Files
selfpost/internal/dmarc/parse.go
T
mix 7ef7f75246 release: 1.9.2: Review pass: port-25 milters, DMARC validation, rate-limit fix
Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump.
Added:
  - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` —
  - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML
  - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration
Changed:
  - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the
Fixed:
  - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other
  - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now
  - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of
  - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was
  - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second
  … (11 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code
  - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character
  - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived
  - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through
  - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and
  … (7 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs
  - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`,

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2).
2026-09-22 15:24:53 +03:00

217 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package dmarc
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"encoding/xml"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"time"
)
// ParsedReport is the structured form of a DMARC aggregate XML payload.
type ParsedReport struct {
Reporter string
ReportID string
ContactEmail string
PeriodBegin time.Time
PeriodEnd time.Time
Domain string
PolicyP string
PolicySP string
PolicyPct int
PolicyADKIM string
PolicyASPF string
Records []ParsedRecord
PassCount int
FailCount int
}
// ParsedRecord is one <record> row from the aggregate XML.
type ParsedRecord struct {
SourceIP string
Count int
Disposition string
SPFResult string
DKIMResult string
HeaderFrom string
}
type feedbackXML struct {
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"feedback"`
Metadata struct {
OrgName string `xml:"org_name"`
Email string `xml:"email"`
ReportID string `xml:"report_id"`
DateRange struct {
Begin int64 `xml:"begin"`
End int64 `xml:"end"`
} `xml:"date_range"`
} `xml:"report_metadata"`
Policy struct {
Domain string `xml:"domain"`
P string `xml:"p"`
SP string `xml:"sp"`
Pct int `xml:"pct"`
ADKIM string `xml:"adkim"`
ASPF string `xml:"aspf"`
} `xml:"policy_published"`
Records []struct {
Row struct {
SourceIP string `xml:"source_ip"`
Count int `xml:"count"`
Policy struct {
Disposition string `xml:"disposition"`
DKIM string `xml:"dkim"`
SPF string `xml:"spf"`
} `xml:"policy_evaluated"`
} `xml:"row"`
Identifiers struct {
HeaderFrom string `xml:"header_from"`
} `xml:"identifiers"`
} `xml:"record"`
}
// ParseAggregate decodes gzip- or zip-compressed, or raw, DMARC aggregate XML.
func ParseAggregate(raw []byte) (ParsedReport, error) {
data, err := decompress(raw)
if err != nil {
return ParsedReport{}, err
}
var doc feedbackXML
if err := xml.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %w", err)
}
if doc.Metadata.ReportID == "" || doc.Policy.Domain == "" {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: missing report_id or domain")
}
out := ParsedReport{
Reporter: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Metadata.OrgName),
ReportID: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Metadata.ReportID),
ContactEmail: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Metadata.Email),
PeriodBegin: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.Begin, 0).UTC(),
PeriodEnd: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.End, 0).UTC(),
Domain: strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(doc.Policy.Domain)),
PolicyP: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Policy.P),
PolicySP: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Policy.SP),
PolicyPct: doc.Policy.Pct,
PolicyADKIM: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Policy.ADKIM),
PolicyASPF: strings.TrimSpace(doc.Policy.ASPF),
}
if out.PolicyPct == 0 {
out.PolicyPct = 100
}
for _, rec := range doc.Records {
row := ParsedRecord{
SourceIP: strings.TrimSpace(rec.Row.SourceIP),
Count: rec.Row.Count,
Disposition: strings.TrimSpace(rec.Row.Policy.Disposition),
SPFResult: strings.TrimSpace(rec.Row.Policy.SPF),
DKIMResult: strings.TrimSpace(rec.Row.Policy.DKIM),
HeaderFrom: strings.TrimSpace(rec.Identifiers.HeaderFrom),
}
if row.Count <= 0 {
row.Count = 1
}
if dmarcRecordPasses(row) {
out.PassCount += row.Count
} else {
out.FailCount += row.Count
}
out.Records = append(out.Records, row)
}
return out, nil
}
func dmarcRecordPasses(r ParsedRecord) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(r.SPFResult, "pass") || strings.EqualFold(r.DKIMResult, "pass")
}
// maxAggregateXML bounds the decompressed payload, so a small archive cannot
// expand into an unbounded allocation.
const maxAggregateXML = 8 << 20
// decompress unwraps the container the reporter used. Both are seen in the
// wild: most senders gzip the XML, some (notably several Microsoft and Yahoo
// endpoints) ship it as a single-entry zip.
func decompress(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch {
case len(raw) >= 2 && raw[0] == 0x1f && raw[1] == 0x8b:
return gunzip(raw)
case len(raw) >= 4 && raw[0] == 'P' && raw[1] == 'K' && raw[2] == 0x03 && raw[3] == 0x04:
return unzip(raw)
}
return raw, nil
}
func gunzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
zr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip: %w", err)
}
defer zr.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(zr, maxAggregateXML))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip read: %w", err)
}
return data, nil
}
// unzip returns the first .xml entry of a zip archive. Directories and any
// other members are skipped rather than trusted.
func unzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw), int64(len(raw)))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: %w", err)
}
for _, f := range zr.File {
if f.FileInfo().IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(f.Name), ".xml") {
continue
}
rc, err := f.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip open %s: %w", f.Name, err)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rc, maxAggregateXML))
rc.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip read %s: %w", f.Name, err)
}
return data, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: no xml entry")
}
// TightenPolicyHint summarises whether raising p= looks reasonable.
func TightenPolicyHint(pass, fail int, sources []SourceHint) string {
total := pass + fail
if total == 0 {
return "No messages in the reporting window yet."
}
failPct := float64(fail) * 100 / float64(total)
if fail > 0 {
for _, s := range sources {
if s.FailCount > 0 && !s.ThisRelay {
return "A third-party source is not aligned. Do not tighten p= until that sender is fixed or removed."
}
}
}
if failPct <= 2 && pass > 0 {
return "Alignment looks strong. Tightening p= may be reasonable."
}
if fail > 0 {
return "Some failures remain. Review sources before tightening p=."
}
return "Alignment looks clean for this window."
}
// SourceHint is a panel-facing rollup row with relay detection.
type SourceHint struct {
SourceIP string
PassCount int
FailCount int
ThisRelay bool
}