3ba0e9c691f35915416574035d84b44c83c7ef0c
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  mixandClaude Opus 5.5
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eaa7de0754 |
audit 4: findings of the two reviews
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
- Two inbound domains on one upstream could never change its TLS mode,
each save refused for the other (medium): SetTransportAs changes the
mode for every domain on the upstream when the one saving may change
them all; a domain user who may not is refused with the mode, not the
other tenant's domain name (security F1: the first version named it).
- A deletion's leftover DKIM key is removed by Resync (Reload
configuration, a restore's first start) for names no domain has.
- The backup's write deadline moves before Check.
- hasUnsavedEdit skips password and file fields and compares a multiple
select's options; htmx.config.timeout 30 s, so a refresh never answered
ends and is tried again; a failed refresh's promise is handled.
- An empty filtered Outbound log says no message matches the filters.
- The dummy bcrypt hash is made at start; a DMARC part over 8 MiB is
refused for its size like the other two limits.
- Health's Configuration box says what Reload writes (design first,
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mixandClaude Opus 5.5
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07be0cfb58 |
audit 4: sign-in timing and sessions, server timeouts, polling that recovers
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Steps 1-3 of stage 4, tested together (their docs share files).
Step 1 (M8, L15, L16): an unknown name pays a bcrypt comparison at the
panel's work factor too (noSuchUserHash, made once) -
TestLoginTakesAsLongForAnUnknownName holds the medians within a factor of
two; the Account form's current-password check has its own limiter, per
user (AllowPasswordChange); a sign-in destroys every session the request
presents before it issues its own.
Step 2 (L14): newHTTPServer - ReadTimeout 30 s, WriteTimeout 60 s,
IdleTimeout 2 min beside ReadHeaderTimeout; the full backup moves its write
deadline to two hours through http.ResponseController (e2e: the log shows
no failure to move it).
Step 3 (M11), read in htmx 2.0.4's source (dev/upstream/htmx-2.0.4, the npm
build byte-equal to the shipped htmx.min.js): the poll passes source: box,
and the next refresh is scheduled from htmx:afterRequest, which htmx fires
on load, error, abort and timeout, and after a swap on the nearest parent
left (the box found by detail.target's id); failures in a row double the
wait to 60 s. RequireAuth answers htmx with 401 + HX-Redirect: /login,
which htmx follows before it looks at the status. testdata/poll_test.js
runs panel.js in node against a stand-in DOM and clock (TestPanelJS; skipped
without node, which the test server lacks - run here, and it fails on the
old panel.js).
Also measured: the stage-3 e2e regression for H1 fails as it should on HEAD
with the old entrypoint ("check data/postfix/e2e_extra_map: permission
denied", the panel restarting).
Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 639 s) on this tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
b2fbe91de9 |
panel-redesign: security review of 2.0 - sessions belong to a user by id
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.
Fixed
- M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
later created under that name, with that account's role. The
baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
- M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
It ends that user's other sessions only.
- L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
- L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
- L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
- I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
that is not a known asset is a 404.
Consequences
- The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
since, too.
- dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
everyone signs in again after the transfer.
- docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.
Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
- L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
- L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
- L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
- Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
only), the domain form's validation messages.
Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.
go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
ok (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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mix
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0730b2090e |
release: 1.3.0: 1.3.0-1.3.1: security pass, queue persist, full backup layout
[1.3.0] Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration. Added: - licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex - docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry Security: - The independent security review of the send-log authorization and Fixed: - test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in - security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's - mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that - panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer - panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials … (2 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full - docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance - docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7) - licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in - ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release … (9 more in CHANGELOG) [1.3.1] Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration. Added: - Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy - docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format, - docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in - docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery - Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`; - docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for - docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh Changed: - docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings - docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages - docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and Fixed: - ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1]. Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1). |
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mix
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f62fe23826 |
release: 1.1.0: Domain-admin role and internal/web package split
The first MINOR after 1.0.0: send-only DMARC guidance in the panel, AGPL packaging on every page, and an internal split of `internal/web` ahead of domain-admin work. Upgrading runs one SQLite migration (empty defaults; existing DNS guidance is unchanged until you set a report address). Changed: - `internal/web` split into subpackages (`web/view`, `web/auth`, `web/validate`, Added: - panel: DMARC guidance for send-only relays — the suggested `_dmarc` record - AGPL packaging hygiene: [NOTICE](NOTICE) names the copyright holder and the - [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) — candidate item **visual-style** (panel Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.1.0). |