91dadf7b3529ec9ad90df6fd08fbbdb3ef852803
22
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
32f6ed626d |
findings of the security review of stages 2-6
The review of 4433688..0808779 (read-only, a separate agent) found one medium and some lows; all fixed here. Medium, proven by the reviewer: A1's userKey put the typed username into the limiter map whole, and the public forms had no body bound beyond net/http's 10 MiB for a parsed form - each refused request kept up to 10 MiB in memory for fifteen minutes. userKey now holds a 96-bit hash of the folded name, and sign-in, reset, a reset link's page and setup read at most 64 KiB (limitForm, http.MaxBytesReader). TestPublicFormsAreBoundedAndKeysShort. Lows: - Refund skipped the request that filled a bucket (count < max), so a right password at the ceiling left the shared address blocked; Refund now always undoes the Allow it follows. - The reset form did not give the address its attempt back when the name's bucket refused (sign-in did); it does. - A3's day of five links is spent only by a link that goes out, and the price of the pause - anyone knowing a username can pause that owner's reset for a day - is recorded in security.md. - longHeaderLine counted a trailing CR on a header's first line. - test.yml declares permissions: contents: read. Not changed, as the review's nits: the store matches names exactly while the limiter folds them (stricter, said in the comment now); a session from a longer window is honoured until its next Touch (the next request). go test ./internal/web/auth ./internal/milter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
08087795cd |
docs, comments: the drift the audit listed (audit 2026-10-17, stage 6)
The lines under "Doc and comment drift" that the findings' own commits did not already fix: - security.md: a newer confirmation link replaces the older, a reset link is not replaced; html/template renders every page (no themes); the container keeps eight capabilities, named, not "KILL". - architecture.md: ImportKey writes over a name's key, as an import must; the error text reaches the browser on the Backup page's import refusal. - guide: with Caddy the key is in Caddy's data, so a full backup refuses until certs/ holds a copy (or back up caddy-data). - comments: sasldb2 holds application passwords in the clear (store, app/password.go); texthash folds ASCII (sender.go); the supervisor socket's group is supervisor (rpc.go); cert-reload's OpenSSL measurement was 3.0.x of bookworm; sendReset's limits (links.go). Migration 0013's comment stays as shipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
4f999f4f95 |
auth, docs: a session from a longer window is cut; the remaining nits (audit A6, A7, A10, W7)
Security audit 2026-10-17, stage 6. A10: a session created under a longer PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS kept its old expiry after the setting was lowered (the renewal arithmetic took ExpiresAt minus the new window for the last renewal). Touch now cuts such a session to now plus the window at once. TestSessionMadeUnderALongerWindowIsCut. A6, A7, W7 - security.md now says what the code does, which is what it should do: a wrong method answers 405 with Allow from the router before the role is looked at (the routes are public source); the setup token is made anew at the first /setup/ request after expiry, a stranger's included, and logged where only the operator reads it; two GETs make what must exist, the server's own DKIM key on Settings and Health. README's local trial says the compose file is the hardened deployment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
668e299c69 |
postfix: no reload for a map that did not change; DNS re-checks limited (audit W6/M9)
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings W6/M9 (low), stage 4. Every application, upstream, recipient or report-address save reloaded Postfix through supervisord, and POST .../dns-recheck bypassed the five-minute cache for up to ~14 resolver queries - both at whatever rate an authenticated user pressed. - writeChanged: each generated map is written only when its content differs from the file on disk, and Postfix is reloaded only when one was (sender map, inbound maps, DMARC maps). Health's Reload configuration ends with an explicit reload (app.Service.ReloadPostfix, SenderMaps gains Reload), so it still re-reads whatever is on disk. No debounce: with unchanged saves gone, a burst is real changes Postfix must see. - auth.AllowDNSRecheck: twenty forced re-checks in 15 minutes per user; past that the outbound, inbound and settings re-check show the cached result without the "re-checked" flash, and the log says why. Tests: TestARebuildThatChangesNothingDoesNotReload, TestDNSRechecksArePerUser; the fakes gain Reload. Docs: guide § Overview and Health; CHANGELOG; plan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
8aad5b6223 |
auth: reset links pause for a day after five (audit A3)
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A3 (low), stage 3. sendReset spaced reset mails ten minutes apart and capped them at five an hour per account, so a stranger who repeated a username kept a live 30-minute link arriving in the administrator's mailbox five times an hour, for ever. Now five reset links a day per account (resetDayLimiter); the sixth request sends one notice instead - "Reset links paused for a day", no link, saying further requests are ignored for 24 hours and that a global administrator can set a password on Server > Users - and every later one in the window sends nothing (resetNoticeLimiter), logged either way. In memory, like every limiter: a restart clears them. Test: TestResetLinksPauseForADayAfterFive. Docs: security.md, guide § Account; CHANGELOG; plan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
3a8e19b71c |
auth: sign-in limits per address and name; successes free (audit A1, A8, A9)
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings A1 (medium), A8, A9 (low), stage 3. Under the shipped Apache-on-host deployment with TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR empty, every visitor has the Docker gateway's address, and every public limit was keyed on the address alone: ten POSTs to /login per 15 minutes (any body, successes counted) locked out every administrator; likewise /login/reset, the link pages and /setup/. IPv6 was keyed per /128. Now (internal/web/auth/limitkeys.go): - sign-in counts per address and username (10 / 15 min) and per address alone at 100; a right password refunds both (rateLimiter.Refund); - a reset request counts per address and username (5) and per address alone (50); a link's page per link, by token hash (30), and per address alone (300); setup per address as before; - an IPv6 address is keyed by its /64 (limitAddr); - proxyWatch: when the first 20 requests after a start all come from one private or loopback peer with X-Forwarded-For and no proxy is trusted, the log says so once with the TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR value to set; - a refused sign-in or a lockout is logged, five lines per address in 15 minutes, the typed name printable and cut (refusalLog, logName). The shipped compose cannot know the gateway, so the guide's install step prints it (docker network inspect) and says to set it. Tests: TestLoginBehindOneUntrustedProxyKeepsOthersIn (the reader's case), TestLoginSuccessesDoNotCount, TestIPv6IsLimitedPerSlash64, TestProxyWatchAndRefusalsAreLogged; the existing lockout tests pass. Docs: security.md § First-run setup, § Authentication; guide § Full deployment; CHANGELOG; plan. Also the I1 plan line's Done note. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
e9d2cbbe28 |
findings of the security review of stage 0
The review of 2c27275..2c8e981 (read-only, a separate agent) found no high or medium; three small ones, fixed here: - reauth took a limiter attempt before the compare, right password included: with A2 asking on every user save, ten saves in fifteen minutes locked the administrator out of Account's password change, the backup and the export. A right password now gives its attempt back (rateLimiter.Refund, Module.PasswordCheckPassed; a bucket already at its limit stays blocked). TestRightAccountPasswordsDoNotUseUpTheLimit. - LoggedPath hid the tokens of /login/reset/ and /confirm/ but not of the first administrator's /setup/<token>; now it does (test case added). - The entrypoint's own `[ -e ] || : >` lines (sender_login_maps, the four inbound maps, mail.log) get the `[ -L ]` guard postfix-config.sh got for I2. Safe before too - drop_links runs first on those paths and the panel is not running yet - this is the belt and braces. The review also confirmed, with a probe of the regex against Postfix's formats, that a port-25 client can place only its own envelope in an Inbound log row, and that every path to a password, e-mail or role asks for the signed-in password. go test ./internal/web/handlers ./internal/web/auth; sh -n entrypoint.sh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
5210cb19f2 |
auth: the duplicate-cookie line hides a link's token (audit A4)
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A4 (low), stage 0. The line logged when a request carries two unprefixed session cookies printed r.URL.Path raw, so GET /confirm/<token> wrote the token to the log (reachable only with PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false, where a sibling host can plant the bare name). loggedPath moves from internal/web to internal/web/auth as LoggedPath (web imports auth, not the other way) and both lines - the origin check's refusal and the duplicate-cookie one - go through it. Tests: TestDuplicateCookieLineHidesALinksToken; TestLoggedPathHidesTokens moved with the function. go test ./internal/web ./internal/web/auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
b8e156c9f4 |
password-reset: a confirmed e-mail, then a link to reset the password
Agreed by the owner on 2026-10-13 ("the e-mail must be confirmed");
notifications to an unconfirmed address settled on 2026-10-17: "Без
подтверждения слать". Mockups
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
a8fd96c752 |
health-setup-checks: the certificate's name, Postfix's greeting, the proxy
Decided by the owner on 2026-10-13 (in place of preflight), taken up on 2026-10-16; mockups |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
eaa7de0754 |
audit 4: findings of the two reviews
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
- Two inbound domains on one upstream could never change its TLS mode,
each save refused for the other (medium): SetTransportAs changes the
mode for every domain on the upstream when the one saving may change
them all; a domain user who may not is refused with the mode, not the
other tenant's domain name (security F1: the first version named it).
- A deletion's leftover DKIM key is removed by Resync (Reload
configuration, a restore's first start) for names no domain has.
- The backup's write deadline moves before Check.
- hasUnsavedEdit skips password and file fields and compares a multiple
select's options; htmx.config.timeout 30 s, so a refresh never answered
ends and is tried again; a failed refresh's promise is handled.
- An empty filtered Outbound log says no message matches the filters.
- The dummy bcrypt hash is made at start; a DMARC part over 8 MiB is
refused for its size like the other two limits.
- Health's Configuration box says what Reload writes (design first,
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
07be0cfb58 |
audit 4: sign-in timing and sessions, server timeouts, polling that recovers
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Steps 1-3 of stage 4, tested together (their docs share files).
Step 1 (M8, L15, L16): an unknown name pays a bcrypt comparison at the
panel's work factor too (noSuchUserHash, made once) -
TestLoginTakesAsLongForAnUnknownName holds the medians within a factor of
two; the Account form's current-password check has its own limiter, per
user (AllowPasswordChange); a sign-in destroys every session the request
presents before it issues its own.
Step 2 (L14): newHTTPServer - ReadTimeout 30 s, WriteTimeout 60 s,
IdleTimeout 2 min beside ReadHeaderTimeout; the full backup moves its write
deadline to two hours through http.ResponseController (e2e: the log shows
no failure to move it).
Step 3 (M11), read in htmx 2.0.4's source (dev/upstream/htmx-2.0.4, the npm
build byte-equal to the shipped htmx.min.js): the poll passes source: box,
and the next refresh is scheduled from htmx:afterRequest, which htmx fires
on load, error, abort and timeout, and after a swap on the nearest parent
left (the box found by detail.target's id); failures in a row double the
wait to 60 s. RequireAuth answers htmx with 401 + HX-Redirect: /login,
which htmx follows before it looks at the status. testdata/poll_test.js
runs panel.js in node against a stand-in DOM and clock (TestPanelJS; skipped
without node, which the test server lacks - run here, and it fails on the
old panel.js).
Also measured: the stage-3 e2e regression for H1 fails as it should on HEAD
with the old entrypoint ("check data/postfix/e2e_extra_map: permission
denied", the panel restarting).
Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 639 s) on this tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
ad3d834392 |
store, web: cite the source of what they rely on (assumptions part D)
Comments only, no behaviour changed. modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1 (the _pragma list on every connection, busy_timeout first; extended result codes; a deferred BEGIN; multi-statement Exec) and SQLite 3.53.4's documentation (transactions, WAL, foreign keys, NOCASE, upsert, julianday, partial indexes); htmx 2.0.4 src/htmx.js; the Fetch and HTML standards for Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, SameSite, __Host-, CSP and defer order; Go's html/template. Comments the source contradicts are corrected - the driver does not serialise writes (SetMaxOpenConns(1) does), htmx:load fires per swapped element, no-store does not keep a page out of history. Left for their own commits: D-S3 a migration two processes can both run, D-S20 recipient case, D-B3 Origin: null under Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, D-H5/H6/H7/H9 (audit M11, stage 4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
b2fbe91de9 |
panel-redesign: security review of 2.0 - sessions belong to a user by id
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.
Fixed
- M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
later created under that name, with that account's role. The
baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
- M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
It ends that user's other sessions only.
- L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
- L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
- L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
- I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
that is not a known asset is a 404.
Consequences
- The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
since, too.
- dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
everyone signs in again after the transfer.
- docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.
Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
- L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
- L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
- L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
- Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
only), the domain form's validation messages.
Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.
go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
ok (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
f59f4778c9 |
panel-redesign: sign-in without an administrator follows its mockup
- panel.css: .sp-signin-form .sp-form, as theme.css has it now.
- templates/login.html: the state is div.sp-form with the mockup's
heading and line; the empty form of
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
ef8a82e4c3 |
panel-redesign: Sign in and Create administrator on the kit
Stage 2, step 1. Written by Sonnet, reviewed by Opus.
- templates/login.html, setup.html: written from the mockups as the
content of layout_signed_out - form.sp-form, kicker, h1, Bulma fields
with icons, the full-width primary button. Actions, field names,
autocomplete and autofocus are the old ones.
- view/signin.go: typed Login and Setup (Meta carries a title only, so
Engine.Render takes the signed-out layout); auth handlers pass them
instead of maps.
- login and setup are in kitPages, have fixtures, and are off
legacy_pages.txt.
States the mockups do not draw:
- a refused sign-in / setup is the kit's flash (notification is-danger
is-light) above the fields;
- login before any administrator exists shows the old sentence in a
form.sp-form that has no action and no control: the signed-out
stylesheet sizes and centres its column through "form" alone. A
workaround, listed for the owner.
Differences from the mockups, for the owner:
- the kicker is <p><span class="sp-kicker"> (the kit's partial is a
span; a page may not write the class), the mockup has <p
class="sp-kicker">: the block sits about 3px lower;
- login's kicker is the configured host name and is absent when there
is none; setup's is the mockup's fixed text;
- the footer is the layout's legal line (full copyright holder name);
- the user name field has autofocus, so it shows its focus ring.
Evidence
- docs/assets/panel-redesign/evidence/login.png, setup.png: 1440x900,
headless Edge, from the real templates served locally with their
fixtures - NOT from the container (no Docker on this machine).
- panel/audit.js on login, login with an error, login without an
administrator, setup, setup with an error, at 1440 and 1280:
118 texts checked, problems: [] ; no page is taller than 900px.
- go test -count=1 ./internal/web/...
ok internal/web
ok internal/web/auth
ok internal/web/handlers
ok internal/web/validate
ok internal/web/view
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
3b86f6c3b6 |
panel-redesign: inbound is delegated per user, separately from outbound
Stage 1, step 2 (plan § Who sees what).
Store
- Reach{AllDomains, DomainIDs, AllInbound, InboundDomainIDs} is what a
domain user is assigned. CreateUser takes it; SetUserReach / ClearUserReach
replace SetUserDomains / ClearUserDomains and write both directions in one
transaction. A domain user with nothing on either list is refused
(ErrEmptyReach). With All set the rows of that direction are not stored,
so clearing All later brings nothing stale back.
- ListDomainsForUser honours all_domains; ListInboundDomainsForUser is its
inbound twin. Both filter in the query.
Authorization
- auth.Principal carries the whole reach: CanAccessDomain (now also true
with All), CanAccessInboundDomain, HasOutbound, HasInbound. An id or a
name on one list opens nothing on the other.
- Inbound handlers in three strengths: requireInbound (the list, filtered),
requireInboundDomain (one domain: page, DNS re-check, upstream,
recipients), requireInboundGlobal (add, delete confirm, delete). All
answer the same 404.
- domainIDSet and the DMARC report pages go through the principal instead
of looking at p.Domains themselves.
Panel (old templates, until stage 2)
- User form: two lists with All; inbound is offered only where the feature
is on, and saving the form with it off keeps the user's inbound reach.
Promotion to global drops the reach.
- Menu: a group with nothing assigned is absent; / sends an inbound-only
administrator to Inbound. The inbound pages hide add / delete from a
domain administrator.
Tests: every route of one inbound domain against five kinds of refused
request (another tenant's id, a missing id, outbound-only reach, an outbound
domain with the same id, one with the same name, no principal) with the 404
bodies compared; add/delete as every non-global user; the filtered list
including a domain added later; thirteen outbound routes against another
tenant's domain and application id; the user form; the reach in the store;
the principal matrix; the menu; the home redirect. Removing the access check
or the query filter makes the tests fail (checked by hand).
go test ./... green except the two Windows-only failures in internal/domain
and internal/logtail that predate this work.
Roadmap 12/27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mixandClaude Opus 5.5
|
8d1af89e1a |
panel-redesign: the 2.0 schema from zero - one baseline, no 1.x chain
Stage 1, step 1. BREAKING: a 1.x database is not migrated.
Schema
- internal/store/migrations/ holds one file, 0001_init.sql, equal to the
2.0 schema; 0002..0010 are deleted (they stay in history at 1.9.5). No
admin table created and dropped, no ALTERs.
- users.email replaces users.dmarc_report_email: the address is the
user's own. The default DMARC report address is a user's setting
(dmarc_default_mode hosted/account/custom/none, dmarc_default_address);
the instance setting that mirrored the global user's field is gone.
- domains.dmarc_rua_user_id: a domain follows a named user's default, or
has an address of its own in dmarc_rua ('' = none). ON DELETE SET NULL
leaves it at "no reports", never at someone else's default.
- user_inbound_domains, users.all_domains, users.all_inbound_domains: in
the schema for the inbound delegation of the next step.
- users.role is 'global' / 'domain' (was 'domain_admin');
rate_limits.allowed_ips, unused since 1.9.0, is dropped.
Opening a database
- The baseline sets PRAGMA application_id ("SP20"). store.Open refuses a
file that has a schema version without it (ErrForeignSchema) and one
newer than the build. A 1.x file at user_version 10 would otherwise read
as already migrated. The refused file is left untouched.
Code
- Store.DomainDMARCRua is the one place a domain's report address is
resolved; dnscheck.ResolveDMARCRua and Store.GlobalDMARCReportEmail are
gone. dmarc.AllowedRecipients, the domain page, the dashboard and the
DNS re-check go through it.
- The old templates keep working on the new model until their pages are
restyled: the Settings form's address field is the account e-mail and
switches the user's default between it and none; a domain's "Same as
Settings" makes it follow the user who chose it; a new or imported
domain follows its creator.
- Domain export/import: a domain that follows a user exports no address.
Tests: the baseline pinned table by table (TestBaselineSchema), refusal of a
1.x and of a newer database, constraints and cascades of the new columns and
table, resolution in every default mode, the deleted-user case, and the three
bridged handlers.
docs/schema-migrations.md is rewritten for the baseline; roadmap 11/27,
schema-squash marked built.
go test ./... (Windows)
ok for every package except two that fail the same way before this commit:
internal/domain TestWriteLoadPrivateKeyRoundtrip (file mode on NTFS)
internal/logtail TestFollowTailsAndRotates (rename of an open file)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
mix
|
7ef7f75246 |
release: 1.9.2: Review pass: port-25 milters, DMARC validation, rate-limit fix
Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump. Added: - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` — - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration Changed: - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the Fixed: - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second … (11 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and … (7 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`, Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2). |
||
|
mix
|
0730b2090e |
release: 1.3.0: 1.3.0-1.3.1: security pass, queue persist, full backup layout
[1.3.0] Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration. Added: - licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex - docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry Security: - The independent security review of the send-log authorization and Fixed: - test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in - security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's - mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that - panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer - panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials … (2 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full - docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance - docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7) - licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in - ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release … (9 more in CHANGELOG) [1.3.1] Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration. Added: - Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy - docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format, - docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in - docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery - Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`; - docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for - docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh Changed: - docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings - docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages - docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and Fixed: - ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1]. Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1). |
||
|
mix
|
60e08e802e |
release: 1.2.0: Panel 1.2.0-1.2.5: layout, RBAC, tests, GUI and CI fixes
[1.2.0] The second MINOR after 1.0.0: domain administrators with per-domain scope, a panel visual refresh on the SelfPost palette, and refinements to navigation and the send log. Upgrading runs one SQLite migration (`0005_panel_users`); the single administrator becomes a global user. Added: - panel: **domain-admin role** — global administrators manage panel users and Fixed: - Docker build: `LICENSE` is no longer excluded by `.dockerignore`, so the - panel: on signed-in pages with a narrow card (**Settings**, the user form) Changed: - panel: navigation session icons are distinct — **Settings** uses a gear, - panel: `/` redirects domain administrators to `/domains`; global users still - panel: **Sign out** in the navigation column uses the same type size and - panel: **visual style** brought in line with the SelfPost mark — brick accent - panel: the send log's **status is a badge**, in the same ok/warn/error/unknown … (1 more in CHANGELOG) [1.2.1] Panel refinements after 1.2.0: navigation icons, status-badge centreing, drill-down back-link placement, and safeguards for the sole global administrator. Upgrading is a tag bump; no migration. Fixed: - panel: status badge text sat low in the box (and below the heading or label - panel: the **Users** navigation icon was two full silhouettes with staggered - panel: the **Settings** navigation icon was a sun-with-rays (circle plus - panel: the user create/edit form placed «Back to users» at the bottom of the Changed: - panel: the user edit form disables role change and delete for the only global - panel: the user create/edit form hides **Assigned domains** when the role is - panel: **Settings** shows panel credentials and DMARC aggregate reports side [1.2.2] Status page layout after 1.2.1: paired cards in a wide column, denser machine and check copy, and a user-form checkbox fix. Upgrading is a tag bump; no migration. Changed: - panel: **Status** is wide again so paired cards fill the column. Layout: Fixed: - panel: cards inside `.split` used `margin: 0 auto`, which in a CSS grid - panel: on the user create/edit form, **Assigned domains** checkboxes stacked [1.2.3] Domain detail layout and panel polish after 1.2.2. Upgrading is a tag bump; no migration. Changed: - panel: the domain detail page is wide with paired cards (DKIM+SPF ‖ DMARC; - panel: Domains list — **Add domain** sits beside the domain field; the - panel: page URLs, browser titles, and headings are aligned — **Settings** is Fixed: - image: `mail.log` rotation no longer silently stops when the build context [1.2.4] Level-2 rate-limit semantics inverted after 1.2.3, plus a small DNS field height fix. Upgrading is a tag bump; no migration. Changed: - rate limiting (level 2): domain ceilings apply to every client IP (no IP Fixed: - panel: on the domain DNS status grid, the Type (TXT) field height matches [1.2.5] Rate-limit form polish after 1.2.4. Upgrading is a tag bump; no migration. Changed: - panel: rate-limit forms refined — level-1 backstop as muted copy on the Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.2.0], [1.2.1], [1.2.2], [1.2.3], [1.2.4], [1.2.5]. Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.2.0, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5). |
||
|
mix
|
f62fe23826 |
release: 1.1.0: Domain-admin role and internal/web package split
The first MINOR after 1.0.0: send-only DMARC guidance in the panel, AGPL packaging on every page, and an internal split of `internal/web` ahead of domain-admin work. Upgrading runs one SQLite migration (empty defaults; existing DNS guidance is unchanged until you set a report address). Changed: - `internal/web` split into subpackages (`web/view`, `web/auth`, `web/validate`, Added: - panel: DMARC guidance for send-only relays — the suggested `_dmarc` record - AGPL packaging hygiene: [NOTICE](NOTICE) names the copyright holder and the - [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) — candidate item **visual-style** (panel Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.1.0). |