Records both decisions and, more usefully, what the item was actually about.
The prefix was filed as a free nicety ("мелочь, но бесплатная"), which is why
it sat undecided: nothing said what it prevents. It prevents the same-site
neighbour from the CSRF item using its other lever — setting a Domain-scoped
cookie of the same name. The browser then sends two, r.Cookie returns the
older one, and the admin logs in successfully into an endless login loop. That
is denial of service rather than compromise (no valid token can be forged with
a single account), but it is close to undiagnosable from the panel's side, and
the origin check decided in A.2 does nothing about it — the request comes from
the admin's own origin.
Phase 14 gains section B: the cookie name becomes conditional on CookieSecure,
because a __Host- cookie over plain HTTP is rejected outright and would break
the dev mode silently; logout clears both names; and requireAuth switches to
r.Cookies() so a duplicate is refused and logged instead of silently picked.
The setup-token documentation moves to 14.C.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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