[1.3.0] Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration. Added: - licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex - docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry Security: - The independent security review of the send-log authorization and Fixed: - test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in - security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's - mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that - panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer - panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials … (2 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full - docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance - docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7) - licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in - ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release … (9 more in CHANGELOG) [1.3.1] Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration. Added: - Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy - docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format, - docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in - docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery - Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`; - docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for - docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh Changed: - docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings - docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages - docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and Fixed: - ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1]. Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1).
130 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
130 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
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// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
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// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
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// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
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const renewThreshold = time.Hour
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// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
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// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
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// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
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// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
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// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
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// cookie.
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type sessionStore struct {
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store *store.Store
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idle time.Duration
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}
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func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
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return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
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}
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// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
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// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
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// server would have expired it anyway.
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func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
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return int(s.idle.Seconds())
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}
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func hashToken(token string) string {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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}
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// Create issues a new session for username and returns its token. It fails
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// closed: if the row cannot be written the caller gets an error and must not
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// hand out a cookie, because a token that is not in the database looks like a
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// signed-in browser while every request it makes bounces back to /login.
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func (s *sessionStore) Create(username string) (string, error) {
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token := randomToken(32)
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now := time.Now()
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if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), username, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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// Pruning is housekeeping: the new session is already valid, so a failure
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// here is logged and does not fail the login.
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if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
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}
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return token, nil
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}
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// Lookup returns the session username for a token if it exists and is
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// unexpired.
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func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (string, bool) {
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if token == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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hash := hashToken(token)
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row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
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return "", false
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}
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if !found {
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return "", false
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}
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if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
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}
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return "", false
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}
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return row.Username, true
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}
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// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
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// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so.
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func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
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hash := hashToken(token)
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row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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if !found {
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return false
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}
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lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
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now := time.Now()
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if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
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return false
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}
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if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// Rename updates the username carried by a session, keeping its expiry.
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func (s *sessionStore) Rename(token, username string) {
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if err := s.store.RenameSession(hashToken(token), username); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: rename failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// DestroyOthers invalidates every session except keep.
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func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(keep string) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
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func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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