6d2d49257d
Both secret-bearing downloads can now be sealed with a password. Unticked, the forms produce exactly the files they did before. - internal/secretfile: envelope format — magic/type/scrypt params/salt/nonce prefix header, then 64 KiB AES-256-GCM chunks each authenticated with the header, its counter and an end-of-stream flag, so truncation, reordering and tampering fail to open instead of restoring a plausible prefix. Streams both ways, so a full backup never sits in memory. - Panel: "Encrypt with a password" checkbox on the full-backup and domain-export forms (shared partial, toggled from panel.js — no inline script); domain import detects an encrypted export by magic bytes, not by extension, and asks for the password. - selfpost-backup: writes .spbk when given a password and converts one back with -decrypt, which a restore needs. The password comes from SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never argv. - Docs: README, security.md (+ accepted risk: encryption stays opt-in), architecture.md, progress.md, CHANGELOG. Verified locally: panel-encrypted archive decrypts through the CLI and unpacks; wrong password and password mismatch are refused; UI checked in a browser. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
163 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
163 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
package secretfile
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"testing"
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)
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// encrypt is the round-trip helper: seal data and return the envelope bytes.
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func encrypt(t *testing.T, typ PayloadType, password string, data []byte) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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w, err := NewWriter(&buf, typ, password)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewWriter: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := w.Write(data); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Write: %v", err)
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}
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if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Close: %v", err)
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}
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return buf.Bytes()
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}
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func decrypt(t *testing.T, enc []byte, password string) ([]byte, PayloadType, error) {
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t.Helper()
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r, err := NewReader(bytes.NewReader(enc), password)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, err
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}
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out, err := io.ReadAll(r)
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return out, r.Type(), err
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}
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func TestRoundTripSizes(t *testing.T) {
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// Empty, sub-chunk, exactly one chunk, and several chunks with a partial
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// tail: the boundaries where chunk framing tends to break.
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sizes := []int{0, 1, 1000, chunkSize - 1, chunkSize, chunkSize + 1, 3*chunkSize + 77}
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for _, n := range sizes {
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data := make([]byte, n)
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for i := range data {
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data[i] = byte(i * 7)
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}
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeFullBackup, "correct horse battery staple", data)
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got, typ, err := decrypt(t, enc, "correct horse battery staple")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("size %d: decrypt: %v", n, err)
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}
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if typ != TypeFullBackup {
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t.Errorf("size %d: type = %v, want full backup", n, typ)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(got, data) {
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t.Errorf("size %d: plaintext mismatch (%d bytes back)", n, len(got))
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}
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}
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}
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func TestCiphertextDoesNotLeakPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
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secret := []byte("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEow...\n")
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeDomainExport, "a very long password", secret)
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if bytes.Contains(enc, secret) {
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t.Fatal("plaintext found verbatim in the envelope")
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}
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if !HasMagic(enc) {
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t.Fatal("envelope does not start with the magic")
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}
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}
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func TestWrongPassword(t *testing.T) {
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeDomainExport, "the right password", []byte("secret payload"))
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_, _, err := decrypt(t, enc, "the wrong password")
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrWrongPassword) {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrWrongPassword", err)
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}
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}
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func TestNotEncrypted(t *testing.T) {
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for _, plain := range [][]byte{[]byte(`{"format":"selfpost-domain-export"}`), {}, []byte("SELF")} {
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if _, err := NewReader(bytes.NewReader(plain), "pw"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotEncrypted) {
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t.Errorf("NewReader(%q) = %v, want ErrNotEncrypted", plain, err)
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}
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if HasMagic(plain) {
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t.Errorf("HasMagic(%q) = true", plain)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestTruncationDetected(t *testing.T) {
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// A backup cut short mid-transfer must fail loudly rather than restore a
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// plausible-looking prefix.
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data := bytes.Repeat([]byte("payload"), 20000) // spans several chunks
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeFullBackup, "password password", data)
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// Drop the final chunk entirely: what remains is a sequence of valid,
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// correctly authenticated chunks, none of which is marked last.
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var chunks []int
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for off := headerLen; off < len(enc); {
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n := int(enc[off])<<24 | int(enc[off+1])<<16 | int(enc[off+2])<<8 | int(enc[off+3])
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chunks = append(chunks, off)
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off += 4 + n
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}
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if len(chunks) < 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected several chunks, got %d", len(chunks))
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}
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truncated := enc[:chunks[len(chunks)-1]]
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r, err := NewReader(bytes.NewReader(truncated), "password password")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("NewReader (truncated): %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := io.ReadAll(r); !errors.Is(err, ErrCorrupt) {
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t.Fatalf("read truncated = %v, want ErrCorrupt", err)
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}
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}
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func TestTamperDetected(t *testing.T) {
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeFullBackup, "password password", []byte("some archive bytes"))
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for _, off := range []int{MagicLen /* type byte */, headerLen + 6 /* ciphertext */} {
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bad := bytes.Clone(enc)
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bad[off] ^= 0xff
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if _, _, err := decrypt(t, bad, "password password"); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("flipping byte %d was accepted", off)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestChunkReorderRejected(t *testing.T) {
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// Two full chunks plus a tail, so swapping the first two is possible without
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// changing any length.
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data := make([]byte, 2*chunkSize+10)
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for i := range data {
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data[i] = byte(i)
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}
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeFullBackup, "password password", data)
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const framed = 4 + chunkSize + tagLen
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first := headerLen
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second := headerLen + framed
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swapped := bytes.Clone(enc)
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copy(swapped[first:first+framed], enc[second:second+framed])
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copy(swapped[second:second+framed], enc[first:first+framed])
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if _, _, err := decrypt(t, swapped, "password password"); !errors.Is(err, ErrWrongPassword) {
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t.Fatalf("reordered chunks = %v, want authentication failure", err)
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}
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}
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func TestEmptyPasswordRejected(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := NewWriter(io.Discard, TypeFullBackup, ""); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("empty password accepted")
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}
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}
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func TestUnreasonableKDFParamsRejected(t *testing.T) {
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enc := encrypt(t, TypeFullBackup, "password password", []byte("x"))
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bad := bytes.Clone(enc)
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bad[MagicLen+2] = 40 // logN far beyond maxLogN
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if _, err := NewReader(bytes.NewReader(bad), "password password"); !errors.Is(err, ErrCorrupt) {
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t.Fatalf("err = %v, want ErrCorrupt", err)
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}
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}
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