Files
selfpost/internal/app/validate.go
T
mix ff4d6a6d28 Phase 4: applications + SASL (sasldb2) + sender_login_maps
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in
sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit
list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create,
list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1,
7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in
plaintext (7.6.1).

- internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique
  login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by-
  domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup.
- internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a
  whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password;
  address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config
  write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full
  rollback on partial failure.
- internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of
  the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write,
  injection backstop (7.6.4).
- Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master,
  so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs
  the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the
  unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in
  mail.log.
- domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades,
  then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both
  OpenDKIM and Postfix.
- web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential
  shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises
  /data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal.

Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a
container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete
cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 21:18:10 +03:00

120 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package app
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
)
const (
minLoginLen = 3
maxLoginLen = 64
)
// validateLogin enforces a strict server-side whitelist for the SASL login
// (spec 7.6.2). It intentionally excludes '@': the login is stored in sasldb2,
// where '@' separates the user from the realm, so allowing it would change the
// account's identity. Client validation is never trusted.
//
// The login is the one piece of user input that is passed to saslpasswd2 as a
// command argument (never through a shell, spec 7.6.3); this whitelist is what
// makes that safe.
func validateLogin(login string) error {
if len(login) < minLoginLen || len(login) > maxLoginLen {
return fmt.Errorf("login must be %d-%d characters", minLoginLen, maxLoginLen)
}
for _, r := range login {
lower := r >= 'a' && r <= 'z'
upper := r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z'
digit := r >= '0' && r <= '9'
if !lower && !upper && !digit && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_' {
return fmt.Errorf("login may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateAddressMode checks the submitted mode is one of the two known values.
func validateAddressMode(mode string) error {
if mode != store.AddressModeWildcard && mode != store.AddressModeList {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid address mode")
}
return nil
}
// normalizeAddress lower-cases and trims a sender address. Both the local part
// and domain are treated case-insensitively for the ownership check and for the
// generated map, matching how addresses are compared elsewhere.
func normalizeAddress(addr string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(addr))
}
// validateSenderAddress enforces that a list-mode address is well-formed and,
// critically, belongs to the application's own domain (spec 7.6.2). The domain
// check is done here, before anything is written to a config file — not left to
// smtpd_sender_login_maps to catch at delivery time. domain must already be a
// validated, normalised domain name.
func validateSenderAddress(addr, domain string) error {
at := strings.LastIndexByte(addr, '@')
if at < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%q is not a valid email address", addr)
}
local, host := addr[:at], addr[at+1:]
if host != domain {
return fmt.Errorf("%q does not belong to domain %s", addr, domain)
}
if err := validateLocalPart(local); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%q: %w", addr, err)
}
return nil
}
// validateLocalPart applies a conservative whitelist to the part before '@'.
// This is deliberately stricter than RFC 5321 (no quoted local parts) so the
// value is always safe to write verbatim into the Postfix map (spec 7.6.4).
func validateLocalPart(local string) error {
if local == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("missing the part before '@'")
}
if local[0] == '.' || local[len(local)-1] == '.' {
return fmt.Errorf("local part must not start or end with '.'")
}
for i := 0; i < len(local); i++ {
c := local[i]
lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
if !lower && !digit && c != '.' && c != '-' && c != '_' && c != '+' {
return fmt.Errorf("local part may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.', '-', '_' and '+'")
}
}
return nil
}
// parseAddresses normalises, validates and de-duplicates a list of submitted
// sender addresses for a list-mode application. It requires at least one address
// and that each belongs to domain. The returned slice is de-duplicated but keeps
// submission order stable for display; the store sorts on read.
func parseAddresses(raw []string, domain string) ([]string, error) {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
out := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
for _, r := range raw {
addr := normalizeAddress(r)
if addr == "" {
continue
}
if err := validateSenderAddress(addr, domain); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if seen[addr] {
continue
}
seen[addr] = true
out = append(out, addr)
}
if len(out) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list mode requires at least one address")
}
return out, nil
}