Owner, 2026-10-18: "Оба предложения делаем"; the mockup is c10cd78. The
security audit's M7: Required is Postfix's encrypt level, which checks no
certificate - it keeps the mail from a listener, not from one who answers
in the upstream's place.
- A fourth TLS mode, Verified, stored as Postfix's level secure (migration
0014 rebuilds inbound_transports with the wider CHECK; schema 14) and
written to the TLS policy map like the others. Postfix matches the
certificate against the next hop's name (smtp_tls_secure_cert_match =
nexthop, dot-nexthop, the default; postconf(5)), so Verified is refused
for an upstream given by address (checkSecureHost).
- Postfix's SMTP client trusts Debian's ca-certificates bundle
(smtp_tls_CAfile): Postfix trusts none by default (DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE
"", DEF_TLS_APPEND_DEF_CA 0). The levels may and encrypt only log the
verdict, so mail to recipients' MX is unchanged.
- The page: the select's fourth option, a help line under it, the lead
"over verified TLS", the list's tag "verified"; Help word for word with
the mockup; guide § Inbound relay, with a posttls-finger command to try
an upstream first.
Tests: TestVerifiedTLSNeedsTheUpstreamsName, TestRenderInboundMapsSecure,
TestUpstreamTLSModeSecure; schema tests at 14. e2e
inbound_upstream_verified_tls: an address refused, a name saved as
"[sink]:25 secure" in tls_policy, the page says verified, the CA file set
and present, and posttls-finger -l secure with it calls the stand's
self-signed port 25 "Untrusted" (the stand has no TLS upstream). make e2e
(65 passed) and go vet + go test (26 packages) on the test server for this
tree. Tried against the live upstream from the 2.14.5 container:
mc-ent.mixfed.ru gives "Verified TLS connection established".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Comments only, no behaviour changed. modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1 (the
_pragma list on every connection, busy_timeout first; extended result
codes; a deferred BEGIN; multi-statement Exec) and SQLite 3.53.4's
documentation (transactions, WAL, foreign keys, NOCASE, upsert, julianday,
partial indexes); htmx 2.0.4 src/htmx.js; the Fetch and HTML standards for
Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, SameSite, __Host-, CSP and defer order; Go's
html/template. Comments the source contradicts are corrected - the driver
does not serialise writes (SetMaxOpenConns(1) does), htmx:load fires per
swapped element, no-store does not keep a page out of history.
Left for their own commits: D-S3 a migration two processes can both run,
D-S20 recipient case, D-B3 Origin: null under Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
D-H5/H6/H7/H9 (audit M11, stage 4).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stage 1, step 2 (plan § Who sees what).
Store
- Reach{AllDomains, DomainIDs, AllInbound, InboundDomainIDs} is what a
domain user is assigned. CreateUser takes it; SetUserReach / ClearUserReach
replace SetUserDomains / ClearUserDomains and write both directions in one
transaction. A domain user with nothing on either list is refused
(ErrEmptyReach). With All set the rows of that direction are not stored,
so clearing All later brings nothing stale back.
- ListDomainsForUser honours all_domains; ListInboundDomainsForUser is its
inbound twin. Both filter in the query.
Authorization
- auth.Principal carries the whole reach: CanAccessDomain (now also true
with All), CanAccessInboundDomain, HasOutbound, HasInbound. An id or a
name on one list opens nothing on the other.
- Inbound handlers in three strengths: requireInbound (the list, filtered),
requireInboundDomain (one domain: page, DNS re-check, upstream,
recipients), requireInboundGlobal (add, delete confirm, delete). All
answer the same 404.
- domainIDSet and the DMARC report pages go through the principal instead
of looking at p.Domains themselves.
Panel (old templates, until stage 2)
- User form: two lists with All; inbound is offered only where the feature
is on, and saving the form with it off keeps the user's inbound reach.
Promotion to global drops the reach.
- Menu: a group with nothing assigned is absent; / sends an inbound-only
administrator to Inbound. The inbound pages hide add / delete from a
domain administrator.
Tests: every route of one inbound domain against five kinds of refused
request (another tenant's id, a missing id, outbound-only reach, an outbound
domain with the same id, one with the same name, no principal) with the 404
bodies compared; add/delete as every non-global user; the filtered list
including a domain added later; thirteen outbound routes against another
tenant's domain and application id; the user form; the reach in the store;
the principal matrix; the menu; the home redirect. Removing the access check
or the query filter makes the tests fail (checked by hand).
go test ./... green except the two Windows-only failures in internal/domain
and internal/logtail that predate this work.
Roadmap 12/27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Optional inbound relay (backup-MX / forwarder) on port 25, off by default. Mail is accepted only for domains configured in the panel and forwarded to an upstream; there are still no mailboxes. A dedicated security review of the inbound path is still open on the plan (Fable).
Added:
- `INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE` (default `false`): when true, Postfix listens on
- Panel **Inbound** pages (global administrator): domains, upstream host/port
- Optional `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER` on the inbound listener only, plus
- Inbound rate limit (`INBOUND_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP`, default 20) and
Changed:
- Compose publishes host port 25 even when the flag is off (nothing listens
- Full-backup restore Resync also rebuilds inbound maps when the flag is on.
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.4.0).
mixandClaude Opus 5.5