findings of the reviews of audit stage 2

Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of a59e3d4..cb5a4a2;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing critical, high or medium; no
outright bug. Fixed:

- F2, F3 (0008 backfill, before it runs on the live database): rows are
  filled by the rule new rows follow - the application's domain, then the
  name's - and only by a domain and application that existed when the row
  was written (created_at); the inbound log likewise. Test: the migration's
  UPDATEs re-run on prepared rows (before the domain, after, null sender,
  application gone, a stranger's name). Dry run on a copy of the live
  database: 68/68 and 10/10 rows filled, none disagreeing with its login's
  domain, integrity ok.
- V2, F4: an application's statistics and level-2 count are its login's
  rows of its domain (appByLogin), and StatsWindow starts no earlier than
  the entity's creation; the message page's "may send as" only for a login
  still of the row's domain. Test: a login taken again in another domain
  starts at zero.
- F7: MAIL FROM:<> is held to the domain limit of its login
  (ApplicationByLogin fills DomainName).
- V3: an imported DKIM selector is held to DNS labels (validate.Selector).
- F5, F6: an imported auto limit's numbers are dropped and recalculated
  right after the import; its mode is stored trimmed.
- V6: the store refuses a role that is neither global nor domain.
- F9: SaveUser keeps the stored hash when no new password is given (the
  form no longer writes back the hash it read). F10: a reach naming a
  domain deleted meanwhile is ErrNoSuchDomain, answered on the form.
- V4, F12: from-lines-other.txt - lines naming another sender ({other}) in
  a quoted string, a quoted pair, capitals, a comment, an encoded word, a
  quoted local part; the unit test wants each refused, the e2e
  (lines_naming_another_sender_never_signed_for_it) wants each refused and
  none signed for it. The passed list gained a.{DOMAIN}, a comment after
  the angle address, a quoted local part, and "b@ {other}" - passed by
  design (security.md), and the e2e shows it signed for the own domain.
- F13: e2e login_in_other_capitals_does_not_authenticate - AUTH with the
  login upper-cased gets 535.

Not changed, written down: V1/F1 - L8 is half closed (refused or passed
still tells an application which domains are hosted here); security.md's
accepted risks and the CHANGELOG say so, and the owner is asked whether to
refuse every foreign address in a display name (changes the 2.4.0 rule).
F11 - deleting a domain rewrites its rows' domain_id (seconds at 1e5 rows),
accepted at this size. F8 (test cannot tell write-first from read-first;
the reviewer verified it with two stores, 30/30), V5, V7, P2: noted.

Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23
packages ok, make e2e exit 0 with the three new cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -70,14 +70,28 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
   with nothing assigned. Saving and creating a user are now one transaction
   each, the e-mail included (audit 2026-10-12, M9).
 
+- **The users form keeps a password changed meanwhile, and says when a
+  domain it offered is gone.** Saving a user wrote back the password hash
+  read when the form was opened, which undid a password the user changed on
+  Account in between; a domain deleted while the form was open ended in an
+  error page.
 - **A domain import is checked like the forms.** The import trusted the file
   for the report address, the rate limits and the client addresses: a limit
   with a window of no seconds counted nothing, and an address that was not
   one made the application refuse every client without a word. The file is
   now held to the forms' rules before anything is created, and refused with
-  the form's own message, naming the field and the application (audit
-  2026-10-12, M10).
+  the form's own message, naming the field and the application; the DKIM
+  selector is held to DNS labels; an auto limit's numbers are worked out on
+  this server right after the import rather than taken from the file
+  (audit 2026-10-12, M10).
 
+- **An application's numbers are its own.** Statistics, the level-2 count
+  and an auto limit's recalculation counted every row of the login, so an
+  application created with the login of a deleted one - in another domain,
+  even - started with the old one's traffic. They now count the login's rows
+  of its domain, from the application's creation on. A message with an empty
+  envelope sender (`MAIL FROM:<>`) is held to its domain's level-2 limit by
+  its login, like the application's other mail.
 - **A domain added again starts with an empty log.** Send-log rows belonged
   to a domain by its name, so a domain deleted and added again showed its
   earlier mail to whoever it was assigned to next, and its statistics and
@@ -86,12 +100,13 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
   registry); the rows of a deleted domain are the global role's alone. The
   inbound log follows the same rule (audit 2026-10-12, L12).
 
-- **A refusal no longer says which other domain sends from this server.**
-  A `From:` line that named another sender of the server was refused with
-  that sender's domain in the reply, which confirmed to whoever tried names
-  that it is hosted here. The reply now stops at "it names another sender of
-  this server"; the line as written stays in the reply and on the refused
-  message's page (audit 2026-10-12, L8).
+- **A refusal no longer names the other domain.** A `From:` line that named
+  another sender of the server was refused with that sender's domain in the
+  reply. The reply now stops at "it names another sender of this server";
+  the line as written stays in the reply and on the refused message's page.
+  That such a line is refused at all still tells the sending application
+  that the domain is hosted here (security.md, accepted risks) (audit
+  2026-10-12, L8).
 
 ### Added
 

docs/audit-2026-10-12.md

@@ -688,6 +688,13 @@ has already run is never edited — the next file is added; the published
    are still in the global log. — **Opus**
    *Done 2026-10-14.* DMARC reports stay by name on purpose: a report is
    about the name in DNS, and whoever holds the name now is its reader.
+   *Changed by the reviews of stage 2:* the backfill follows the rule new
+   rows follow (the application's domain, then the name) and gives a row
+   only to a domain - and an application - that existed when it was
+   written; an application's numbers are its login's rows of its domain,
+   from its creation on. Deleting a domain now rewrites its rows' domain_id
+   (14 s for 333k rows, measured by the review; milliseconds at this
+   installation's size) - accepted, to revisit if a log grows that large.
 - [x] Docs: security.md § Roles (the guard) and the struck accepted risk, guide
    § Domain export, schema-migrations.md. — **Sonnet**
 - [x] **Which key OpenDKIM signs with, seen and not reasoned** (owner,
@@ -701,6 +708,14 @@ has already run is never edited — the next file is added; the published
    shared with the check's unit test, so a line added to one is run by the
    other. A disagreement found is fixed in the check before the cut, and
    security.md § Mail path says the claim is tested. - **Opus**
+   *Changed by the reviews of stage 2:* a second list, lines naming another
+   sender in a quoted string, a comment, a quoted pair, capitals, an encoded
+   word (`from-lines-other.txt`), each refused and never signed for it; the
+   passed list gained capitals, a quoted local part and a name with a space
+   after its `@` (passed by design, signed for the own domain). L8 is half
+   closed: refused-or-passed still tells an application which domains are
+   hosted here - the owner decides whether to refuse every foreign address
+   in a display name (asked 2026-10-14).
    *Done 2026-10-14:* fifteen lines (`internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt`),
    each signed for the application's domain alone, the signature valid. No
    disagreement. Groups are refused by the check, so none is in the file;

docs/security.md

@@ -216,10 +216,17 @@ operator can act on it.
   the line may hold one `@`. That the two agree is tested, not only argued:
   the e2e sends every `From:` line the check passes - a list it shares with
   the check's unit test, `internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt` -
-  and wants the message signed for the application's domain and no other.
-  The reply to a refusal says that the line names another sender of the
-  server, not which: it would confirm to whoever tries names that a domain
-  is hosted here. What this does not promise is what a display
+  and wants the message signed for the application's domain and no other;
+  and every line of a second list, lines that name another sender of the
+  server in a quoted string, a comment, a quoted pair, capitals or an encoded
+  word (`from-lines-other.txt`), must be refused and never arrive signed for
+  that sender. The reply to a refusal says that the line names another
+  sender of the server, not which. That a line naming a domain is refused
+  when the domain is a sender of this server, and passed when it is not,
+  still tells an application which domains are hosted here; the probe needs
+  an application of this server, and refusing every foreign address in a
+  display name would change the 2.4.0 rule - the owner decides (accepted
+  risks). What this does not promise is what a display
   name looks like to a person: a name of another sender written without an
   `@` the scan can find (a full-width dot, a space inside the name) passes,
   signed with the application's own key - a forged display name is as old
@@ -436,6 +443,15 @@ deferred item from the roadmap.
   through - but no message data. The inbound journal itself is in the
   database, 0640. Trigger to revisit: a shared host, where the sidecar should
   instead be given the files through a group it shares with the panel.
+- **An application can learn which domains are senders of this server.**
+  A `From:` whose display name or comment names an address at a domain this
+  server signs for is refused; one naming any other domain passes. The reply
+  no longer names the domain (audit 2026-10-12, L8), but refused or passed
+  answers the question for whoever sends the line. Accepted for now: it needs
+  an application of this server, and closing it means refusing every
+  foreign address in a display name, which changes the owner's 2.4.0 rule
+  (a stranger's address in the name passes) - his decision, asked on
+  2026-10-14.
 - ~~**A row of the inbound log belongs to a domain by name.**~~ Struck in
   `2.5.0` (audit 2026-10-12, L12): both logs now hold a domain by id, see
   § Roles.

internal/milter/milter_test.go

@@ -700,3 +700,18 @@ func TestDomainOf(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// MAIL FROM:<> has no domain of its own; it is held to the limit of its
+// login's domain like the application's other mail (review of audit stage 2).
+func TestRateLimitHoldsTheNullSenderToItsLoginsDomain(t *testing.T) {
+	rec := &fakeRecorder{
+		apps: map[string]store.Application{"app1": {Login: "app1", DomainName: "example.com"}},
+		limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{
+			store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": domainLimit(),
+		},
+		counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 5}, // == max
+	}
+	if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "<>", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail {
+		t.Fatalf("a null sender over its domain's limit = %v, want TempFail (4xx)", resp)
+	}
+}

internal/milter/ratelimit.go

@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ func (s *session) overLimit() bool {
 	}
 
 	domain := domainOf(s.from)
+	if domain == "" && s.login != "" {
+		// MAIL FROM:<> has no domain to read; the login has one. A null
+		// sender is held to its application's domain like any other message
+		// of it (review of audit stage 2).
+		if a, err := s.rec.ApplicationByLogin(s.login); err == nil {
+			domain = a.DomainName
+		}
+	}
 	if domain == "" {
 		return false
 	}

internal/milter/sender_test.go

@@ -283,8 +283,15 @@ func TestSenderCheckRefusalWithNullSenderHasItsDomain(t *testing.T) {
 
 // passedFromLines reads testdata/from-lines-passed.txt with {domain} put in.
 func passedFromLines(t *testing.T, domain string) []string {
+	return fromLines(t, "from-lines-passed.txt", domain, "news.example.net")
+}
+
+// fromLines reads one of the shared files of From: lines with the
+// placeholders put in: {domain}, {DOMAIN} (in capitals), {other}, {OTHER} and
+// {other_qp} (its dots as quoted pairs).
+func fromLines(t *testing.T, file, domain, other string) []string {
 	t.Helper()
-	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "from-lines-passed.txt"))
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", file))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -298,11 +305,27 @@ func passedFromLines(t *testing.T, domain string) []string {
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: %v", line, err)
 		}
-		out = append(out, strings.ReplaceAll(s, "{domain}", domain))
+		out = append(out, strings.NewReplacer(
+			"{domain}", domain, "{DOMAIN}", strings.ToUpper(domain),
+			"{other_qp}", strings.ReplaceAll(other, ".", `\.`),
+			"{other}", other, "{OTHER}", strings.ToUpper(other),
+		).Replace(s))
 	}
 	return out
 }
 
+// Every line of the shared file of lines naming another sender is refused:
+// none may be passed to be signed with that sender's key.
+func TestSenderCheckRefusesTheSharedLinesNamingAnother(t *testing.T) {
+	bind := NewBindings(writeMaps(t, senderMaps))
+	for _, line := range fromLines(t, "from-lines-other.txt", "shop.example.org", "news.example.net") {
+		resp, _ := offer(t, bind, "shop", "shop@shop.example.org", [2]string{"From", line})
+		if resp == milter.RespContinue {
+			t.Errorf("From: %q passed", line)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // Every line of the shared file is passed for the domain's application; the
 // e2e then checks OpenDKIM signs each for that domain alone.
 func TestSenderCheckPassesTheSharedLines(t *testing.T) {

internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-other.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# From: lines that name another sender of this server, {other}, beside or in
+# place of the application's own address at {domain} (review of audit stage
+# 2). The check must refuse each: a line it read as the application's own and
+# OpenDKIM as {other}'s would be signed with {other}'s key. The unit test
+# (internal/milter/sender_test.go) wants each refused; the e2e
+# (test/e2e/dkim_from_test.go) sends each and wants nothing signed for
+# {other}. {OTHER} is {other} in capitals; {other_qp} is {other} with each
+# dot escaped as a quoted pair. One Go-quoted string per line.
+"b@{other}"
+"<b@{other}>"
+"\"a@{domain}\"@{other}"
+"\"b@{other}\"@{domain}"
+"\"x\\\" <b@{other}>\" <a@{domain}>"
+"\"x\\\" <b@{other_qp}>\" <a@{domain}>"
+"\"b@{other}\" <a@{domain}>"
+"\"b@{OTHER}\" <a@{domain}>"
+"b@{other} <a@{domain}>"
+"a@{domain} (b@{other})"
+"<a@{domain}> (b@{other})"
+"(b@{other}) a@{domain}"
+"=?utf-8?q?b=40{other}?= <a@{domain}>"
+"\"x\" <b@{other}>, <a@{domain}>"

internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 # domain. Two tests read this file: the check's unit test
 # (internal/milter/sender_test.go) wants each line passed, and the e2e
 # (test/e2e/dkim_from_test.go) sends each one and wants the message signed
-# for {domain} and nothing else. A line added here is run by both.
+# for {domain} and nothing else. A line added here is run by both. {DOMAIN}
+# is {domain} in capitals; {other} is another sender of the server, which a
+# line here names in a way the check's scan does not see (a space after the
+# @) - passed by design, and so signed for {domain} alone.
 "a@{domain}"
 "<a@{domain}>"
 "\"The Shop\" <Orders@{domain}>"
@@ -20,3 +23,7 @@
 "=?utf-8?b?0JzQsNCz0LDQt9C40L0=?=\r\n\t<a@{domain}>"
 "a@{domain} (the shop)"
 "a@{domain} (the (nested) shop)"
+"a@{DOMAIN}"
+"<a@{domain}> (the shop)"
+"\"a@{domain}\"@{domain}"
+"\"b@ {other}\" <a@{domain}>"

internal/store/applications.go

@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ type Application struct {
 	Addresses      []string
 	AuthIPRestrict bool     // when true, only AuthAllowedIPs may submit as this login
 	AuthAllowedIPs []string // client IPs permitted when AuthIPRestrict is set
+	// DomainName is the name of DomainID, filled by ApplicationByLogin only.
+	DomainName string
 }
 
 // AllowsAuthFromIP reports whether a client at ip may submit mail authenticated
@@ -205,8 +207,16 @@ func (s *Store) GetApplicationByLogin(login string) (Application, error) {
 }
 
 // ApplicationByLogin is the milter-facing alias for GetApplicationByLogin.
+//
+// DomainName is filled too: the milter holds a message with an empty
+// envelope sender to the limit of its login's domain.
 func (s *Store) ApplicationByLogin(login string) (Application, error) {
-	return s.GetApplicationByLogin(login)
+	a, err := s.GetApplicationByLogin(login)
+	if err != nil {
+		return a, err
+	}
+	err = s.db.QueryRow("SELECT name FROM domains WHERE id = ?", a.DomainID).Scan(&a.DomainName)
+	return a, err
 }
 
 // ListApplicationsByDomain returns a domain's applications ordered by login,

internal/store/backfill_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// backfill0008 runs the UPDATE statements of migration 0008 again: the store
+// is already at its head, so the rows a test prepares get the backfill as
+// they would have on an upgrade.
+func backfill0008(t *testing.T, st *Store) {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := migrationsFS.ReadFile("migrations/0008_tenant_boundary.sql")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var lines []string
+	for _, l := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(l), "--") {
+			lines = append(lines, l)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, stmt := range strings.Split(strings.Join(lines, "\n"), ";") {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(stmt), "UPDATE") {
+			if _, err := st.db.Exec(stmt); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s: %v", stmt, err)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The backfill follows the rule new rows follow - the application's domain,
+// then the domain of the row's name - and gives a row only to a domain that
+// already existed when it was written (review of audit stage 2).
+func TestBackfillOf0008(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openTestStore(t)
+	d := addTestDomain(t, st, "a.example")
+	if _, err := st.AddApplication(d.ID, "shop", AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	in, err := st.AddInboundDomain("in.example")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// The domain, its application and the inbound domain were created on 1 Oct.
+	for _, q := range []string{
+		`UPDATE domains SET created_at = '2026-10-01T00:00:00Z'`,
+		`UPDATE applications SET created_at = '2026-10-01T00:00:00Z'`,
+		`UPDATE inbound_domains SET created_at = '2026-10-01T00:00:00Z'`,
+	} {
+		if _, err := st.db.Exec(q); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	rows := []struct{ queue, domain, login, at string }{
+		{"BEFORE", "a.example", "shop", "2026-09-01T00:00:00Z"},  // a predecessor's: nobody's
+		{"AFTER", "a.example", "shop", "2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"},   // the application's
+		{"NULLSENDER", "", "shop", "2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"},       // no domain of its own: the application's
+		{"GONEAPP", "a.example", "gone", "2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"}, // the application is gone: by name
+		{"STRANGER", "b.example", "gone", "2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"},
+	}
+	for _, r := range rows {
+		if _, err := st.db.Exec(`INSERT INTO send_log (queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, created_at, updated_at)
+			VALUES (?, ?, ?, '', 'x@example.net', '', 'sent', ?, ?)`, r.queue, r.domain, r.login, r.at, r.at); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, at := range []string{"2026-09-01T00:00:00Z", "2026-10-02T00:00:00Z"} {
+		if _, err := st.db.Exec(`INSERT INTO inbound_spam_log (inbound_domain, client_ip, from_addr, to_addr, subject, decision, engine, detail, created_at)
+			VALUES ('in.example', '203.0.113.7', 's@x', 'r@in.example', '', 'accept', 'rspamd', '', ?)`, at); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	backfill0008(t, st)
+
+	want := map[string]int64{"BEFORE": 0, "AFTER": d.ID, "NULLSENDER": d.ID, "GONEAPP": d.ID, "STRANGER": 0}
+	for queue, id := range want {
+		var got int64
+		if err := st.db.QueryRow(`SELECT COALESCE(domain_id, 0) FROM send_log WHERE queue_id = ?`, queue).Scan(&got); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if got != id {
+			t.Errorf("%s: domain_id %d, want %d", queue, got, id)
+		}
+	}
+	var before, after int64
+	st.db.QueryRow(`SELECT COALESCE(inbound_domain_id, 0) FROM inbound_spam_log WHERE created_at = '2026-09-01T00:00:00Z'`).Scan(&before)
+	st.db.QueryRow(`SELECT COALESCE(inbound_domain_id, 0) FROM inbound_spam_log WHERE created_at = '2026-10-02T00:00:00Z'`).Scan(&after)
+	if before != 0 || after != in.ID {
+		t.Errorf("inbound rows: before %d, after %d; want 0 and %d", before, after, in.ID)
+	}
+}

internal/store/deliverylog_test.go

@@ -76,3 +76,18 @@ func TestCountQueuedOlderThan(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("queued rows before an hour ago = %d, %v; want 0", n, err)
 	}
 }
+
+// Statistics start no earlier than the entity: what came before is a
+// predecessor's of the same name (review of audit stage 2).
+func TestStatsWindowStartsAtTheEntity(t *testing.T) {
+	created := time.Now().UTC().Add(-48 * time.Hour)
+	since, _, _ := StatsWindow(90, created)
+	if !since.Equal(created) {
+		t.Fatalf("since = %s, want the entity's creation %s", since, created)
+	}
+	old := time.Now().UTC().AddDate(-1, 0, 0)
+	since, _, _ = StatsWindow(90, old)
+	if since.Before(time.Now().UTC().AddDate(0, 0, -31)) {
+		t.Fatalf("since = %s, want within the 30-day window", since)
+	}
+}

internal/store/domains.go

@@ -161,6 +161,12 @@ func scanDomain(r scanRow) (Domain, error) {
 	return d, nil
 }
 
+// isForeignKeyViolation reports whether err is a SQLite FOREIGN KEY conflict.
+func isForeignKeyViolation(err error) bool {
+	var se *sqlite.Error
+	return errors.As(err, &se) && se.Code() == sqlite3.SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_FOREIGNKEY
+}
+
 // isUniqueViolation reports whether err is a SQLite UNIQUE/PRIMARY-KEY conflict,
 // so callers can turn a duplicate insert into a friendly domain-level error.
 func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {

internal/store/migrations/0008_tenant_boundary.sql

@@ -16,13 +16,26 @@ CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_applications_login_nocase ON applications (login COLLATE
 -- the domain of the login the row was written for; a row of a domain deleted
 -- since - and every row older than this migration whose domain is gone - is
 -- NULL and nobody's but the global role's. The name stays for display and for
--- the global view. Filled once from the registry as it is now.
+-- the global view.
+--
+-- Filled once, by the rule new rows follow: the domain of the row's
+-- application, then - for a row whose application is gone - the domain of the
+-- row's name. Either only if it already existed when the row was written: a
+-- domain deleted and added again before this migration must not inherit the
+-- rows of the one before (review of audit stage 2). Times are RFC3339 UTC
+-- text, so they compare as times.
 ALTER TABLE send_log ADD COLUMN domain_id INTEGER REFERENCES domains(id) ON DELETE SET NULL;
-UPDATE send_log SET domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM domains d WHERE d.name = send_log.domain);
+UPDATE send_log SET domain_id = COALESCE(
+    (SELECT a.domain_id FROM applications a JOIN domains d ON d.id = a.domain_id
+      WHERE a.login = send_log.app_login
+        AND a.created_at <= send_log.created_at AND d.created_at <= send_log.created_at),
+    (SELECT d.id FROM domains d
+      WHERE d.name = send_log.domain AND d.created_at <= send_log.created_at));
 CREATE INDEX idx_send_log_domain_id_created_at ON send_log (domain_id, created_at);
 
 -- The inbound journal follows the same rule, so the two logs do not follow two
 -- (security.md's accepted risk of the inbound log, struck).
 ALTER TABLE inbound_spam_log ADD COLUMN inbound_domain_id INTEGER REFERENCES inbound_domains(id) ON DELETE SET NULL;
-UPDATE inbound_spam_log SET inbound_domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM inbound_domains d WHERE d.name = inbound_spam_log.inbound_domain);
+UPDATE inbound_spam_log SET inbound_domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM inbound_domains d
+    WHERE d.name = inbound_spam_log.inbound_domain AND d.created_at <= inbound_spam_log.created_at);
 CREATE INDEX idx_inbound_spam_log_domain_id_created_at ON inbound_spam_log (inbound_domain_id, created_at);

internal/store/ratelimits.go

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func (s *Store) CountMessages(scope, ref string, since time.Time) (int64, error)
 	case RateLimitScopeDomain:
 		match = domainByName
 	case RateLimitScopeApp:
-		match = "app_login = ?"
+		match = appByLogin
 	default:
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("unknown rate-limit scope %q", scope)
 	}

internal/store/sendlog_test.go

@@ -401,3 +401,36 @@ func TestADomainAddedAgainStartsWithAnEmptyLog(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("statistics = %+v, %v; want one message", stats, err)
 	}
 }
+
+// A deleted application's login taken again in another domain starts with
+// none of the old one's numbers (review of audit stage 2).
+func TestALoginTakenAgainStartsWithNoNumbers(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openTestStore(t)
+	a := addTestDomain(t, st, "a.example")
+	b := addTestDomain(t, st, "b.example")
+	old, err := st.AddApplication(a.ID, "news", AddressModeWildcard, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.InsertQueued(SendLogEntry{QueueID: "OLD", Domain: "a.example", AppLogin: "news", To: "x@example.net"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.DeleteApplication(old.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := st.AddApplication(b.ID, "news", AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if n, err := st.CountMessages(RateLimitScopeApp, "news", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); err != nil || n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("level-2 count of the new news = %d, %v; want 0", n, err)
+	}
+	if stats, err := st.AppSendStats("news", 90, time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); err != nil || stats.Total != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("statistics of the new news = %+v, %v; want none", stats, err)
+	}
+	if err := st.InsertQueued(SendLogEntry{QueueID: "NEW", Domain: "b.example", AppLogin: "news", To: "x@example.net"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if n, _ := st.CountMessages(RateLimitScopeApp, "news", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("level-2 count of the new news = %d, want its own one", n)
+	}
+}

internal/store/stats.go

@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ func StatsWindow(retentionDays int, entityCreated time.Time) (since time.Time, h
 	if hours < 1 {
 		hours = 1
 	}
+	// Nothing before the entity was created is its own: rows from then are a
+	// predecessor's of the same name or login (review of audit stage 2).
+	if c := entityCreated.UTC(); c.After(since) {
+		since = c
+	}
 	return since, hours, windowDays
 }
 
@@ -62,7 +67,7 @@ func (s *Store) DomainSendStats(name string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.T
 // AppSendStats returns send statistics for an application login.
 func (s *Store) AppSendStats(login string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.Time) (SendStats, error) {
 	since, hours, windowDays := StatsWindow(retentionDays, createdAt)
-	stats, err := s.sendStats("app_login = ?", login, since, hours)
+	stats, err := s.sendStats(appByLogin, login, since, hours)
 	if err != nil {
 		return SendStats{}, err
 	}
@@ -75,6 +80,13 @@ func (s *Store) AppSendStats(login string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.Tim
 // registered under the name it is given.
 const domainByName = "domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM domains d WHERE d.name = ?)"
 
+// appByLogin selects an application's send-log rows: its login's rows of its
+// domain. A login is unique while it exists, but a deleted application's
+// login can be taken again in another domain, and its numbers - statistics,
+// the level-2 count - must not start with the old one's (review of audit
+// stage 2). ?1 twice; a plain ? after it takes the next number.
+const appByLogin = "app_login = ?1 AND domain_id = (SELECT a.domain_id FROM applications a WHERE a.login = ?1)"
+
 // sendStats counts the rows that match, a condition with one placeholder
 // taking ref.
 func (s *Store) sendStats(match, ref string, since time.Time, hours float64) (SendStats, error) {

internal/store/stats_test.go

@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ func TestSendStatsTotalPeakAvg(t *testing.T) {
 	now := time.Now().UTC()
 	hour := now.Format("2006-01-02T15")
 	prevHour := now.Add(-2 * time.Hour).Format("2006-01-02T15")
+	// Both were created before the messages below: statistics start at the
+	// entity's creation.
+	created := now.Add(-3 * time.Hour)
+	d.CreatedAt, a.CreatedAt = created, created
 
 	// Hour 1: two messages (Q1 two recipients + Q2).
 	for _, to := range []string{"a@x.net", "b@x.net"} {

internal/store/users.go

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ var ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("user not found")
 // ErrUserExists is returned when a username is already taken.
 var ErrUserExists = errors.New("username already taken")
 
+// ErrNoSuchDomain is returned when a user is assigned a domain that does not
+// exist - one deleted while the users form was open.
+var ErrNoSuchDomain = errors.New("an assigned domain does not exist")
+
 // ErrLastGlobal is returned when deleting or demoting the last global user.
 var ErrLastGlobal = errors.New("cannot remove last global administrator")
 
@@ -225,7 +229,8 @@ func (s *Store) CreateUser(username, passwordHash string, role Role, reach Reach
 }
 
 // UserChange is everything the users form sets on a user, written at once by
-// AddUser and SaveUser. ID is ignored by AddUser.
+// AddUser and SaveUser. ID is ignored by AddUser; SaveUser keeps the stored
+// password hash when PasswordHash is empty.
 type UserChange struct {
 	ID                            int64
 	Username, PasswordHash, Email string
@@ -238,6 +243,9 @@ type UserChange struct {
 // and a failure part way leaves no user rather than one without it (audit
 // 2026-10-12, M9).
 func (s *Store) AddUser(c UserChange) (int64, error) {
+	if err := knownRole(c.Role); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
 	if c.Role == RoleDomain && c.Reach.Empty() {
 		return 0, ErrEmptyReach
 	}
@@ -282,6 +290,9 @@ func (s *Store) AddUser(c UserChange) (int64, error) {
 // after the write, so two administrators demoting each other at once cannot
 // both succeed (M7).
 func (s *Store) SaveUser(c UserChange) error {
+	if err := knownRole(c.Role); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if c.Role == RoleDomain && c.Reach.Empty() {
 		return ErrEmptyReach
 	}
@@ -292,8 +303,10 @@ func (s *Store) SaveUser(c UserChange) error {
 	defer tx.Rollback()
 	// A write first: it takes the write lock, so what is counted below is
 	// what is committed.
+	// An empty hash keeps the stored one: the form read it when it was
+	// opened, and the user may have changed it on Account since.
 	res, err := tx.Exec(
-		"UPDATE users SET username = ?, password_hash = ?, email = ?, role = ? WHERE id = ?",
+		"UPDATE users SET username = ?, password_hash = COALESCE(NULLIF(?, ''), password_hash), email = ?, role = ? WHERE id = ?",
 		c.Username, c.PasswordHash, c.Email, c.Role, c.ID,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -321,6 +334,15 @@ func (s *Store) SaveUser(c UserChange) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// knownRole refuses a role that is neither global nor domain. The handlers
+// check the form first; this is the second line.
+func knownRole(r Role) error {
+	if r != RoleGlobal && r != RoleDomain {
+		return fmt.Errorf("unknown role %q", r)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // requireAGlobal is ErrLastGlobal when the transaction has left no global
 // user.
 func requireAGlobal(tx *sql.Tx) error {
@@ -510,6 +532,9 @@ func writeUserReach(tx *sql.Tx, userID int64, reach Reach) error {
 	if !reach.AllDomains {
 		for _, id := range reach.DomainIDs {
 			if _, err := tx.Exec("INSERT INTO user_domains (user_id, domain_id) VALUES (?, ?)", userID, id); err != nil {
+				if isForeignKeyViolation(err) {
+					return ErrNoSuchDomain
+				}
 				return fmt.Errorf("set user reach insert: %w", err)
 			}
 		}
@@ -517,6 +542,9 @@ func writeUserReach(tx *sql.Tx, userID int64, reach Reach) error {
 	if !reach.AllInbound {
 		for _, id := range reach.InboundDomainIDs {
 			if _, err := tx.Exec("INSERT INTO user_inbound_domains (user_id, inbound_domain_id) VALUES (?, ?)", userID, id); err != nil {
+				if isForeignKeyViolation(err) {
+					return ErrNoSuchDomain
+				}
 				return fmt.Errorf("set user reach insert inbound: %w", err)
 			}
 		}

internal/store/users_tx_test.go

@@ -149,3 +149,46 @@ func TestCreateGlobalUserOnlyOnce(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("%d setups succeeded, %d global users; want 1 and 1", ok, n)
 	}
 }
+
+// The store refuses a role that is neither global nor domain.
+func TestTheStoreKnowsOnlyTwoRoles(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openTestStore(t)
+	if _, err := st.AddUser(UserChange{Username: "x", PasswordHash: "h", Role: "admin"}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("AddUser took the role admin")
+	}
+	id, err := st.CreateUser("y", "h", RoleGlobal, Reach{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.SaveUser(UserChange{ID: id, Username: "y", PasswordHash: "h", Role: ""}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("SaveUser took an empty role")
+	}
+}
+
+// A save without a new password keeps the stored hash - one the user may have
+// changed on Account since the form was opened - and a reach naming a domain
+// deleted meanwhile is ErrNoSuchDomain (review of audit stage 2).
+func TestSaveUserKeepsTheHashAndNamesAMissingDomain(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openTestStore(t)
+	d := addTestDomain(t, st, "example.com")
+	if _, err := st.CreateUser("root", "hash", RoleGlobal, Reach{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	id, err := st.CreateUser("shop", "old", RoleDomain, Reach{DomainIDs: []int64{d.ID}})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.UpdateUser(id, "shop", "changed-on-account", ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.SaveUser(UserChange{ID: id, Username: "shop", Role: RoleDomain, Reach: Reach{DomainIDs: []int64{d.ID}}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	u, _ := st.GetUser(id)
+	if u.PasswordHash != "changed-on-account" {
+		t.Fatalf("the hash became %q", u.PasswordHash)
+	}
+	if err := st.SaveUser(UserChange{ID: id, Username: "shop", Role: RoleDomain, Reach: Reach{DomainIDs: []int64{9999}}}); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoSuchDomain) {
+		t.Fatalf("a reach to a deleted domain = %v, want ErrNoSuchDomain", err)
+	}
+}

internal/web/handlers/handlers_backup.go

@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleImportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if exp.DMARCRua != "" {
 		h.resyncDMARC("domain import")
 	}
+	h.recalcImportedLimits(d, exp)
 	http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/outbound/domains/%d?imported=1", d.ID), http.StatusSeeOther)
 }
 
@@ -384,6 +385,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) checkDomainImport(exp *domain.DomainExport) string {
 	invalid := func(what string, err error) string {
 		return "Invalid " + what + " in export file: " + err.Error()
 	}
+	if err := validate.Selector(exp.DKIMSelector); err != nil {
+		return invalid("DKIM selector", err)
+	}
 	if exp.DMARCRua != "" {
 		if err := validate.Email(exp.DMARCRua); err != nil {
 			return invalid("report address", err)
@@ -397,7 +401,12 @@ func (h *Handlers) checkDomainImport(exp *domain.DomainExport) string {
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		rl.Mode = mode // as the form stores it, trimmed
 		if mode == store.RateLimitModeAuto {
+			// An auto limit's numbers are this server's to work out from its
+			// own traffic, not the file's: they are dropped here and worked
+			// out right after the import (review of audit stage 2).
+			rl.MaxMessages, rl.WindowSeconds = 0, 0
 			if rl.AutoMultiplier == 0 {
 				return nil // as an empty field on the form: the default
 			}
@@ -434,3 +443,27 @@ func (h *Handlers) checkDomainImport(exp *domain.DomainExport) string {
 	}
 	return ""
 }
+
+// recalcImportedLimits works out the numbers of the auto limits an import
+// brought, at once rather than at the next six-hourly pass: the file's own
+// numbers were dropped (checkDomainImport). A failure is logged; the pass
+// tries again.
+func (h *Handlers) recalcImportedLimits(d store.Domain, exp domain.DomainExport) {
+	if exp.RateLimit != nil && exp.RateLimit.Mode == store.RateLimitModeAuto {
+		if err := h.recalcRateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, d.ID); err != nil {
+			logf("panel: import domain %q: recalculate its auto limit: %v", d.Name, err)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, a := range exp.Applications {
+		if a.RateLimit == nil || a.RateLimit.Mode != store.RateLimitModeAuto {
+			continue
+		}
+		app, err := h.store.GetApplicationByLogin(a.Login)
+		if err == nil {
+			err = h.recalcRateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, app.ID)
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			logf("panel: import domain %q: recalculate the auto limit of %s: %v", d.Name, a.Login, err)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/web/handlers/handlers_import_test.go

@@ -21,9 +21,10 @@ func TestDomainImportIsCheckedLikeTheForms(t *testing.T) {
 	h, _ := inboundHandlers(t)
 	good := func() domain.DomainExport {
 		return domain.DomainExport{
-			Domain:    "example.com",
-			DMARCRua:  "reports@example.com",
-			RateLimit: &domain.RateLimitExport{Mode: store.RateLimitModeManual, MaxMessages: 10, WindowSeconds: 3600},
+			Domain:       "example.com",
+			DKIMSelector: "mail.2026",
+			DMARCRua:     "reports@example.com",
+			RateLimit:    &domain.RateLimitExport{Mode: store.RateLimitModeManual, MaxMessages: 10, WindowSeconds: 3600},
 			Applications: []domain.AppExport{{
 				Login: "app1", AddressMode: store.AddressModeWildcard, Password: "imported-password",
 				AuthIPRestrict: true, AuthAllowedIPs: []string{"192.0.2.1", " 2001:DB8::1 "},
@@ -39,11 +40,26 @@ func TestDomainImportIsCheckedLikeTheForms(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("client addresses stored as %q, want as the form stores them", got)
 	}
 
+	// An auto limit's numbers are worked out here, not taken from the file,
+	// and its mode is stored trimmed.
+	exp = good()
+	exp.Applications[0].RateLimit = &domain.RateLimitExport{Mode: " auto ", MaxMessages: 1, WindowSeconds: 86400}
+	if msg := h.checkDomainImport(&exp); msg != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("an auto limit with numbers refused: %s", msg)
+	}
+	if rl := exp.Applications[0].RateLimit; rl.Mode != store.RateLimitModeAuto || rl.MaxMessages != 0 || rl.WindowSeconds != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the auto limit kept %+v", rl)
+	}
+
 	for _, c := range []struct {
 		name   string
 		break_ func(*domain.DomainExport)
 		want   string
 	}{
+		{"selector", func(e *domain.DomainExport) { e.DKIMSelector = "mail;x=y" },
+			"Invalid DKIM selector in export file: selector: domain may contain only"},
+		{"long selector", func(e *domain.DomainExport) { e.DKIMSelector = strings.Repeat("a", 64) },
+			"Invalid DKIM selector in export file: selector must be at most 63 characters"},
 		{"report address", func(e *domain.DomainExport) { e.DMARCRua = "not an address" },
 			"Invalid report address in export file: "},
 		{"no window", func(e *domain.DomainExport) { e.RateLimit.WindowSeconds = 0 },

internal/web/handlers/handlers_monitor.go

@@ -123,19 +123,19 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDelivery(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		break
 	}
 	page := view.NewOutMessage(h.shellMeta(r), in).
-		WithHistory(deliveryEvents(row, h.cfg.RetryPolicy, h.sendsAs(row.AppLogin))).
+		WithHistory(deliveryEvents(row, h.cfg.RetryPolicy, h.sendsAs(row))).
 		// The mail.log lines for this message, and — when there are none — the
 		// reason, which is a normal outcome rather than a failure.
 		WithDeliveryLog(logLines, logNote)
 	h.view.Render(w, http.StatusOK, "out-message", page)
 }
 
-// sendsAs says what an application may send as, in the words of a refusal:
-// any address of its domain, or the addresses of its list. Empty when the
-// login is no application's any more.
-func (h *Handlers) sendsAs(login string) view.Text {
-	a, err := h.store.GetApplicationByLogin(login)
-	if err != nil {
+// sendsAs says what the row's application may send as, in the words of a
+// refusal: any address of its domain, or the addresses of its list. Empty when
+// the login is no application's any more, or is now another domain's.
+func (h *Handlers) sendsAs(row store.SendLogRow) view.Text {
+	a, err := h.store.GetApplicationByLogin(row.AppLogin)
+	if err != nil || a.DomainID != row.DomainID {
 		return nil
 	}
 	if a.AddressMode == store.AddressModeList {

internal/web/handlers/handlers_users.go

@@ -217,6 +217,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) submitUserCreate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			h.renderUserForm(w, r, http.StatusConflict, 0, userFormView{FormErr: "That username is already in use.", FormUsername: username, FormEmail: email, FormRole: string(role), Reach: reach})
 			return
 		}
+		if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNoSuchDomain) {
+			h.renderUserForm(w, r, http.StatusConflict, 0, userFormView{FormErr: "A domain chosen here has been deleted meanwhile. Choose again.", FormUsername: username, FormEmail: email, FormRole: string(role), Reach: reach})
+			return
+		}
 		logf("panel: create user: %v", err)
 		h.renderUserForm(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, 0, userFormView{FormErr: "Could not create user. Please check the logs."})
 		return
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) submitUserUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u st
 		}
 	}
 
-	hash := u.PasswordHash
+	hash := "" // empty keeps the stored hash (SaveUser)
 	if password != "" {
 		if err := validate.AdminPassword(password); err != nil {
 			h.renderUserForm(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, u.ID, userFormView{FormErr: err.Error(), FormUsername: username, FormEmail: email, FormRole: string(role), Reach: reach})
@@ -308,6 +312,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) submitUserUpdate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, u st
 	case errors.Is(err, store.ErrLastGlobal):
 		lastGlobal()
 		return
+	case errors.Is(err, store.ErrNoSuchDomain):
+		h.renderUserForm(w, r, http.StatusConflict, u.ID, userFormView{FormErr: "A domain chosen here has been deleted meanwhile. Choose again.", FormUsername: username, FormEmail: email, FormRole: string(role), Reach: reach})
+		return
 	case err != nil:
 		logf("panel: update user: %v", err)
 		h.renderUserForm(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, u.ID, userFormView{FormErr: "Could not save user. Please check the logs.", FormUsername: username, FormEmail: email, FormRole: string(role), Reach: reach})

internal/web/validate/validate.go

@@ -82,6 +82,26 @@ func Domain(name string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// Selector checks a DKIM selector: one or more DNS labels as Domain allows
+// them, at most 63 characters in all. The panel's own selector is fixed in
+// its configuration; this is for one read from a domain export file, which
+// goes into OpenDKIM's tables, a key file's name and every signature's s=
+// (review of audit stage 2).
+func Selector(s string) error {
+	if s == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("selector is required")
+	}
+	if len(s) > 63 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("selector must be at most 63 characters")
+	}
+	for _, label := range strings.Split(s, ".") {
+		if err := domainLabel(label); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("selector: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func domainLabel(label string) error {
 	if len(label) == 0 {
 		return fmt.Errorf("domain must not contain an empty label")

test/e2e/dkim_from_test.go

@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ import (
 	"github.com/emersion/go-msgauth/dkim"
 )
 
-// passedFromLines reads the From: lines the sender check passes, the file its
-// unit test reads too, with the application's domain put in.
-func passedFromLines(repoRoot, domain string) ([]string, error) {
-	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot, "internal", "milter", "testdata", "from-lines-passed.txt"))
+// fromLines reads one of the files of From: lines the sender check's unit
+// test reads too, with the placeholders put in: {domain} the application's,
+// {other} another sender of the server, each also in capitals, and
+// {other_qp} with its dots as quoted pairs.
+func fromLines(repoRoot, file, domain, other string) ([]string, error) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot, "internal", "milter", "testdata", file))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -30,7 +32,11 @@ func passedFromLines(repoRoot, domain string) ([]string, error) {
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", line, err)
 		}
-		out = append(out, strings.ReplaceAll(s, "{domain}", domain))
+		out = append(out, strings.NewReplacer(
+			"{domain}", domain, "{DOMAIN}", strings.ToUpper(domain),
+			"{other_qp}", strings.ReplaceAll(other, ".", `\.`),
+			"{other}", other, "{OTHER}", strings.ToUpper(other),
+		).Replace(s))
 	}
 	return out, nil
 }
@@ -43,7 +49,7 @@ func passedFromLines(repoRoot, domain string) ([]string, error) {
 // application's own and OpenDKIM as another sender's would be signed with
 // that sender's key.
 func testSignedForItsDomainOnly(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
-	lines, err := passedFromLines(h.repoRoot, senderDomain)
+	lines, err := fromLines(h.repoRoot, "from-lines-passed.txt", senderDomain, otherDomain)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -82,3 +88,49 @@ func testSignedForItsDomainOnly(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// testNeverSignedForAnother: the lines that name another sender of the server
+// are refused by the check; whatever happens to one, nothing arrives signed
+// with that sender's key (review of audit stage 2).
+func testNeverSignedForAnother(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
+	lines, err := fromLines(h.repoRoot, "from-lines-other.txt", senderDomain, otherDomain)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, line := range lines {
+		token := uniqueToken("dkimother")
+		res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
+			authLogin: sc.appLogin, authPassword: sc.appPassword,
+			from: "alerts@" + senderDomain, headerFrom: line, to: recipient,
+			subject: "e2e " + token, body: "which key signs this",
+		})
+		if err := res.refusedAt("DATA", 550, "5.7.1 From:"); err == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		t.Errorf("From: %q was not refused by the check: %v", line, res.firstErr())
+		raw, err := findSinkMessage(h.stageDir, token, 15*time.Second)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		verifications, _ := dkim.VerifyWithOptions(bytes.NewReader(raw), &dkim.VerifyOptions{LookupTXT: lookupTXTFunc()})
+		for _, v := range verifications {
+			if v.Domain == otherDomain {
+				t.Errorf("From: %q arrived signed for %s", line, otherDomain)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// testLoginCaseMatters: SASL compares the login byte for byte, so an
+// application's login in other capitals does not authenticate. Every lookup on
+// the mail path is by the exact login and relies on that (review of audit
+// stage 2, F13).
+func testLoginCaseMatters(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
+	res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
+		authLogin: strings.ToUpper(sc.appLogin), authPassword: sc.appPassword,
+		from: "alerts@" + senderDomain, to: recipient, subject: "e2e " + uniqueToken("case"), body: "x",
+	})
+	if err := res.refusedAt("AUTH", 535, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("AUTH as %s: %v", strings.ToUpper(sc.appLogin), err)
+	}
+}

test/e2e/main_test.go

@@ -313,6 +313,12 @@ func TestE2E(t *testing.T) {
 	run("passed_from_lines_signed_for_their_domain_only", func(t *testing.T) {
 		testSignedForItsDomainOnly(t, sc)
 	})
+	run("lines_naming_another_sender_never_signed_for_it", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testNeverSignedForAnother(t, sc)
+	})
+	run("login_in_other_capitals_does_not_authenticate", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testLoginCaseMatters(t, sc)
+	})
 	run("panel_down_defers_mail", func(t *testing.T) {
 		testPanelDownDefersMail(t, sc)
 	})