0feaa552d1a6873da4e1934d854d002e8270b637
7
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
599149bf83 |
build, deploy, inbound, dmarc, backup, e2e: cite the source of what they rely on (assumptions part C)
Comments only, no behaviour changed. Each main.cf/master.cf parameter the
build sets, the wrapper's and the reload hook's reliance on Postfix 3.7.11
(postfix-script, master.5, postconf.5, cleanup_init.c, smtpd_peer.c,
README_FILES), supervisor 4.2.5 (process.py, options.py, events.rst),
logrotate 3.21.0, OpenDKIM's config, Cyrus SASL's sasldb, rspamd 3.11.1
(milter_headers.lua, multimap, the map watcher), Docker Compose, CoreDNS
and certbot now say where that is written. Measurements already there stay
measurements ("date not recorded" where none was); hand-composed fixtures
say so.
Contradictions left for their own commits: C-P31 cleanup's size limit,
C-P42 master outside supervisor's signal, C-V5/V6 startsecs, C-V10,
C-S3/Q3 sasldb written in place, C-Q4/A1 certbot's symlinks, C-R7 rspamd
skips local clients but the signature routine does not, C-P8, C-R4, C-R12,
C-M7, C-E2, C-K8/K9, C-D1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
d398f488e2 |
inbound-antispam-panel: the filter signs what it judged
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Closes what the security review left as an accepted risk: with the
spam filter down - it is attached fail-open - nothing removes verdict
headers a sender wrote himself, and the inbound journal recorded his
verdict as the filter's. The owner asked whether rspamd could add a
header that proves the others are ours (2026-10-12) and agreed to a
signature: a fixed mark could be written by a sender as easily as the
verdict.
- inbound.FilterKey: a key of 32 random bytes, 64 hex characters, in
/data/antispam/filter.key, made on the first start with the relay
on. 0644 like the list files beside it: the filter is another user
in another container.
- deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf: a custom routine reads
the key through the directory the sidecar already mounts and adds
X-SelfPost-Filter, the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id, hex;
a header of that name from the sender is removed.
- internal/milter/inbound.go: the verdict headers are kept as they
are read, and at end-of-message - when the queue id is known - they
count only if the signature fits (FilterSignature, hmac.Equal). No
key, no queue id, no signature or a wrong one: the row is that of
mail nobody judged (accept, selfpost, no detail).
The signature goes on to the upstream with the mail and is of no use
there: it fits one queue id.
Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11 container on the test server before
the Go side was written: the routine loads, signs
(2aa1ca6d... for key 0123...cdef and queue id 4A1B2C3D5E, the value
python's hmac gives and TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites
pins), removes a sender's header of the same name, and adds nothing
without a queue id.
Tests: signed, unsigned, made-up, another message's, another key's,
the sender's followed by the real one, the next message on the
connection, no queue id; the key made once, read after, replaced when
damaged, left alone by the lists. e2e: filter.key is there, 644, 65
bytes.
docs/security.md: the accepted risk is replaced by a narrower one (the
key is readable on the host); Mail path describes the signature.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
89774ab847 |
inbound-antispam-panel: three things the reviews left as found
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The owner asked for them to be put right (2026-10-12).
- A refusal is not logged twice after an unclean stop. The tailer
saves its place every five seconds, so on start it reads some
lines again; for the lines it reads on start a row is written only
if the same row is not there already (store.InsertInboundSpamOnce:
same moment, client, sender, recipient, decision, engine, detail).
Lines read as they are written are always new, so two identical
refusals in one second stay two rows.
- The Inbound log offers Deny / Allow sender only for a sender the
lists would take (inbound.Listable): an envelope sender may be
spelt in ways the form refuses, and the link led to a refusal.
- A network of one address is stored as the address: 192.0.2.7/32
and 192.0.2.7 were two entries of one list.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
c731a98a0f |
inbound-antispam-panel: findings of the technical and security reviews
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Steps 11 and 12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md: 12/12. Two
read-only reviews of d65d632..HEAD by different models (Opus,
technical; Fable, security), each given the code and questions, not
conclusions. Nothing Critical or High in the feature; the High the
technical review found outside it is the commit before this one.
Log tailer (internal/logtail/inbound.go):
- the reply of a refusal ends at the first "; from=<", Postfix's own,
and the HELO name after it is whatever is left. Taking the longest
reply let a HELO name that spelt "; from=<..> to=<..> proto=.."
supply the row's sender, recipient and reply - and so make a
refusal read as the deny list's;
- an address with a quote, a bracket or a space is not kept: a quoted
sender could otherwise supply the recipient;
- the journal is cut to its row cap every 500 rows written, not only
every six hours;
- a queue id is forgotten when the message is queued or the id is
opened by another listener, and a stale place in the queue of
arrivals no longer drops a live id;
- milter-hold lines are not read: the held message reaches the
journal milter, which writes its row - it was written twice.
Lists (internal/inbound/lists.go): a change of the table and the
rewrite of the files are one step under a mutex; a failed rewrite puts
a removed entry back and rewrites after taking a new one out.
Store: the row cap removes the oldest by time, as the page orders them.
Page: on a sheet a refusal's text is a Reply whatever it starts with.
Help and the guide say that an allow entry for a sender address trusts
an address anyone can claim (design commit before this one).
docs/security.md: the two reviews; the roles table gains Inbound > Log
and Filter lists; Mail path describes the milters, the tailer and the
lists; four accepted risks - the filter's verdict while it is down, an
allow entry by sender address, the list files' mode, log rows held by
domain name. The plan's stale lines (size and rate refusals, who reads
the journal) are corrected.
Left as found, told to the owner: the journal's rows after an unclean
stop may be written twice (the tailer saves its place every five
seconds); a "Deny sender" link is offered for an address the form then
refuses; 1.2.3.4 and 1.2.3.4/32 are two entries.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
7192c3861e |
inbound-antispam-panel: Filter lists, kind column, matches, note on a sheet
Follows the design commit before it (owner's words quoted there). The lists' tables are Value, Kind, Matched and Remove. The kind tag opens the entry's sheet: note, day added, how often it decided a message in the days the log keeps, and the last match. Matches are read off the journal on each view, nothing is stored (inbound.Lists.Usage, store.ListSpamListHits). A row counts for an entry when the list decided the message - a rejected row whose reply is the deny rule's message, an accepted row whose verdict carries the allow rule's symbol for that kind - and the entry fits the row's sender or client address the way rspamd matches it: an address whole, a domain as the sender's domain, a network containing the client (an IPv4-mapped address as IPv4). A failure to count shows the lists with "never" and logs why. For that the journal milter keeps the lists' own symbols ahead of its six-symbol cap: rspamd writes symbols heaviest first, so an allow entry's -100 came last and was cut behind any six others. The plan gains "Filter list usage": what counting from the journal implies, and - the owner asked for it in writing - the conditions under which a counter kept with each entry becomes worth a migration (the journal cut by its row cap and not by age; a short retention; counts that must outlive the journal; a slow page). multimap.conf says which of its texts SelfPost reads back. Tests: Usage over every kind on both lists and the rows that are nobody's; the milter's symbol order; the store query; the page and its sheets; a handler test from journal rows to the numbers on the page. Seen: the fixture page with a sheet open, headless Edge at 1360 px - the same as the accepted drawing. Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok. Not seen in a real run: a count above zero. It needs an entry added in the panel, which I cannot sign in to, and then mail that the list decides; in particular the deny rule's message arriving in mail.log as the reply of a milter-reject line is what the trial with rspamc showed, not yet what Postfix logged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
56c5dfee40 |
inbound-antispam-panel: Inbound > Log and Inbound > Filter lists
Step 6/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md. Written by a Sonnet
subagent from the mockups, reviewed and corrected by me.
GET /inbound/log - the journal a page at a time (50), filtered by
domain, decision and day; QueryInboundSpam / CountInboundSpam with the
viewer's inbound domains as the scope. The global role reads all of it
and gets "Deny sender" / "Allow sender" links into the lists; a user
with the domain role reads the rows of the inbound domains assigned to
them, without the links. The plan said global-only for the journal;
the accepted mockup and 2.0's delegation of Inbound say otherwise -
recorded in the plan as built.
GET, POST /inbound/filter-lists and POST .../{id}/delete - global role,
404 otherwise. Add form (prefilled from the query), the two lists with
Remove as the kit's row action, and "Where the lists go" with the
filter's state and when the maps were last written
(Lists.LastWritten). A refused or duplicate entry is 422 with the
message and what was typed.
Server > Settings: "Keep inbound log rows, days" with the relay on.
Help: Inbound log, Filter lists. Navigation: Log for everyone who sees
Inbound, Filter lists for the global role (Shell.ShowFilterLists).
Status tags accept / reject / tempfail join the kit's mapping.
Tests: page fixtures for both screens, held to outlines.json; view and
handler tests (both roles, filters, paging, relay off, add / duplicate
/ invalid / delete, map file content, settings field, help). e2e reads
the journal from the page instead of the database and adds and removes
a deny entry through the panel, reading deny_domain.map after each.
Seen: both pages and Settings rendered from their fixtures and compared
with the mockups side by side (headless Edge, 1360 px) - same layout
and wording.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
eea40bcd49 |
inbound-antispam-panel: filter lists, written as rspamd maps
Step 5/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md.
Store: AddSpamListEntry, ListSpamListEntries, DeleteSpamListEntry.
internal/inbound/lists.go validates and normalises an entry - sender
address, sender domain, client address or network (canonical text, an
IPv4-mapped address as IPv4, /0 refused) - and writes the lists as six
map files under /data/antispam (ANTISPAM_DIR), each atomically, 0644 in
a 0755 directory: the filter is another user in another container. All
six are written on every change and on every start with the relay on,
empty ones included. An entry whose maps could not be written is taken
back out of the table. The writer refuses a stored value with
whitespace, a newline or # in it.
The plan's allow.map / deny.map became one file per list and entry
type: to rspamd an IP map and a sender map are different map types.
deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf holds the rules; the fragment
mounts it and ./data/antispam into the sidecar. Deny is a prefilter
reject, allow a symbol weighing -100. Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11
container on the test server:
- with allow as a prefilter accept, an address on both lists was
accepted and an IP on both was refused - the rule that ran first
decided; with the weight, deny won in all five mixed cases;
- IPv4, IPv6, address (any case), domain (not its subdomains) match;
- a rewritten file is reread in about ten seconds, no restart;
- files that appear after rspamd started are loaded the same way.
No page edits the lists yet (step 6).
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - with the relay on
/data/antispam is 755 and holds the six maps, 644, empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|