7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 49c872f836 backup-reauth: the account password before a backup or an export
Agreed with the owner on 2026-10-13, taken up on 2026-10-16 ("Да"); the
mockup is 1888dce. Both secret downloads - the full backup on Server ›
Backup and a domain's export on its settings - ask for "Your account
password": reauth (handlers_backup.go) checks the signed-in user's own
password with bcrypt, as a password change does, under the same limiter
(auth.AllowPasswordChange: ten in fifteen minutes per user, shared with the
Account form). A wrong or missing one is 401 on the same page with "Your
account password is incorrect.", logged; nothing is sent. The import and
the selfpost-backup CLI are not asked.

Also, the owner's phone screenshot of 2026-10-16 ("кнопка выбора файла не
такая, как в макете. Это косяк?"): the import's file field was a bare
<input type="file"> drawn by the browser ("Browse…"), where the mockup has
Bulma's .file - "Choose a file…" and the name chosen. The template now
follows the mockup; panel.js writes the name into .file-name on change and
at load (testdata/filename_test.js, run by TestPanelJS). No other file
field exists.

Tests: TestSecretDownloadsAskForTheAccountPassword (missing, wrong, right,
the limiter), the export refusals of the settings page with the password,
cmd/panel's restore tests and e2e's backups with it, e2e's refusal of a
backup without and with a wrong password. go vet + go test (26 packages)
and make e2e on the test server for this tree.

Docs: security.md § Backup and domain export, guide § Full backup and
restore, help (word for word with the mockup); CHANGELOG [Unreleased];
roadmap row done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 22:39:13 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 1c6e04b7d3 base-trixie: the image on Debian trixie, Postfix 3.10.13; Received: hidden on 465/587
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The runtime base is debian:trixie-slim, the build stage golang:1.26-trixie:
Postfix 3.10.13 with upstream's 2026 security fixes up to the August
batch, libmilter 8.18.1, OpenSSL 3.5. Every citation of another program in
code, scripts and documents was re-read against the trixie sources
(dev/upstream; bookworm's kept in dev/upstream-bookworm) and updated;
development.md's cited-package table holds the trixie versions.

What the re-reading changed in behaviour:
- logtail: reject lines with sasl_method/sasl_username/sasl_sender
  (smtpd_check.c:1019-1026); cleanup's "removed (canceled)" forgets a
  port-25 id (cleanup_api.c:363-364).
- internal/postfix/retry.go reads postconf's stdout only: since 3.9 a
  deprecated-parameter warning on stderr made one value too many and the
  panel fell back to the compiled-in retry policy.
- logrotate-loop.sh: logrotate 3.22 exits 1 when it ignores a config;
  the loop refuses on that output whatever the status.
- postfix-config.sh: cyrus_sasl_config_path set explicitly (bookworm's
  07_sasl_config.diff is gone); maillog_file_permissions=0640; mynetworks
  explicit; Dockerfile: SYNC_CHROOT= in /etc/default/postfix,
  opendkim-tools dropped, openssl named, systemd-standalone-sysusers so
  cron does not bring the whole of systemd.
- The selfpost group is 10998, outside the system range 100-999: in
  trixie a package took 998 and the build failed (owner's decision:
  a conflict-free id, the distribution's own ids untouched). The
  entrypoint hands /data back by name when the user or the group differs.
  Guide, backup refusal text, help (design commit 68ec8b2), e2e.
- smtpd_hide_client_session=yes on smtps and submission (owner's
  decision): Received: names no client, TLS, login or protocol; port 25
  keeps the full header. e2e checks both.
- test/upstream/opendkim-probe.sh makes keys with openssl genrsa.

Tests: on the server, make e2e exit 0 (674 s, the image built on trixie),
go vet + go test 27 packages ok. CHANGELOG [Unreleased], guide,
architecture.md, security.md, roadmap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 19:31:35 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 07be0cfb58 audit 4: sign-in timing and sessions, server timeouts, polling that recovers
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Steps 1-3 of stage 4, tested together (their docs share files).

Step 1 (M8, L15, L16): an unknown name pays a bcrypt comparison at the
panel's work factor too (noSuchUserHash, made once) -
TestLoginTakesAsLongForAnUnknownName holds the medians within a factor of
two; the Account form's current-password check has its own limiter, per
user (AllowPasswordChange); a sign-in destroys every session the request
presents before it issues its own.

Step 2 (L14): newHTTPServer - ReadTimeout 30 s, WriteTimeout 60 s,
IdleTimeout 2 min beside ReadHeaderTimeout; the full backup moves its write
deadline to two hours through http.ResponseController (e2e: the log shows
no failure to move it).

Step 3 (M11), read in htmx 2.0.4's source (dev/upstream/htmx-2.0.4, the npm
build byte-equal to the shipped htmx.min.js): the poll passes source: box,
and the next refresh is scheduled from htmx:afterRequest, which htmx fires
on load, error, abort and timeout, and after a swap on the nearest parent
left (the box found by detail.target's id); failures in a row double the
wait to 60 s. RequireAuth answers htmx with 401 + HX-Redirect: /login,
which htmx follows before it looks at the status. testdata/poll_test.js
runs panel.js in node against a stand-in DOM and clock (TestPanelJS; skipped
without node, which the test server lacks - run here, and it fails on the
old panel.js).

Also measured: the stage-3 e2e regression for H1 fails as it should on HEAD
with the old entrypoint ("check data/postfix/e2e_extra_map: permission
denied", the panel restarting).

Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 639 s) on this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 11:07:02 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 242515c305 audit 3: backup CLI, envelope budget, directory sync, docs; findings of the reviews
Steps 3-6 of stage 3 and what the two reviews found in steps 1-6, in one
commit: the review fixes sit in the same hunks.

Step 3, CLI backup (M3, M5, L1, L2; L4 of the stage's list):
- backup.snapshotDB refuses a database that is not there and opens the
  source mode=ro (measured: mode=ro creates no file).
- selfpost-backup holds an encrypting password to
  validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen; -o of both directions writes a
  temporary file beside the name and renames it whole; -decrypt peeks the
  first chunk (password and type authenticated) before the output exists.
- what a backup leaves out (a link under data/, a link under certs/ to a
  directory, a socket...) is told to OnWarn; certs/ with no file is
  backup.ErrNoCerts, refused by Check and Create, named by the panel.
- parseTrustedProxies: a bare address takes /128 when written with a
  colon (::ffff:10.0.0.1/32 was ::/32).
Step 4, secretfile (M4, L3): scrypt's V at most 128 MiB, r <= 64, p <= 2;
bytes after the last chunk are ErrCorrupt.
Step 5 (L7): atomicfile.SyncDir after the rename, used by Write,
replaceSASLDB and the CLI; atomicfile_test.go.
Step 6: security.md and guide on backup and restore.

Reviews (technical, security):
- H1: a restore of a server with DMARC on was refused on every start - the
  archive records no owner, tar as root left the DMARC maps root's, and the
  entrypoint only chowned the maps it named. It now hands every file beside
  queue/ in /data/postfix to panel:selfpost 0640; e2e writes an extra map
  before the backup and finds it panel:selfpost 640 after a root unpack.
- the comparison reads regular files only (Lstat, size, LimitReader); a
  record unpacked again wins over the earlier check's mark; ConsumeRestore
  removes both; the mark is synced; a journal file beside a freshly unpacked
  database is refused.
- AttachRefusalLine refuses an empty line as the old statement did; skipped
  entries named in words; -decrypt of an empty payload is no failure; guide
  wording on the shell's '>' and a killed CLI; the in-place restore's
  'mv .' (older than this stage) fixed.

Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 643 s) on this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 10:38:39 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 8e3241ef98 audit 3: a restore is ended by its Resync, and half an archive is refused
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The restore manifest was consumed as soon as its version was checked,
before store.Open and the Resync; a start that failed in between left a
data directory the next start took for an ordinary one (M1). openData now
runs CheckRestore, store.Open, the Resync, and only then ConsumeRestore.

A truncated archive had nothing to refuse it: the manifest is the first
entry, so a download cut short or a tar stopped by a damaged block was a
restore on half a database. Every archive now ends with data/contents.json,
the size and SHA-256 of each data/ file (deploy files are the operator's to
edit), and CheckRestore compares /data with it before the database is
opened, then renames it contents.checked.json so a start after a failed one
does not compare again unless the manifest changed.

Tests: a start whose Resync fails, then a start that resyncs and consumes;
an archive cut in the database, before the deploy files and in its last
entry (refused, database untouched, no -wal); a damaged key named; the
record's names confined to data/; the domain import of a cut plain export,
a cut and an altered .spde (refused, nothing created). e2e on the test
server: full_backup_restore now also sees contents.json in the archive and
gone after the first start, through the real entrypoint and daemons (all
pass, 762 s); go vet + go test of 24 packages pass there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 09:53:46 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 dd0fefdcb7 backup: the panel's archive is the command's, private key included
Owner, 2026-10-11: the private key is needed, and a backup from the
panel and one from the console have to be the same.

The commit that made the panel's backup work skipped a file under
certs/ the panel could not open - on the test server the private key,
which the certificate hook leaves to root and Postfix's group. That gave
an archive with a certificate and no key, and two kinds of archive.

- Params.Unprivileged is gone. Nothing is left out on account of who
  makes the archive; the queue is out for everyone (previous commit).
- When the panel cannot read a file under certs/, backup.Check says so
  before the download and the panel refuses with what to do on the host:
  chgrp 998 certs/privkey.pem && chmod 640. backup.UnreadableCert tells
  that case from any other failure.
- 998 is the container's selfpost group, which holds the panel and
  Postfix. Its id was whatever groupadd gave; the Dockerfile now fixes
  it at the value it has always had, because an operator addresses it
  by number from the host.
- Guide: method 1 is the same archive as method 2, with the permission
  the key needs and a note for whatever renews the certificate. Help and
  the box follow the design commit before this one.
- e2e: the restore scenario first makes the key unreadable and expects
  the refusal naming the file and the way out, then takes the backup and
  expects the key in it; nothing is put back by hand before the restart.

  go vet ./internal/backup/ ./internal/web/handlers/: ok
  go test ./internal/backup/ ./cmd/... ./internal/web/...: ok
  make e2e on the test server: ok

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-11 20:43:10 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 b55b33ae92 e2e: full backup from the panel, restore into an empty directory
After the rate-limit checks the run takes a full backup through the
panel, reads the archive through while the container can still say what
went wrong, then removes data/, certs/, docker-compose.yml and .env,
unpacks the archive into the project directory, puts the private key
back (the panel's archive comes without it and without the queue, both
asserted), and starts the stand again.

What has to hold: manifest.json is consumed by the first start, the
administrator signs in, the domain shows the same DKIM value, and a
message sent with the application's old password reaches the sink and
verifies against the record published before the backup.

The port-25 scenarios then run on the restored installation.

make e2e on the test server: ok.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-11 19:55:19 +03:00