postfix: ETRN refused and not offered (audit S6)
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding S6 (low), stage 0 - proven from outside: `ETRN <an inbound domain>` on port 25 answered "250 Queuing started". smtpd_etrn_restrictions was empty (Postfix allows every client) and fast_flush_domains = $relay_domains, so a stranger could flush the deferred queue toward an inbound domain's upstream at will. Now smtpd_etrn_restrictions=reject (etrn_cmd -> smtpd_check_etrn -> reject_code 554, Postfix 3.10.13 src/smtpd/smtpd.c) and smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=etrn. e2e: testInboundRelay sends EHLO + ETRN for the inbound domain on port 25 and expects 554 and no ETRN in the EHLO reply (etrnPort25); checkPostfixHardening reads both settings back. To be run on the server. Docs: architecture.md § Postfix; CHANGELOG; plan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
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hundred long lines were megabytes held per connection.
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- **A link's token stays out of the duplicate-cookie log line** (audit A4),
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as it already did out of the origin check's.
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- **ETRN is refused and no longer offered** (audit S6): Postfix's default
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let anyone on port 25 flush the queue toward an inbound domain's upstream.
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- **The entrypoint follows no link at the DMARC maps** (audit I2): the
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three `dmarc_*` maps root creates at the start were missing from the list
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of paths where a symbolic link is removed first.
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@@ -323,11 +323,18 @@ postconf -e \
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# and the banner names no distribution (Debian's adds "(Debian)": postfix
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# 3.10.13-0+deb13u1, debian/main.cf.in:15 "(@DEB_VENDOR@)", filled in by
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# debian/rules:118; the upstream default is "$myhostname ESMTP $mail_name").
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# ETRN is refused to everyone and not offered: Postfix's default lets any
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# client flush the queue toward an inbound domain's upstream
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# (fast_flush_domains = $relay_domains), and nothing here needs it (security
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# audit 2026-10-17, S6; Postfix 3.10.13, src/smtpd/smtpd.c, etrn_cmd() asks
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# smtpd_check_etrn(), whose "reject" answers reject_code, 554).
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postconf -e \
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"smtpd_tls_protocols=>=TLSv1.2" \
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"smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols=>=TLSv1.2" \
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"smtp_tls_mandatory_protocols=>=TLSv1.2" \
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"disable_vrfy_command=yes" \
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"smtpd_etrn_restrictions=reject" \
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"smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=etrn" \
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'smtpd_banner=$myhostname ESMTP'
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# SASL: Cyrus with the local sasldb2 the panel maintains. The realm is left
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@@ -103,7 +103,10 @@ smtp/inet` removes Debian's stock smtpd). Outbound delivery still uses the
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`smtpd_milters` is always overridden on this service, because main.cf's
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submission chain would otherwise let a signing outage defer relayed mail and
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would file inbound mail into the outbound send log under the sender's
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domain. With the inbound relay on the chain is the optional antispam milter,
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domain. `ETRN` is refused on every listener and not offered in the EHLO
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reply (`smtpd_etrn_restrictions=reject`, `smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=etrn`):
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Postfix's default lets any client flush the queue toward an inbound
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domain's upstream. With the inbound relay on the chain is the optional antispam milter,
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then the panel's **inbound journal milter** (unix socket
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`INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET`, default
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`/run/selfpost/inbound-journal.sock`, `default_action=accept`); with DMARC
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@@ -709,9 +709,11 @@ the argument.
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- [x] **A4.** Duplicate-cookie line through `loggedPath`. — **Sonnet**, 0.25 h.
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*Done 2026-10-17:* `loggedPath` moved to `auth.LoggedPath`, used by both
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lines; TestDuplicateCookieLineHidesALinksToken.
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- [ ] **S6.** `smtpd_etrn_restrictions = reject`, `smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords
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- [x] **S6.** `smtpd_etrn_restrictions = reject`, `smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords
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= etrn` in postfix-config.sh; architecture.md § Postfix one line. Done when
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an e2e `ETRN` on 25 gets `554`. — **Opus**, 0.5 h.
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an e2e `ETRN` on 25 gets `554`. — **Opus**, 0.5 h. *Done 2026-10-17:*
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testInboundRelay sends ETRN for the inbound domain; checkPostfixHardening
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reads both settings back.
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- [ ] **X1.** SECURITY.md's table: `latest 2.x` supported, `1.x` not. —
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**Sonnet**, 0.25 h.
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@@ -82,6 +82,37 @@ func waitForPort25Ready(timeout time.Duration) error {
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})
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}
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// etrnPort25 sends EHLO and then ETRN domain on port 25 and returns ETRN's
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// reply code and what EHLO offered.
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func etrnPort25(domain string) (int, string, error) {
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conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", port25Addr, 10*time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", port25Addr, err)
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}
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defer conn.Close()
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_ = conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(30 * time.Second))
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tp := textproto.NewConn(conn)
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if _, _, err := tp.ReadResponse(220); err != nil {
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return 0, "", err
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}
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if err := tp.PrintfLine("EHLO mx.stranger.e2e.test"); err != nil {
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return 0, "", err
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}
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_, ehlo, err := tp.ReadResponse(250)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, ehlo, err
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}
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if err := tp.PrintfLine("ETRN %s", domain); err != nil {
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return 0, ehlo, err
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}
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code, _, err := tp.ReadResponse(0)
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_ = tp.PrintfLine("QUIT")
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if code != 0 {
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err = nil // any code is the answer asked for
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}
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return code, ehlo, err
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}
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// deliverPort25Raw is deliverPort25 with the DATA bytes written as they
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// stand. net/smtp's data writer would turn a bare LF into CRLF and stuff a
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// lone "." (net/textproto, DotWriter), which is the very input this is for.
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@@ -262,6 +262,12 @@ func testInboundRelay(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
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to, token, time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC1123Z))
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}
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// A stranger cannot flush the queue toward the domain's upstream: ETRN is
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// refused and not offered (security audit 2026-10-17, S6).
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if code, ehlo, err := etrnPort25(inboundDomain); err != nil || code != 554 || strings.Contains(strings.ToUpper(ehlo), "ETRN") {
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t.Errorf("ETRN %s on port 25 = %d (%v), EHLO offers:\n%s", inboundDomain, code, err, ehlo)
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}
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token := uniqueToken("inbound")
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if res := deliverPort25("someone@stranger.e2e.test", inboundRecipient, message(inboundRecipient, token)); !res.ok() {
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t.Fatalf("port 25 did not accept mail for %s: %v", inboundRecipient, res.firstErr())
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@@ -149,12 +149,13 @@ func checkDKIMTree(s *stack) error {
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// checkPostfixHardening reads back what postfix-config.sh sets against
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// downgrade and enumeration (audit 2026-10-12, L31).
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func checkPostfixHardening(s *stack) error {
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out, err := s.execIn("selfpost", "postconf", "-h", "smtpd_tls_protocols", "smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols", "disable_vrfy_command", "smtpd_banner")
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out, err := s.execIn("selfpost", "postconf", "-h", "smtpd_tls_protocols", "smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols", "disable_vrfy_command", "smtpd_banner",
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"smtpd_etrn_restrictions", "smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords")
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("postconf: %v\n%s", err, out)
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}
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got := strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(out), "\n")
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want := []string{">=TLSv1.2", ">=TLSv1.2", "yes", "$myhostname ESMTP"}
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want := []string{">=TLSv1.2", ">=TLSv1.2", "yes", "$myhostname ESMTP", "reject", "etrn"}
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if strings.Join(got, "|") != strings.Join(want, "|") {
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return fmt.Errorf("postconf -h of the hardened settings = %q, want %q", got, want)
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}
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