Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/session.go
T
mix 0730b2090e release: 1.3.0: 1.3.0-1.3.1: security pass, queue persist, full backup layout
[1.3.0]
Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration.
Added:
  - licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex
  - docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry
Security:
  - The independent security review of the send-log authorization and
Fixed:
  - test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in
  - security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's
  - mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that
  - panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer
  - panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials
  … (2 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full
  - docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance
  - docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7)
  - licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in
  - ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release
  … (9 more in CHANGELOG)
[1.3.1]
Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration.
Added:
  - Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy
  - docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format,
  - docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in
  - docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery
  - Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`;
  - docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for
  - docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh
Changed:
  - docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings
  - docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages
  - docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and
Fixed:
  - ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped

Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1].

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1).
2026-09-22 15:24:52 +03:00

130 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
const renewThreshold = time.Hour
// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
// cookie.
type sessionStore struct {
store *store.Store
idle time.Duration
}
func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
}
// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
// server would have expired it anyway.
func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
return int(s.idle.Seconds())
}
func hashToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// Create issues a new session for username and returns its token. It fails
// closed: if the row cannot be written the caller gets an error and must not
// hand out a cookie, because a token that is not in the database looks like a
// signed-in browser while every request it makes bounces back to /login.
func (s *sessionStore) Create(username string) (string, error) {
token := randomToken(32)
now := time.Now()
if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), username, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Pruning is housekeeping: the new session is already valid, so a failure
// here is logged and does not fail the login.
if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
}
return token, nil
}
// Lookup returns the session username for a token if it exists and is
// unexpired.
func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (string, bool) {
if token == "" {
return "", false
}
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
return "", false
}
if !found {
return "", false
}
if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
}
return "", false
}
return row.Username, true
}
// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so.
func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
return false
}
if !found {
return false
}
lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
now := time.Now()
if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
return false
}
if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
// Rename updates the username carried by a session, keeping its expiry.
func (s *sessionStore) Rename(token, username string) {
if err := s.store.RenameSession(hashToken(token), username); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: rename failed: %v", err)
}
}
// DestroyOthers invalidates every session except keep.
func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(keep string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
}
}
// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
}
}