538a4b66032762542b9b358ed5a8cabe23903d0b
7 Commits
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14b4933917 |
panel: move inline styles and confirmations out of the templates
Groundwork for the Content-Security-Policy of phase 14.A. A policy that has to
allow inline script is not worth writing — script-src 'unsafe-inline' gives
back exactly the XSS foothold the policy exists to remove — so the three
inline constructs the templates still had are moved out first:
- the layout's <style> block becomes /static/panel.css;
- the one style="background:#b42318" attribute becomes the .danger class
that already existed for it;
- the four onsubmit="return confirm(...)" handlers become data-confirm,
handled by a delegated listener in panel.js. Delegation matters: the
application rows are also delivered by HTMX swaps.
htmx would otherwise inject a <style> of its own for the request-indicator
classes and become the single reason the policy needs an exemption; the panel
uses no hx-indicator, so the meta config switches it off.
A guard test keeps this from silently regressing later, which it otherwise
would: an inline handler added to a template does not fail, it just quietly
stops working in the browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7b4549a35d |
panel: server status page, per-domain DNS checks, /domains move
Phase 13. Two new packages and one new screen. internal/health owns the shared status vocabulary (ok/warn/error/unknown) and the local checks: supervisord's process table, TLS certificate expiry and the two milter sockets. Each check reports a problem as a status rather than an error, so one broken component costs a line and not the page. internal/dnscheck does the read-only lookups: forward-confirmed reverse DNS for SELFPOST_HOSTNAME, and per-domain DKIM (compared against the key this server actually signs with), SPF and DMARC. Every check is bounded by a timeout and cached, and the resolver sits behind an interface so the tests drive every branch without touching the network. The SPF check is deliberately shallow: it looks for a mechanism literally covering the server's address and does not follow include:/redirect=, so a record that authorises us through an include is reported as "cannot tell" rather than as a failure. /status renders both, with the local checks in an HTMX-polled fragment and the DNS lookups behind a Re-check button, and becomes the panel's landing page: / now redirects there and the domain list lives at /domains. The Reload button moves onto /status, where it reads as what it is — a drift-recovery for the daemons — with text explaining what it regenerates. A template test fails on any remaining href="/" so a stale link cannot silently land on the wrong screen. Also fixes a defect this made visible: the panel could never read the mail queue in the documented deployment. postqueue relies on its setgid-postdrop bit, which the compose file's no-new-privileges disables, so the Queue screen always said "Could not read the mail queue" — including in the released 1.0.0 image. The panel user is now a real member of postdrop, which needs no setgid transition. Verified in a container on the dev server against real DNS: PTR matching (selfpost.example.com) and not matching (example.com), DKIM absent and mismatched, SPF absent and via include:, DMARC p=quarantine/p=reject/absent, and a resolver timeout degrading to "unknown" without hanging the page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fc53ae1314 |
panel: shared nav, account settings, backup page, connection settings
Phase 12 (UI/UX). The navigation bar now renders once from layout.html instead of being copied into each content template, so it is present on every authenticated page — including the domain page and its delete confirmation, which had no links at all — and the current page is highlighted via .Active rather than quietly dropping out of the list. New /account page changes the administrator's username and/or password: the current password is required and the attempt is throttled on the same limiter as the login form, so this route cannot be used to brute-force past that limit. A password change invalidates every other session while keeping the one performing it; a rename carries that session over. Backup and domain import move from a card in the middle of the domain list to their own /backup page, one card each; the handlers themselves are unchanged, only the page the import form renders its errors on. The domain page gains a "Sending server settings" card (server, port, encryption) so a client can be configured without reading the docs; 587 is listed only when SUBMISSION_ENABLE is true for this deployment, which is a deploy-time flag the panel cannot verify at runtime. Client-side (static/panel.js, no libraries): Copy buttons on the values that get carried elsewhere (DKIM record, new application credentials, server name), and the Addresses field is hidden while the address mode is wildcard, where the server ignores it. Verified in a container on the dev server: setup, login, every page's nav and active item, domain and application creation, all account-form paths including cross-session invalidation, import errors, full backup download. gofmt/vet/test/docker build green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f88d8dabcb |
Phase 9: full backup/restore + domain export/import (spec 7.5, 11.6)
Full server backup (spec 7.5.A): internal/backup produces a tar.gz of all of /data — a consistent SQLite snapshot via VACUUM INTO, DKIM keys, sasldb2 and a version manifest; TLS certs (tls/) and the Postfix queue are excluded. Two equal paths: the panel button (POST /backup, no-store) and the selfpost-backup CLI via docker exec (spec 11.6). CheckRestore runs before store.Open: a manifest version mismatch refuses to boot with the image tag to use; a match consumes the manifest so it only guards the first post-restore boot. Restore is not a separate branch — Postfix/OpenDKIM regenerate from the restored SQLite as on any start. Domain export/import (spec 7.5.B): DomainExport carries the DKIM private key and each application's working password. SASL secrets are read from sasldb2 via db_dump (the userPassword property is plaintext) and, on import, re-keyed under the local realm with saslpasswd2 — so credentials keep working on an instance with a different hostname, with no DKIM DNS change. Import validates and rolls back atomically on any failure. db-util (db_dump) is now an explicit image dep. Verified on the server (selfpost:p9): gofmt/vet/test green; container e2e for cross-realm domain export/import (SMTP AUTH 235 under the new realm), CLI and panel backups, same-version restore, and version-mismatch refusal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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56a4fa892d |
Phase 8: level-2 differentiated rate limits (spec 7.4)
The journal-milter, until now a pure monitor, now refuses a message with a
4xx tempfail (RespTempFail/451) at MAIL FROM when a per-domain or per-
application limit is exceeded. Key is the client IP; the count is
COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) over a sliding window reusing the send log; the
limit applies only when a non-empty IP binding matches the client (empty
binding => level-1 only, per spec 7.4). Enforcement is fail-open on the
milter's own errors — a limiter malfunction never blocks mail, and Postfix's
level-1 anvil limit stays the independent backstop. Refused messages are
recorded in send_log with status "rejected" for UI visibility.
- store/ratelimits.go: RateLimit type (+Active/AllowsIP), id-keyed get/set/
delete for the panel, name/login-keyed lookup + windowed distinct-message
count for the milter, DeleteRateLimitsForDomain. No migration — the
rate_limits table has existed since Phase 2.
- milter: enforce at MailFrom, fail-open helper overLimit, InsertRejected.
- web: server-side validated IP/ceiling/window forms on the domain page and
per application; routes POST /domains/{id}/ratelimit and
/applications/{aid}/ratelimit. Milter reads rows live, so no reload.
- domain/app services clear limits on deletion (rate_limits has no FK cascade).
Unit tests + container e2e (p8) green: refusal on both scopes, unregistered
IP ignored, fail-open with the panel stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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c6eeb30258 |
Phase 4: applications + SASL (sasldb2) + sender_login_maps
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create, list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1, 7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in plaintext (7.6.1). - internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by- domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup. - internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password; address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full rollback on partial failure. - internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write, injection backstop (7.6.4). - Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master, so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in mail.log. - domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades, then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both OpenDKIM and Postfix. - web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises /data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a7a5ad3f91 |
Phase 3: sending domains + per-domain OpenDKIM signing
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10). internal/domain: - Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation. - KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile: with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4). - Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid. - Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries. Infra: - Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim (reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design. - opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s). - entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership, setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing after a restore. - supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel can request the reload. web/store: - Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2 labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2). - Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12, OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5). - Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard patterns. Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering + injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain, DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and tables persist across a restart). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |