Steps 3-6 of stage 3 and what the two reviews found in steps 1-6, in one
commit: the review fixes sit in the same hunks.
Step 3, CLI backup (M3, M5, L1, L2; L4 of the stage's list):
- backup.snapshotDB refuses a database that is not there and opens the
source mode=ro (measured: mode=ro creates no file).
- selfpost-backup holds an encrypting password to
validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen; -o of both directions writes a
temporary file beside the name and renames it whole; -decrypt peeks the
first chunk (password and type authenticated) before the output exists.
- what a backup leaves out (a link under data/, a link under certs/ to a
directory, a socket...) is told to OnWarn; certs/ with no file is
backup.ErrNoCerts, refused by Check and Create, named by the panel.
- parseTrustedProxies: a bare address takes /128 when written with a
colon (::ffff:10.0.0.1/32 was ::/32).
Step 4, secretfile (M4, L3): scrypt's V at most 128 MiB, r <= 64, p <= 2;
bytes after the last chunk are ErrCorrupt.
Step 5 (L7): atomicfile.SyncDir after the rename, used by Write,
replaceSASLDB and the CLI; atomicfile_test.go.
Step 6: security.md and guide on backup and restore.
Reviews (technical, security):
- H1: a restore of a server with DMARC on was refused on every start - the
archive records no owner, tar as root left the DMARC maps root's, and the
entrypoint only chowned the maps it named. It now hands every file beside
queue/ in /data/postfix to panel:selfpost 0640; e2e writes an extra map
before the backup and finds it panel:selfpost 640 after a root unpack.
- the comparison reads regular files only (Lstat, size, LimitReader); a
record unpacked again wins over the earlier check's mark; ConsumeRestore
removes both; the mark is synced; a journal file beside a freshly unpacked
database is refused.
- AttachRefusalLine refuses an empty line as the old statement did; skipped
entries named in words; -decrypt of an empty payload is no failure; guide
wording on the shell's '>' and a killed CLI; the in-place restore's
'mv .' (older than this stage) fixed.
Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 643 s) on this tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
- A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
- Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
- Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
- The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
- Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
- `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
- `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
- Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
… (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
- Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
- `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
- Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
- Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
- `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
- `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
- docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
… (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
- docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
- docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
- docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
- docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
- docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
- docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
… (10 more in CHANGELOG)
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
mixandClaude Opus 5.5