
|
ADKIM string `xml:"adkim"`
|
|
ASPF string `xml:"aspf"`
|
|
} `xml:"policy_published"`
|
|
Records []struct {
|
|
Row struct {
|
|
SourceIP string `xml:"source_ip"`
|
|
Count int `xml:"count"`
|
|
Policy struct {
|
|
Disposition string `xml:"disposition"`
|
|
DKIM string `xml:"dkim"`
|
|
SPF string `xml:"spf"`
|
|
} `xml:"policy_evaluated"`
|
|
} `xml:"row"`
|
|
Identifiers struct {
|
|
HeaderFrom string `xml:"header_from"`
|
|
} `xml:"identifiers"`
|
|
} `xml:"record"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// What a report may hold. The XML comes from anyone who knows a report address,
|
|
// and eight megabytes of it (maxAggregateXML) fit some 160 000 empty records or
|
|
// one name of eight megabytes - every one of them a row or a table cell later.
|
|
// A real report has tens of records, a few thousand from the largest
|
|
// receivers, and no field longer than a line - an estimate: the live
|
|
// installation had received one report by 2026-10-15, of one record, which
|
|
// says nothing yet about the largest (assumptions C-M8: keep this ten times
|
|
// above the largest seen).
|
|
const (
|
|
maxReportRecords = 5000
|
|
maxFieldLen = 255
|
|
maxRecordCount = 1_000_000_000
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// field trims a text value of the report and cuts it to maxFieldLen bytes, on
|
|
// a character boundary.
|
|
func field(s string) string {
|
|
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
|
|
if len(s) <= maxFieldLen {
|
|
return s
|
|
}
|
|
s = s[:maxFieldLen]
|
|
for len(s) > 0 && !utf8.ValidString(s) {
|
|
s = s[:len(s)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
return s
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ParseAggregate decodes gzip- or zip-compressed, or raw, DMARC aggregate XML.
|
|
func ParseAggregate(raw []byte) (ParsedReport, error) {
|
|
data, err := decompress(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return ParsedReport{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
var doc feedbackXML
|
|
if err := xml.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil {
|
|
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if doc.Metadata.ReportID == "" || doc.Policy.Domain == "" {
|
|
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: missing report_id or domain")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(doc.Records) > maxReportRecords {
|
|
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %d records, more than the %d a report may hold", len(doc.Records), maxReportRecords)
|
|
}
|
|
// Cut, not refused: a domain name is at most 253 bytes, so a longer one
|
|
// names nothing this relay sends for and is turned away as such.
|
|
out := ParsedReport{
|
|
Reporter: field(doc.Metadata.OrgName),
|
|
ReportID: field(doc.Metadata.ReportID),
|
|
ContactEmail: field(doc.Metadata.Email),
|
|
PeriodBegin: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.Begin, 0).UTC(),
|
|
PeriodEnd: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.End, 0).UTC(),
|
|
Domain: strings.ToLower(field(doc.Policy.Domain)),
|
|
PolicyP: field(doc.Policy.P),
|
|
PolicySP: field(doc.Policy.SP),
|
|
PolicyADKIM: field(doc.Policy.ADKIM),
|
|
PolicyASPF: field(doc.Policy.ASPF),
|
|
}
|
|
// RFC 7489 § 6.3: pct is "between 0 and 100, inclusive", 100 when absent.
|
|
// An explicit 0 is a policy applied to no message, and stays 0; only a
|
|
// report without the element gets the default (assumptions C-M7).
|
|
out.PolicyPct = 100
|
|
if doc.Policy.Pct != nil {
|
|
out.PolicyPct = *doc.Policy.Pct
|
|
}
|
|
for _, rec := range doc.Records {
|
|
row := ParsedRecord{
|
|
SourceIP: field(rec.Row.SourceIP),
|
|
Count: rec.Row.Count,
|
|
Disposition: field(rec.Row.Policy.Disposition),
|
|
SPFResult: field(rec.Row.Policy.SPF),
|
|
DKIMResult: field(rec.Row.Policy.DKIM),
|
|
HeaderFrom: field(rec.Identifiers.HeaderFrom),
|
|
}
|
|
if row.Count <= 0 {
|
|
row.Count = 1
|
|
}
|
|
// Bounded so that the sums of a report cannot wrap around.
|
|
if row.Count > maxRecordCount {
|
|
row.Count = maxRecordCount
|
|
}
|
|
if dmarcRecordPasses(row) {
|
|
out.PassCount += row.Count
|
|
} else {
|
|
out.FailCount += row.Count
|
|
}
|
|
out.Records = append(out.Records, row)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// dmarcRecordPasses: RFC 7489, Appendix C, PolicyEvaluatedType - dkim and spf
|
|
// are "The DMARC-aligned authentication result"; § 4.2: DMARC passes when one
|
|
// supported mechanism passes aligned.
|
|
func dmarcRecordPasses(r ParsedRecord) bool {
|
|
return strings.EqualFold(r.SPFResult, "pass") || strings.EqualFold(r.DKIMResult, "pass")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// maxAggregateXML bounds the decompressed payload, so a small archive cannot
|
|
// expand into an unbounded allocation.
|
|
const maxAggregateXML = 8 << 20
|
|
|
|
// decompress unwraps the container the reporter used. Both are seen in the
|
|
// wild: most senders gzip the XML, some (notably several Microsoft and Yahoo
|
|
// endpoints) ship it as a single-entry zip. (A sighting: where and when not
|
|
// recorded. RFC 7489 § 7.2.1.1 names gzip only.)
|
|
func decompress(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case len(raw) >= 2 && raw[0] == 0x1f && raw[1] == 0x8b:
|
|
return gunzip(raw)
|
|
case len(raw) >= 4 && raw[0] == 'P' && raw[1] == 'K' && raw[2] == 0x03 && raw[3] == 0x04:
|
|
return unzip(raw)
|
|
}
|
|
return raw, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func gunzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
zr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer zr.Close()
|
|
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(zr, maxAggregateXML))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip read: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// unzip returns the first .xml entry of a zip archive. Directories and any
|
|
// other members are skipped rather than trusted.
|
|
func unzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw), int64(len(raw)))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
for _, f := range zr.File {
|
|
if f.FileInfo().IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(f.Name), ".xml") {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
rc, err := f.Open()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip open %q: %w", field(f.Name), err)
|
|
}
|
|
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rc, maxAggregateXML))
|
|
rc.Close()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip read %q: %w", field(f.Name), err)
|
|
}
|
|
return data, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: no xml entry")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TightenPolicyHint summarises whether raising p= looks reasonable.
|
|
func TightenPolicyHint(pass, fail int, sources []SourceHint) string {
|
|
total := pass + fail
|
|
if total == 0 {
|
|
return "No messages in the reporting window yet."
|
|
}
|
|
failPct := float64(fail) * 100 / float64(total)
|
|
if fail > 0 {
|
|
for _, s := range sources {
|
|
if s.FailCount > 0 && !s.ThisRelay {
|
|
return "A third-party source is not aligned. Do not tighten p= until that sender is fixed or removed."
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if failPct <= 2 && pass > 0 {
|
|
return "Alignment looks strong. Tightening p= may be reasonable."
|
|
}
|
|
if fail > 0 {
|
|
return "Some failures remain. Review sources before tightening p=."
|
|
}
|
|
return "Alignment looks clean for this window."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SourceHint is a panel-facing rollup row with relay detection.
|
|
type SourceHint struct {
|
|
SourceIP string
|
|
PassCount int
|
|
FailCount int
|
|
ThisRelay bool
|
|
}
|