Security headers and setup-token docs were already decided but had no
concrete implementation phase; also mark A.1 rate-limit and CI test
workflow as done since they landed in recent commits.
A.2: headers emitted from the panel, not reverse-proxy — keep proxy config
minimal and hard to break, push complexity into the service.
A.5: keep stdout as the base setup-link delivery per spec; document the
/data/setup-token file as a more secure alternative for centralized-logging
setups.
Resolves plan item A.1 (option б): login/setup rate-limiting used
RemoteAddr only, which behind the default reverse proxy is the proxy's own
address, making the limiter effectively global and enabling a lockout-DoS.
Now, when the request's direct peer matches the new TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR list
(comma-separated CIDRs, env, empty by default), the last X-Forwarded-For
entry is used instead, giving a real per-client limit. Unset behaviour is
unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fold user feedback into a new Phase 12 covering the panel's UX gaps:
structural nav header on every page with active-state highlighting,
an account settings page for admin login/password, a dedicated
backup/migration page split from domain import, connection settings
on the domain page, copy-to-clipboard for values meant to be pasted
elsewhere, hiding the unused addresses field in wildcard mode, and
moving the Reload button to the new /status landing page (Phase 13,
renumbered from 12).
Tests (including the rate-limit suite) previously only ran manually
on the build server; now every push to main and every PR triggers
them via GitHub Actions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a new agreed-upon phase covering /status (supervisord processes,
Postfix queue, TLS cert expiry, milter sockets, PTR/FCrDNS check) and
per-domain DNS correctness status (DKIM/SPF-heuristic/DMARC) on the
domain page. Not part of v1.0 spec scope; scoped and agreed with the
user before implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CHANGELOG.md now tracks version history (0.1.0 baseline); progress.md and
implementation-plan.md keep only live process and unfinished work (open
questions, optional 2.x.x phase O1) since phases 0-11 are fully closed and
already covered by git history and the changelog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Avoids a spurious unknown/unknown platform entry in the ghcr.io
manifest list alongside linux/amd64 and linux/arm64.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
supervisord runs as root inside the container but cap_drop: ALL still
blocked it from signaling opendkim (a different uid) — cross-uid
kill() checks CAP_KILL regardless of the caller's uid. Domain add was
failing in prod with "unknown problem sending sig opendkim ...
PermissionError: Operation not permitted".
Bringing up the production Apache stack for real surfaced a latent bug
in the Phase 10 hardening: cap_drop: ALL with only NET_BIND_SERVICE/
CHOWN/SETUID/SETGID/DAC_OVERRIDE left the root startup phase unable to
chmod the /data dirs it had just chowned to the panel user (needs
CAP_FOWNER) or set their setgid bit (needs CAP_FSETID). The container
crash-looped on "chmod: Operation not permitted". Phase 10 never caught
this because its compose up hit a port conflict before full boot.
Add FOWNER and FSETID to cap_add and document what each capability is
for. Verified: container now starts clean under the hardened compose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Capture conscious tradeoffs and hardening candidates that go beyond the
mandatory 7.6 requirements: reverse-proxy rate-limit keying, missing
security response headers, CSRF/SameSite stance, __Host- cookie prefix,
session/ops notes, and the gap that CI does not run go test. None are
compliance defects; each is a decide-later item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Line-by-line audit of all 8 points of spec 7.6 against the code: full
compliance, no code changes required. Acceptance verified on the dev
server (image selfpost:p11): gofmt/vet/build/test green, docker build
ok, clean container start (all processes RUNNING, panel as non-root
uid 999, setup link + 0600 token, bogus token 404, unauth 303, healthz
200). Baseline v1.0 plan (phases 0->11) complete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- deploy/docker-compose.yml: pinned-tag ghcr image, hardened (cap_drop ALL +
minimal cap_add, no-new-privileges, panel bound to 127.0.0.1 only). Apache
itself runs on the host (spec 10.5), fragment at deploy/apache/.
- Alternative reverse-proxy fragments: nginx (+certbot sidecar), Caddy
(automatic ACME), Traefik (+acme.json PEM extraction script).
- .github/workflows/release.yml: tag-triggered ghcr.io publish, version piped
from the git tag into both the binary ldflags and the image tag (spec 10.1).
- Closed a gap from Phase 1: logrotate was installed but never invoked;
wired up build/logrotate-mail.conf + logrotate-loop.sh + a supervisor
program (copytruncate, since postlogd holds mail.log open with nothing to
signal on rotation).
- README rewritten: site requirements checklist, reverse-proxy comparison,
DNS setup (server- vs domain-level), IP warmup, backup/restore vs domain
export/import, fixed-tag rationale, machine requirements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full server backup (spec 7.5.A): internal/backup produces a tar.gz of all of
/data — a consistent SQLite snapshot via VACUUM INTO, DKIM keys, sasldb2 and a
version manifest; TLS certs (tls/) and the Postfix queue are excluded. Two equal
paths: the panel button (POST /backup, no-store) and the selfpost-backup CLI via
docker exec (spec 11.6). CheckRestore runs before store.Open: a manifest version
mismatch refuses to boot with the image tag to use; a match consumes the
manifest so it only guards the first post-restore boot. Restore is not a
separate branch — Postfix/OpenDKIM regenerate from the restored SQLite as on any
start.
Domain export/import (spec 7.5.B): DomainExport carries the DKIM private key and
each application's working password. SASL secrets are read from sasldb2 via
db_dump (the userPassword property is plaintext) and, on import, re-keyed under
the local realm with saslpasswd2 — so credentials keep working on an instance
with a different hostname, with no DKIM DNS change. Import validates and rolls
back atomically on any failure. db-util (db_dump) is now an explicit image dep.
Verified on the server (selfpost:p9): gofmt/vet/test green; container e2e for
cross-realm domain export/import (SMTP AUTH 235 under the new realm), CLI and
panel backups, same-version restore, and version-mismatch refusal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The journal-milter, until now a pure monitor, now refuses a message with a
4xx tempfail (RespTempFail/451) at MAIL FROM when a per-domain or per-
application limit is exceeded. Key is the client IP; the count is
COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) over a sliding window reusing the send log; the
limit applies only when a non-empty IP binding matches the client (empty
binding => level-1 only, per spec 7.4). Enforcement is fail-open on the
milter's own errors — a limiter malfunction never blocks mail, and Postfix's
level-1 anvil limit stays the independent backstop. Refused messages are
recorded in send_log with status "rejected" for UI visibility.
- store/ratelimits.go: RateLimit type (+Active/AllowsIP), id-keyed get/set/
delete for the panel, name/login-keyed lookup + windowed distinct-message
count for the milter, DeleteRateLimitsForDomain. No migration — the
rate_limits table has existed since Phase 2.
- milter: enforce at MailFrom, fail-open helper overLimit, InsertRejected.
- web: server-side validated IP/ceiling/window forms on the domain page and
per application; routes POST /domains/{id}/ratelimit and
/applications/{aid}/ratelimit. Milter reads rows live, so no reload.
- domain/app services clear limits on deletion (rate_limits has no FK cascade).
Unit tests + container e2e (p8) green: refusal on both scopes, unregistered
IP ignored, fail-open with the panel stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three HTMX-polled monitoring screens (spec 7.2.11-13): send log with
server-side domain/application filters and pagination, Postfix queue
(postqueue -p), and a mail.log tail. Fragment endpoints return HTML
snippets, not JSON (spec 7.1); all output is auto-escaped via
html/template (spec 7.6.7).
Adds store.QuerySendLog/CountSendLog/ListApplicationLogins,
postfix.Queue(), and logtail.TailLines (a point-in-time reverse read,
independent of the background follow loop). Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, docker build green, container e2e (filters,
60-row pagination, <script> escaping, real postqueue/mail.log output,
existing Reload button unaffected).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add optional Phase O1 (targeted at the 2.x.x release line, outside the
v1.0 baseline) covering inbound relay as an opt-in/plugin: accept on :25
for explicit relay_domains and forward to an upstream backend, with
strict anti-open-relay/backscatter (relay_domains + relay_recipient_maps
+ reject_unauth_destination). Use cases: backup-MX and fronting a mail
server with no external IP.
Antispam is an important but optional capability: blind forwarding stays
valid. Since a blind relay hides the origin IP from the backend (breaking
downstream DNSBL/SPF), filtering must be attachable at the inbound hop —
provided as a milter hook to an external engine running in a separate
optional container, plus native Postfix DNSBL as a dependency-free
backstop. SelfPost neither bundles nor runs the engine, keeping the image
and the "one container, three processes" model intact.
Requires explicit sign-off (spec 12.6) as it extends beyond out-of-scope
section 3; plan-only, no implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement the structured send log (spec 7.3), the project's highest-risk
component since a milter bug can break the relay itself.
- internal/milter: go-milter v0.4.1 journal-milter. Per-connection session
collects SASL login, From, recipients and Subject across callbacks and
writes one send_log "queued" row per (queue-id, recipient) at EOM
(spec 7.3.3). Monitoring only: callbacks return Continue/Accept, recorder
errors are logged never propagated, so it can never block mail.
- internal/logtail: polling mail.log tailer with rotation handling (inode
change / truncation), parses sent/deferred/bounced/expired by queue-id +
recipient and advances rows; background retention sweep prunes rows past
SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90) at startup and every 6h.
- internal/store/sendlog.go: InsertQueued, UpdateStatus (case-insensitive
recipient match), DeleteSendLogBefore + status constants.
- cmd/panel: open the store once and share it across http/milter/tailer;
replace the journal/logtail stubs with the real roles.
- build/postfix-config.sh: bounded milter timeouts (15/15/30s) so a hung
milter also fails open in seconds, not the 300s default.
Fix found in-container: SASL login (app_login) was empty because go-milter
keys macros exactly as Postfix sends them, and multi-character macro names
arrive brace-wrapped ({auth_authen}); the SASL-less Phase 0 spike could not
observe this. Added a brace-tolerant macro lookup.
Verified on selfpost.mixfed.ru: gofmt/vet/unit tests green; container e2e
records rows with correct fields and advances status via the tailer; fail-open
confirmed for both an unreachable and a hung milter; retention prunes at start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live delivery verified end-to-end: dtester@mixdelta.ru -> selfpost@mixeme.ru
accepted by mc.mixfed.ru with Authentication-Results dkim=pass
(d=mixdelta.ru s=selfpost) and spf=pass, read back over IMAP. All Phase 5
"done when" criteria met. Records the own-domain-policy pitfall (can't test
delivery from a domain the receiver itself hosts) and the mixdelta.ru sender
workaround for future delivery tests. Next: Phase 6 (journal-milter) on Opus.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 5 code is complete, committed (b2692e4) and verified on the server.
Everything at SelfPost's boundary is proven (auth, sender binding, no open
relay, valid DKIM signing, delivery to the recipient MX over TLS). The one
open item — the receiver accepting the message into its inbox — is gated by
mc.mixfed.ru's DNS cache / own-domain policy, not a relay defect; a background
loop retries until it lands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generate the relay config from the environment at container start
(build/postfix-config.sh, run from entrypoint.sh):
- smtps 465 (implicit TLS) primary + optional submission 587 (STARTTLS),
chroot=n so smtpd reaches the sasldb2/sender map under /data.
- Cyrus SASL against the panel-maintained sasldb2; realm left implicit so the
authenticated name equals the bare login in smtpd_sender_login_maps.
- reject_sender_login_mismatch + relay/recipient restrictions with no
permit_mynetworks: credentials-only, open relay impossible (spec 5, 5.1).
- TLS cert/key from TLS_CERT_FILE/TLS_KEY_FILE; daily postfix reload picks up
renewed certs (postfix-cert-reload.sh under supervisord, spec 5.2).
- anvil level-1 rate limit from env (spec 5 p.5).
- Milter chain with per-milter action: OpenDKIM strict (tempfail), journal
fail-open (accept) so monitoring never blocks the relay (spec 7.3).
Two integration fixes found on the server:
- postconf -F '*/*/chroot=n': Debian's chrooted delivery agent can't read
/etc/resolv.conf, so MX lookups failed and mail never left.
- entrypoint sets /run/opendkim and /run/selfpost to group selfpost + setgid,
and the journal stub chmods its socket 0660, so postfix can connect to both
milter sockets (strict OpenDKIM was milter-rejecting all mail otherwise).
Verified on selfpost.mixfed.ru: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds; container
e2e — 465 auth+send DKIM-signed (d=domain,s=selfpost), 587 STARTTLS auth,
cross-domain sender 553, list-mode per-address binding, unauth relay 554,
real outbound delivery reaching the recipient MX over TLS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in
sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit
list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create,
list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1,
7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in
plaintext (7.6.1).
- internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique
login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by-
domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup.
- internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a
whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password;
address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config
write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full
rollback on partial failure.
- internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of
the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write,
injection backstop (7.6.4).
- Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master,
so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs
the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the
unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in
mail.log.
- domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades,
then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both
OpenDKIM and Postfix.
- web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential
shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises
/data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal.
Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a
container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete
cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the
OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10).
internal/domain:
- Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the
published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source
of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation.
- KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every
add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile:
with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses
any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4).
- Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through
supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no
shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never
overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid.
- Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with
rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps
via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries.
Infra:
- Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim
(reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit
the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design.
- opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s).
- entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership,
setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing
after a restore.
- supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel
can request the reload.
web/store:
- Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2
labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2).
- Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE
CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the
DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade
before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12,
OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5).
- Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard
patterns.
Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering +
injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain,
DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and
tables persist across a restart).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add section 10.1 covering tag-triggered CI build, version from git tag
flowing into both ldflags and the image tag (enforcing the 7.5.A restore
invariant), and publishing to ghcr.io. Document Quay.io as an alternative
registry. Update 11.7 (GitHub is no longer a dumb mirror) and add the
workflow as deliverable 11.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single bookworm-slim image running opendkim + panel + postfix under
supervisord with enforced start ordering (spec 4):
- build/Dockerfile: multi-stage static Go build; runtime installs postfix,
opendkim, cyrus-sasl, supervisor, logrotate; unprivileged panel user (7.6.8).
- build/supervisord.conf: priority ordering opendkim -> panel -> postfix;
crashexit event listener terminates the container on any FATAL process.
- build/postfix-wrapper.sh: waits for both milter sockets (test -S, 30s
timeout) before `postfix start-fg`, exits non-zero on timeout.
- panel: HTTP :8080 stub + /healthz, journal-milter socket stub (so the
wrapper's readiness probe passes), log-tailer stub; SIGTERM graceful stop.
Verified on the dev server: image builds, three processes live, panel serves
the stub, wrapper waits for sockets, and an unrecoverable panel failure brings
the container down cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
De-risk spike confirmed emersion/go-milter v0.4.1 (BSD-2) interoperates with
Postfix 3.7.11 (bookworm) over protocol v6: reads From/To(per-rcpt)/Subject/
queue-id, gets client IP from Connect(), and fails open when the milter dies.
Progress tracker updated; Phase 1 (Docker + supervisord) is next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Go module (codeberg.org/mix/selfpost), two command skeletons (panel,
selfpost-backup) sharing internal/buildinfo for the -ldflags version stamp,
Makefile (static CGO_ENABLED=0 build), AGPL-3.0 LICENSE, README skeleton and
.gitattributes forcing LF (container scripts must not get CRLF).
Verified on the dev server: go vet clean, make build produces statically
linked binaries, version stamping works.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
12-phase plan derived from the spec, plus a durable progress tracker
(model-per-phase, resume-after-reset protocol, commit conventions).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mix