Files
selfpost/internal/web/view/static.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 b2fbe91de9 panel-redesign: security review of 2.0 - sessions belong to a user by id
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.

Fixed
  - M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
    deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
    before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
    later created under that name, with that account's role. The
    baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
    CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
    only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
  - M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
    It ends that user's other sessions only.
  - L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
    administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
  - L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
    on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
    the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
    Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
    store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
    and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
  - L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
    takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
    and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
    reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
    box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
  - I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
    that is not a known asset is a 404.

Consequences
  - The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
    since, too.
  - dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
    everyone signs in again after the transfer.
  - docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.

Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
  - L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
    address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
    administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
  - L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
    and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
    be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
  - L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
    requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
  - Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
    only), the domain form's validation messages.

Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.

  go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
    ./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
      ok  (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 03:04:02 +03:00

66 lines
2.4 KiB
Go

package view
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"io/fs"
"net/http"
"path"
)
// staticETags maps each /static/ URL path to a strong ETag over the asset's
// bytes, computed once at startup from the embedded FS.
//
// The assets are baked into the binary, so their FS modification times are the
// zero value and http.FileServer sends no Last-Modified. Without an ETag either,
// a response carries no validator at all and the browser is free to guess how
// long to keep it — which is how a replaced favicon keeps showing the old mark
// long after a deploy. Hashing the content gives every asset a validator that
// changes exactly when the asset does.
var staticETags = buildStaticETags()
func buildStaticETags() map[string]string {
etags := make(map[string]string)
// An error here would mean the embed directive and this walk disagree, which
// is a build-time defect rather than a runtime condition; the assets still
// serve correctly without a validator, so skip what can't be read.
_ = fs.WalkDir(assetsFS, "static", func(name string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil || d.IsDir() {
return nil
}
b, err := fs.ReadFile(assetsFS, name)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
sum := sha256.Sum256(b)
etags["/"+name] = `"` + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:16]) + `"`
return nil
})
return etags
}
// StaticHandler serves the embedded assets under /static/ with a content ETag.
// A path that is not one of those assets — the folder itself included — is a
// 404: the file server would otherwise answer the folder with a listing of
// everything the binary embeds.
//
// Cache-Control is no-cache rather than a max-age: it lets the browser keep the
// copy but requires it to revalidate, so an asset that changed is picked up on
// the next page load while an unchanged one costs a 304 with no body. For a
// handful of small files on a single-operator panel that trade is the right way
// round — correctness after a deploy matters more than saving the round trip.
// http.ServeContent answers the conditional request from the ETag we set here.
func StaticHandler() http.Handler {
files := http.FileServer(http.FS(assetsFS))
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
etag, ok := staticETags[path.Clean(r.URL.Path)]
if !ok {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
w.Header().Set("ETag", etag)
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
files.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}