Found by the e2e restore scenario of the next commit: the Full backup button answered 200 with ten bytes. The archive includes the Postfix queue, Postfix keeps every queue file and directory readable by its own user alone (not configurable), and the panel runs as its own user - the walk stopped at /data/postfix/queue/active with "permission denied" after the headers were out. So since the queue moved under /data in 1.3.0. Confirmed on the test server: selfpost-backup as root makes the whole archive, the same command as user panel fails the same way. Owner, 2026-10-11: the panel's archive comes without the queue. - backup.Params.Unprivileged: the queue is left out, and so is a file under certs/ that cannot be opened (the private key on the test server is root and Postfix's group only), named through OnWarn. The selfpost-backup command leaves it unset and takes both, as before. - backup.Check reads through everything Create would archive, writing nothing. The panel runs it before the first byte: a failure is a message on the page, not a download cut short. - The box, Help (design commit before this one) and the guide say what the panel's archive leaves out; the guide's comparison table has rows for the queue and the private key, and tells to put the key back before starting a restored instance. go vet ./internal/backup/ ./internal/web/handlers/: ok go test ./internal/backup/ ./cmd/... ./internal/web/...: ok make e2e on the test server, with the restore scenario: ok Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
359 lines
14 KiB
Go
359 lines
14 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/backup"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/domain"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/secretfile"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/validate"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/view"
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)
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// maxImportBytes caps a domain-import upload. A domain export is a small JSON
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// document (a DKIM key and a handful of credentials); this leaves generous head
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// room while refusing anything large enough to be an abuse attempt. An
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// encrypted export adds only a header and per-chunk tags, so the same ceiling
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// covers both forms.
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const maxImportBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
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// HandleBackupPage renders the backup/migration screen: the full-server backup
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// and the domain import are separate actions with different risk, so each gets
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// its own card here rather than sharing a block on the domain list.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleBackupPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, ok := h.requireGlobal(w, r); !ok {
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return
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}
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusOK, "")
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}
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// renderBackupPage draws the page; importErr surfaces a failed domain import
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// (architecture.md § Persistence) next to the form that produced it.
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func (h *Handlers) renderBackupPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, importErr string) {
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h.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, status, importErr, "")
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}
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// renderBackupPageWith is renderBackupPage with the second of the page's two
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// error slots: backupErr belongs to the full-backup card (a rejected encryption
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// password), importErr to the import card, so neither message appears under the
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// wrong form.
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func (h *Handlers) renderBackupPageWith(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, importErr, backupErr string) {
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refusal := importErr
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if refusal == "" {
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refusal = backupErr
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}
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h.view.Render(w, status, "backup", view.NewBackup(h.shellMeta(r), validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen, refusal))
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}
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// HandleBackup streams a full-server backup as a download (architecture.md §
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// Persistence). It is an authenticated admin action (this handler sits behind
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// the auth middleware). The archive carries DKIM private keys, the admin
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// password hash and SASL credentials, so it is served with no-store and as an
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// attachment to discourage caching of secret material. When the operator ticks
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// "encrypt with a password", the archive is wrapped in a .spbk envelope on the
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// way out, so the file that lands on their disk — wherever it is copied
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// afterwards — is useless without the password.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, ok := h.requireGlobal(w, r); !ok {
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return
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}
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password, pwErr := secretFilePassword(r)
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if pwErr != "" {
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h.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "", pwErr)
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return
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}
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// The panel is not root: its archive leaves out the Postfix queue and a
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// certificate file it may not open (backup.Params.Unprivileged).
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params := backup.Params{
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DataDir: h.cfg.DataDir,
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DBPath: h.cfg.DBPath,
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Version: h.cfg.Version,
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DeployRoot: h.cfg.DeployRoot,
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Unprivileged: true,
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OnWarn: func(msg string) {
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logf("panel: full backup: %s", msg)
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},
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}
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if err := backup.ValidateDeployRoot(h.cfg.DeployRoot); err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup: %v", err)
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h.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "", deployBackupErr(err))
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return
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}
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// Everything is read through once before the first byte goes out. Past the
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// headers a failure can only cut the download short - which is what the
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// button did from 1.3.0 to 2.0.0, with a 200 and ten bytes, because the
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// queue was not the panel's to read.
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if err := backup.Check(params); err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup: %v", err)
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h.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "",
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"Could not read everything a backup holds. Nothing was downloaded; the reason is in the panel's log.")
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return
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}
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stamp := time.Now().UTC().Format("20060102-150405")
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filename := fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-backup-%s.tar.gz", stamp)
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contentType := "application/gzip"
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if password != "" {
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filename = fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-backup-%s%s", stamp, secretfile.ExtBackup)
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contentType = "application/octet-stream"
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filename))
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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// Everything below streams: past this point headers (and possibly some
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// bytes) are already on the wire, so a failure cannot switch to a clean
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// error page. Log it and let the truncated download fail loudly on the
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// client side — for an encrypted archive that is a missing end-of-stream
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// chunk, which decryption refuses outright.
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sink := io.Writer(w)
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var env *secretfile.Writer
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if password != "" {
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var err error
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// The only failures here are key derivation (which happens before
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// anything is written) and writing the envelope header, which fails only
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// if the client is already gone.
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env, err = secretfile.NewWriter(w, secretfile.TypeFullBackup, password)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup: encrypt: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "backup failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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sink = env
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}
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if err := backup.Create(sink, params); err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup failed: %v", err)
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return
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}
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if env != nil {
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if err := env.Close(); err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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}
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// HandleExportDomain streams a single-domain export as a secret download
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// (architecture.md § Persistence). Like the full backup it is POST-only (state
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// is not changed, but the response contains the domain's DKIM private key and
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// application passwords, so it must not be prefetchable or cached). Like the
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// full backup it can be encrypted with a password, in which case the download
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// is a .spde envelope instead of plain JSON.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleExportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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d, ok := h.lookupDomain(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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password, pwErr := secretFilePassword(r)
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if pwErr != "" {
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h.renderDomainSettings(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, settingsView{Err: pwErr})
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return
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}
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exp, err := h.domains.Export(d.ID)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: export domain %d: %v", d.ID, err)
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http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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body, err := json.MarshalIndent(exp, "", " ")
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: export domain %d: encode: %v", d.ID, err)
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http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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filename := fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-domain-%s.json", d.Name)
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contentType := "application/json"
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if password != "" {
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// An export is small, so it is sealed in memory: the response is only
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// started once the ciphertext is complete and nothing can half-fail.
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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env, err := secretfile.NewWriter(&buf, secretfile.TypeDomainExport, password)
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if err == nil {
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_, err = env.Write(body)
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}
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if err == nil {
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err = env.Close()
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}
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: export domain %d: encrypt: %v", d.ID, err)
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http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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body = buf.Bytes()
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filename = fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-domain-%s%s", d.Name, secretfile.ExtDomainExport)
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contentType = "application/octet-stream"
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filename))
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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_, _ = w.Write(body)
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}
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// HandleImportDomain accepts an uploaded domain-export file and re-creates the
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// domain on this instance (architecture.md § Persistence). The domain name is
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// normalised and validated here (security.md); the domain service validates
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// the selector, each login and address, and the DKIM key before writing
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// anything. On success it redirects to the new domain's page; on failure it
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// re-renders the backup page, where the import form lives, with a friendly
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// message.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleImportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, ok := h.requireGlobal(w, r); !ok {
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return
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}
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxImportBytes)
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if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(maxImportBytes); err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not read the uploaded file (too large or not a valid upload).")
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return
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}
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file, _, err := r.FormFile("file")
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if err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Choose a domain export file to import.")
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return
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}
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defer file.Close()
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// An encrypted export announces itself with the envelope magic, so the file
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// decides which path it takes; the password field is only consulted when the
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// file actually needs it, and a password typed for a plain file is a plain
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// mistake worth reporting.
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head := make([]byte, secretfile.MagicLen)
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n, err := io.ReadFull(file, head)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) && !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not read the uploaded file.")
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return
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}
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source := io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(head[:n]), file)
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password := r.PostFormValue("import_password")
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if secretfile.HasMagic(head[:n]) {
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if password == "" {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is encrypted — enter the password it was exported with.")
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return
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}
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env, err := secretfile.NewReader(source, password)
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if err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, decryptErrorMessage(err))
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return
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}
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if env.Type() != secretfile.TypeDomainExport {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is an encrypted "+env.Type().String()+", not a domain export.")
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return
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}
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// Read the whole plaintext first: authentication of the last chunk is
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// what proves the file is intact, and a streaming JSON decoder could
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// accept a truncated document before ever reaching it.
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plain, err := io.ReadAll(env)
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if err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, decryptErrorMessage(err))
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return
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}
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source = bytes.NewReader(plain)
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} else if password != "" {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is not encrypted — leave the password empty.")
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return
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}
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var exp domain.DomainExport
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dec := json.NewDecoder(source)
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dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
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if err := dec.Decode(&exp); err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is not a valid SelfPost domain export.")
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return
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}
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// Normalise and validate the domain name before it reaches the service, the
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// same gate the add-domain form uses (security.md).
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exp.Domain = validate.NormalizeDomain(exp.Domain)
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if err := validate.Domain(exp.Domain); err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid domain in export file: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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d, err := h.domains.Import(exp)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: import domain %q: %v", exp.Domain, err)
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status, msg := importErrorMessage(err)
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, status, msg)
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return
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}
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if exp.DMARCRua != "" {
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h.resyncDMARC("domain import")
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/outbound/domains/%d?imported=1", d.ID), http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
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// secretFilePassword reads the "encrypt this download with a password" controls
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// shared by the full-backup and domain-export forms. It returns the password to
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// encrypt with — empty when the box is not ticked, which keeps the plain
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// .tar.gz/.json behaviour of earlier versions — or a message to show above the
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// form. The confirmation field is checked here rather than in the browser
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// because a typo in an encryption password is unrecoverable: the archive would
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// be sealed with a secret the operator does not know.
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func secretFilePassword(r *http.Request) (password, errMsg string) {
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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return "", "Invalid form submission."
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}
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if r.PostFormValue("encrypt") == "" {
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return "", ""
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}
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password = r.PostFormValue("password")
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if len([]rune(password)) < validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen {
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return "", fmt.Sprintf("The encryption password must be at least %d characters.", validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen)
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}
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if password != r.PostFormValue("password_confirm") {
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return "", "The two passwords do not match."
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}
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return password, ""
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}
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// decryptErrorMessage phrases an envelope failure for the operator. A wrong
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// password and a damaged file are deliberately indistinguishable to the code,
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// so the message names both possibilities.
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func decryptErrorMessage(err error) string {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrWrongPassword):
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return "Wrong password, or the file has been altered since it was exported."
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case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrCorrupt):
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return "That file is damaged or incomplete."
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case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrNotEncrypted):
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return "That file is not a SelfPost export."
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default:
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return "Could not decrypt the file."
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}
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}
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// deployBackupErr phrases a pre-flight backup failure for the operator.
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func deployBackupErr(err error) string {
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if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "DeployRoot") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "deploy root") {
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return "Full backup needs the project directory mounted read-only at /selfpost-deploy — add .:/selfpost-deploy:ro to the volumes in docker-compose.yml and recreate the container."
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}
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return "Could not create the backup: " + err.Error()
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}
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// importErrorMessage maps a domain-import failure (already logged by the caller)
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// to an HTTP status and a user-facing message. Duplicate domain/login are called
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// out specifically; other failures — validation errors describing what is wrong
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// with the file, or an internal write/reload problem — are surfaced verbatim to
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// this admin-only panel so the operator can act on them.
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func importErrorMessage(err error) (int, string) {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, store.ErrDomainExists):
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return http.StatusConflict, "A domain with that name already exists here. Delete it first, or import into a fresh instance."
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case errors.Is(err, store.ErrLoginExists):
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return http.StatusConflict, "One of the application logins in the file is already in use on this instance. Application logins must be unique across all domains."
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default:
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return http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not import the domain: " + err.Error()
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}
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}
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