Owner, 2026-10-18: "Оба предложения делаем"; the mockup is c10cd78. The
security audit's M7: Required is Postfix's encrypt level, which checks no
certificate - it keeps the mail from a listener, not from one who answers
in the upstream's place.
- A fourth TLS mode, Verified, stored as Postfix's level secure (migration
0014 rebuilds inbound_transports with the wider CHECK; schema 14) and
written to the TLS policy map like the others. Postfix matches the
certificate against the next hop's name (smtp_tls_secure_cert_match =
nexthop, dot-nexthop, the default; postconf(5)), so Verified is refused
for an upstream given by address (checkSecureHost).
- Postfix's SMTP client trusts Debian's ca-certificates bundle
(smtp_tls_CAfile): Postfix trusts none by default (DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE
"", DEF_TLS_APPEND_DEF_CA 0). The levels may and encrypt only log the
verdict, so mail to recipients' MX is unchanged.
- The page: the select's fourth option, a help line under it, the lead
"over verified TLS", the list's tag "verified"; Help word for word with
the mockup; guide § Inbound relay, with a posttls-finger command to try
an upstream first.
Tests: TestVerifiedTLSNeedsTheUpstreamsName, TestRenderInboundMapsSecure,
TestUpstreamTLSModeSecure; schema tests at 14. e2e
inbound_upstream_verified_tls: an address refused, a name saved as
"[sink]:25 secure" in tls_policy, the page says verified, the CA file set
and present, and posttls-finger -l secure with it calls the stand's
self-signed port 25 "Untrusted" (the stand has no TLS upstream). make e2e
(65 passed) and go vet + go test (26 packages) on the test server for this
tree. Tried against the live upstream from the 2.14.5 container:
mc-ent.mixfed.ru gives "Verified TLS connection established".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
145 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
145 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
package postfix
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import (
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"fmt"
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"path/filepath"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/configsafe"
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)
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// InboundRoute is one inbound domain's Postfix map material: the relay
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// domain, the next-hop transport, the TLS policy for that hop, and the
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// recipient list (or a domain catch-all).
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type InboundRoute struct {
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Domain string
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Host string
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Port int
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TLSMode string
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RecipientMode string
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Recipients []string
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}
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func (p *Postfix) inboundMapPaths() (relayDomains, transport, recipients, tlsPolicy string) {
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dir := filepath.Dir(p.senderLoginMapsPath)
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return filepath.Join(dir, "relay_domains"),
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filepath.Join(dir, "transport"),
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filepath.Join(dir, "relay_recipients"),
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filepath.Join(dir, "tls_policy")
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}
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// RebuildInboundMaps regenerates the inbound relay lookup tables from the full
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// set of configured routes and reloads Postfix. Domains with an empty host are
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// omitted so mail is never accepted with nowhere to send it. Full regeneration
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// keeps the files a pure function of the registry (security.md).
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func (p *Postfix) RebuildInboundMaps(routes []InboundRoute) error {
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relay, transport, recipients, tlsPolicy, err := renderInboundMaps(routes)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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rd, tr, rc, tl := p.inboundMapPaths()
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changed, err := writeChanged(mapFile{rd, relay}, mapFile{tr, transport}, mapFile{rc, recipients}, mapFile{tl, tlsPolicy})
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if err != nil || !changed {
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return err
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}
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return p.reload()
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}
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// Postfix 3.10.13, man/man5/postconf.5: a relay_domains table "is matched when
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// a (parent) domain appears as lookup key", the value unused; relay_recipient_maps
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// is used as a list, "@domain" its wild-card (src/global/mail_addr_find.c,
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// MA_FIND_AT_DOMAIN, the exact domain only). man/man5/transport.5: "domain
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// transport:nexthop" for that domain. README_FILES/TLS_README: the
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// smtp_tls_policy_maps key is the verbatim next-hop; src/tls/tls_level.c names
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// the levels none, may and encrypt.
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func renderInboundMaps(routes []InboundRoute) (relay, transport, recipients, tlsPolicy []byte, err error) {
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sort.Slice(routes, func(i, j int) bool { return routes[i].Domain < routes[j].Domain })
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var relayB, transportB, recipB, tlsB strings.Builder
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// One TLS policy line per next hop: the map is keyed by it, and a key
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// written twice was a warning from Postfix and the first line's mode
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// (audit 2026-10-12, L5). The panel refuses two modes for one next hop
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// (inbound.Service.SetTransport); rows saved before that keep the
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// first by domain name, which is what Postfix did with them.
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tlsFor := map[string]bool{}
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for _, r := range routes {
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if strings.TrimSpace(r.Host) == "" {
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continue
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}
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if err := assertInboundRouteSafe(r); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
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}
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nexthop := inboundNexthop(r.Host, r.Port)
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fmt.Fprintf(&relayB, "%s OK\n", r.Domain)
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fmt.Fprintf(&transportB, "%s smtp:%s\n", r.Domain, nexthop)
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if !tlsFor[nexthop] {
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tlsFor[nexthop] = true
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fmt.Fprintf(&tlsB, "%s %s\n", nexthop, r.TLSMode)
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}
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switch r.RecipientMode {
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case "any":
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fmt.Fprintf(&recipB, "@%s OK\n", r.Domain)
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default:
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addrs := append([]string(nil), r.Recipients...)
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sort.Strings(addrs)
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for _, addr := range addrs {
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fmt.Fprintf(&recipB, "%s OK\n", addr)
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}
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}
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}
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return []byte(relayB.String()), []byte(transportB.String()), []byte(recipB.String()), []byte(tlsB.String()), nil
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}
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// inboundNexthop is the Postfix next-hop [host]:port form. The brackets are
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// what disable the MX lookup, so the operator's explicit upstream is used as
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// given; they also delimit a bare IPv6 address.
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//
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// Postfix 3.10.13, src/smtp/smtp_connect.c: no MX lookup for a destination that
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// starts with "["; src/util/host_port.c, host_port(): "[host]:port", the host
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// a name or an address ("ipv6:" in front is optional), checked by
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// valid_hostaddr().
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func inboundNexthop(host string, port int) string {
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return "[" + host + "]:" + strconv.Itoa(port)
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}
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func assertInboundRouteSafe(r InboundRoute) error {
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if err := assertMapToken(r.Domain, "domain"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := assertMapToken(r.Host, "host"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if r.Port < 1 || r.Port > 65535 {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: invalid inbound port %d", r.Port)
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}
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switch r.TLSMode {
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case "may", "encrypt", "secure", "none":
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: invalid tls mode %q", r.TLSMode)
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}
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if r.RecipientMode != "list" && r.RecipientMode != "any" {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: invalid recipient mode %q", r.RecipientMode)
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}
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for _, addr := range r.Recipients {
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if err := assertMapToken(addr, "recipient"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// texthashForbidden is what may never appear in a texthash line: whitespace and
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// the newline that would end it, the comma that separates values, and the
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// backslash.
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const texthashForbidden = " \t\r\n,\\"
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// assertMapToken rejects values that could break out of a texthash line.
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func assertMapToken(v, what string) error {
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if err := configsafe.Token(what, v, texthashForbidden); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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