Security audit 2026-10-17, stage 6.
A10: a session created under a longer PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS kept its old
expiry after the setting was lowered (the renewal arithmetic took
ExpiresAt minus the new window for the last renewal). Touch now cuts such
a session to now plus the window at once. TestSessionMadeUnderALongerWindowIsCut.
A6, A7, W7 - security.md now says what the code does, which is what it
should do: a wrong method answers 405 with Allow from the router before the
role is looked at (the routes are public source); the setup token is made
anew at the first /setup/ request after expiry, a stranger's included, and
logged where only the operator reads it; two GETs make what must exist,
the server's own DKIM key on Settings and Health. README's local trial
says the compose file is the hardened deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A4 (low), stage 0. The line logged when
a request carries two unprefixed session cookies printed r.URL.Path raw,
so GET /confirm/<token> wrote the token to the log (reachable only with
PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false, where a sibling host can plant the bare name).
loggedPath moves from internal/web to internal/web/auth as LoggedPath
(web imports auth, not the other way) and both lines - the origin check's
refusal and the duplicate-cookie one - go through it.
Tests: TestDuplicateCookieLineHidesALinksToken; TestLoggedPathHidesTokens
moved with the function. go test ./internal/web ./internal/web/auth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.
Fixed
- M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
later created under that name, with that account's role. The
baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
- M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
It ends that user's other sessions only.
- L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
- L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
- L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
- I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
that is not a known asset is a 404.
Consequences
- The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
since, too.
- dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
everyone signs in again after the transfer.
- docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.
Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
- L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
- L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
- L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
- Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
only), the domain form's validation messages.
Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.
go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
ok (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
[1.3.0]
Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration.
Added:
- licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex
- docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry
Security:
- The independent security review of the send-log authorization and
Fixed:
- test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in
- security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's
- mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that
- panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer
- panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials
… (2 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
- docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full
- docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance
- docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7)
- licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in
- ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release
… (9 more in CHANGELOG)
[1.3.1]
Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration.
Added:
- Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy
- docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format,
- docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in
- docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery
- Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive
… (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
- **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`;
- docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for
- docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh
Changed:
- docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings
- docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages
- docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and
Fixed:
- ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped
Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1].
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1).
The first MINOR after 1.0.0: send-only DMARC guidance in the panel, AGPL packaging on every page, and an internal split of `internal/web` ahead of domain-admin work. Upgrading runs one SQLite migration (empty defaults; existing DNS guidance is unchanged until you set a report address).
Changed:
- `internal/web` split into subpackages (`web/view`, `web/auth`, `web/validate`,
Added:
- panel: DMARC guidance for send-only relays — the suggested `_dmarc` record
- AGPL packaging hygiene: [NOTICE](NOTICE) names the copyright holder and the
- [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) — candidate item **visual-style** (panel
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.1.0).
mixandClaude Opus 5.5