745f1c03d23114baf7aebc401ca50516ab3b708c
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  mixandClaude Opus 4.8
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6ebb6f56d6 |
Phase 6: journal-milter + send-log status tailer + retention
Implement the structured send log (spec 7.3), the project's highest-risk
component since a milter bug can break the relay itself.
- internal/milter: go-milter v0.4.1 journal-milter. Per-connection session
collects SASL login, From, recipients and Subject across callbacks and
writes one send_log "queued" row per (queue-id, recipient) at EOM
(spec 7.3.3). Monitoring only: callbacks return Continue/Accept, recorder
errors are logged never propagated, so it can never block mail.
- internal/logtail: polling mail.log tailer with rotation handling (inode
change / truncation), parses sent/deferred/bounced/expired by queue-id +
recipient and advances rows; background retention sweep prunes rows past
SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90) at startup and every 6h.
- internal/store/sendlog.go: InsertQueued, UpdateStatus (case-insensitive
recipient match), DeleteSendLogBefore + status constants.
- cmd/panel: open the store once and share it across http/milter/tailer;
replace the journal/logtail stubs with the real roles.
- build/postfix-config.sh: bounded milter timeouts (15/15/30s) so a hung
milter also fails open in seconds, not the 300s default.
Fix found in-container: SASL login (app_login) was empty because go-milter
keys macros exactly as Postfix sends them, and multi-character macro names
arrive brace-wrapped ({auth_authen}); the SASL-less Phase 0 spike could not
observe this. Added a brace-tolerant macro lookup.
Verified on selfpost.example.com: gofmt/vet/unit tests green; container e2e
records rows with correct fields and advances status via the tailer; fail-open
confirmed for both an unreachable and a hung milter; retention prunes at start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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mixandClaude Opus 4.8
|
c6eeb30258 |
Phase 4: applications + SASL (sasldb2) + sender_login_maps
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create, list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1, 7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in plaintext (7.6.1). - internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by- domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup. - internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password; address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full rollback on partial failure. - internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write, injection backstop (7.6.4). - Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master, so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in mail.log. - domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades, then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both OpenDKIM and Postfix. - web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises /data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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mixandClaude Opus 4.8
|
a7a5ad3f91 |
Phase 3: sending domains + per-domain OpenDKIM signing
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10). internal/domain: - Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation. - KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile: with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4). - Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid. - Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries. Infra: - Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim (reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design. - opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s). - entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership, setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing after a restore. - supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel can request the reload. web/store: - Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2 labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2). - Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12, OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5). - Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard patterns. Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering + injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain, DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and tables persist across a restart). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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mixandClaude Opus 4.8
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d72a383904 |
Phase 2: SQLite persistence, admin setup-link, login/sessions
Implements the secure single-admin panel entry (spec 7.6). - internal/store: modernc.org/sqlite (pure Go, static build), WAL + foreign keys, embedded PRAGMA user_version migrations; schema 0001 covers admin/settings/domains/applications/send_log/rate_limits (spec 9). - Setup secret-link (spec 7.6.1): 128-bit crypto/rand token, printed to log + /data/setup-token (0600), 10-min TTL with regeneration, per-IP rate limit, subtle.ConstantTimeCompare, failures don't invalidate, one-time admin form, permanent invalidation once admin exists (/setup 404). - bcrypt admin password; server-side username/password validation. - Login + in-memory sessions, crypto-random token, cookie HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite (Secure toggleable for dev HTTP), login rate limit, auth middleware. - html/template base layout + setup/login/dashboard, vendored htmx 2.0.4. - build/entrypoint.sh: fix bind-mounted /data ownership as root before supervisord drops to the unprivileged panel user (found via container test). Verified on selfpost.example.com: go vet/build/test/gofmt clean; e2e curl of setup+login flows; docker build + run with -v ./data:/data creates the DB and 0600 token owned by panel. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |