Comments only, no behaviour changed. modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1 (the _pragma list on every connection, busy_timeout first; extended result codes; a deferred BEGIN; multi-statement Exec) and SQLite 3.53.4's documentation (transactions, WAL, foreign keys, NOCASE, upsert, julianday, partial indexes); htmx 2.0.4 src/htmx.js; the Fetch and HTML standards for Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, SameSite, __Host-, CSP and defer order; Go's html/template. Comments the source contradicts are corrected - the driver does not serialise writes (SetMaxOpenConns(1) does), htmx:load fires per swapped element, no-store does not keep a page out of history. Left for their own commits: D-S3 a migration two processes can both run, D-S20 recipient case, D-B3 Origin: null under Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, D-H5/H6/H7/H9 (audit M11, stage 4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
133 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
133 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
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// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
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// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
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// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
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const renewThreshold = time.Hour
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// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
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// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
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// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
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// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
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// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
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// cookie.
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type sessionStore struct {
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store *store.Store
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idle time.Duration
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}
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func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
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return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
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}
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// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
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// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
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// server would have expired it anyway. RFC 6265 § 5.2.2: Max-Age sets the
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// expiry to now plus that many seconds, and a cookie set again under the same
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// name, domain and path replaces the old one (§ 5.3 step 11), so each renewal
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// slides it.
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func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
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return int(s.idle.Seconds())
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}
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func hashToken(token string) string {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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}
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// Create issues a new session for the user and returns its token. It fails
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// closed: if the row cannot be written the caller gets an error and must not
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// hand out a cookie, because a token that is not in the database looks like a
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// signed-in browser while every request it makes bounces back to /login.
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func (s *sessionStore) Create(userID int64) (string, error) {
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token := randomToken(32)
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now := time.Now()
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if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), userID, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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// Pruning is housekeeping: the new session is already valid, so a failure
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// here is logged and does not fail the login.
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if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
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}
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return token, nil
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}
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// Lookup returns the id of the user a token's session belongs to, if the
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// session exists and is unexpired.
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func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (int64, bool) {
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if token == "" {
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return 0, false
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}
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hash := hashToken(token)
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row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
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return 0, false
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}
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if !found {
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return 0, false
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}
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if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
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}
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return 0, false
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}
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return row.UserID, true
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}
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// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
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// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so.
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func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
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hash := hashToken(token)
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row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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if !found {
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return false
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}
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lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
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now := time.Now()
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if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
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return false
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}
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if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// DestroyOthers invalidates every session of the user except keep.
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func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(userID int64, keep string) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(userID, hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// DestroyAll invalidates every session of the user.
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func (s *sessionStore) DestroyAll(userID int64) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteUserSessions(userID); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy all failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
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func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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