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Author SHA1 Message Date
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 f51f5db245 app: logins folded to lower case, unique without regard to case (audit H4, 0008) 
Postfix's reject_sender_login_mismatch compares the SASL login with the
sender map without regard to case - seen on the e2e stand this time (a
one-off probe, not committed: map rewritten to "APP1", client authenticated
as "app1", RCPT accepted). The panel stored logins as typed under a BINARY
UNIQUE, so "Ops" and "ops" were two applications to the panel and one sender
to Postfix: a tenant could send with another tenant's envelope sender.

- app.foldLogin: Service.Create lower-cases the login (owner: fold, do not
  refuse); CreateWithSettings rolls back the stored (folded) login.
- ImportApplication keeps the login as written: folding it would rename the
  SASL account and break the imported application's working credentials;
  the index below refuses a case clash there too.
- Migration 0008 (DDL): CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_applications_login_nocase ON
  applications (login COLLATE NOCASE). The column's own BINARY UNIQUE stays
  (SQLite cannot change a collation without a table rebuild, which a
  migration transaction cannot do with foreign keys on). Checked on the live
  installation first: 4 logins, no case clash; "Quieter3C" keeps its case.
  0008 is not run anywhere yet; send_log.domain_id joins it later in stage 2.

Tests: "Ops" created as ops, SASL account and map binding in lower case,
OPS in another domain and an imported oPs refused; the store refuses ops
beside Ops; schema at user_version 8 with the index.

CHANGELOG [Unreleased], audit plan line ticked, roadmap 15/61.
Evidence on the test server for this tree (with the probe): go vet clean,
go test ./... 23 packages ok, make e2e exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 14:55:24 +03:00
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 b2fbe91de9 panel-redesign: security review of 2.0 - sessions belong to a user by id 
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.

Fixed
  - M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
    deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
    before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
    later created under that name, with that account's role. The
    baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
    CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
    only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
  - M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
    It ends that user's other sessions only.
  - L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
    administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
  - L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
    on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
    the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
    Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
    store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
    and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
  - L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
    takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
    and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
    reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
    box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
  - I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
    that is not a known asset is a 404.

Consequences
  - The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
    since, too.
  - dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
    everyone signs in again after the transfer.
  - docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.

Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
  - L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
    address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
    administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
  - L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
    and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
    be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
  - L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
    requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
  - Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
    only), the domain form's validation messages.

Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.

  go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
    ./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
      ok  (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-10 03:04:02 +03:00
mix 5e5d157496 release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation 
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
 2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00
mix 8ce050ef7f release: 0.1.0: Phases 0-11: panel, Postfix/DKIM, milter, backup, Docker image 
Initial feature-complete implementation of the v1.0 specification (phases 0-11 of `docs/implementation-plan.md`).
Added:
  - Panel (Go, single static binary) with SQLite persistence, one-time
  - Domain management with per-domain DKIM (RSA-2048, generated in pure Go) and
  - Application (sender identity) management: SASL credentials via `sasldb2`,
  - Full Postfix relay config generated from env at container start: SMTPS 465,
  - Journal milter (pure Go, `go-milter`) recording every send to `send_log`;
  … (6 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.1.0).
 2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00