Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the
tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced.
- bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work
factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere.
- rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an
attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one
fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past
maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover
both halves.
- postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now
capped at 4 MiB and report truncation.
- spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were
gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the
release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments
only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked.
- schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10,
and three links pointed at deleted plan files.
- internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the
OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set.
- dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs
left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them).
- plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in
place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the
open CSRF-token question.
Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC
service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review pass over the 1.4.0-1.9.1 work.
Port 25 no longer inherits main.cf's submission milter chain: smtpd_milters
is always overridden on smtp/inet, to the antispam milter or to nothing.
Without that, OpenDKIM (strict, tempfail) gated relayed mail during a signing
outage, and the journal-milter filed inbound mail into the outbound send log
under the sender's domain -- so Deliveries showed other people's mail and a
forged From: consumed that domain's level-2 budget. architecture.md already
described the intended behaviour; the code now matches.
DMARC reports are checked before they are stored: the policy domain must be a
configured sending domain, and must match the +tag of a per-domain hosted
address. The rua address form is predictable, so anyone able to reach it could
file reports under any domain and evict genuine ones through the retention cap.
Zip attachments are now decompressed as well as gzip.
The auto level-2 ceiling is scaled to the level-1 window before the multiplier
is applied; any window other than 3600s shifted the allowance by window/3600.
Migration 0010 indexes send_log(app_login, created_at) -- both the per-MAIL
FROM rate-limit count and the per-application statistics were scanning the
created_at range.
e2e now regenerates the Postfix config in-container for all four port-25 flag
combinations and requires postfix check to pass; the 1.9.1 crash-loop shipped
in 1.4.0 and survived three releases because only the flags-off path was
exercised.
Migration 0009 stays as shipped -- its conversion branch only fires for a
database carrying application-scope allowed_ips from before 1.9.0. The schema
reference notes that the old list was permissive and the new column is
restrictive; the guide documents the allow-list as a sending control on a
fail-open path, not an authentication boundary.
Also: gofmt across cmd/ and internal/, unused duplicate validators dropped from
internal/web/validate, export no longer swallows store errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Application client IP allow-list restricts which addresses may submit as a SASL login; level-2 rate limits override the domain ceiling per application (higher or lower, capped at L1). Migration 0009, authips form, milter enforcement, export/import, and operator docs.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Receive DMARC aggregate reports on port 25 and show parsed summaries in the panel. Close Unreleased; pin compose and docs to 1.7.0.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Add 30-day send statistics and auto level-2 rate limits on the domain page. Close Unreleased; pin compose and docs to 1.6.0.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Port 25 accepts only configured domains and listed recipients, then forwards to an upstream; the outbound path is unchanged when the flag is off.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The panel now suggests policy-only DMARC by default, lets operators configure a default and per-domain report address, and DNS-checks hub _report._dmarc records. Future in-panel report ingestion is tracked as dmarc-reports in the roadmap.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- logtail: persist the read position (offset + fingerprint of the log's
first 512 bytes) in a new logtail_state table (migration 0003) and
resume from it on start, so delivery lines written while the panel was
down are parsed instead of skipped and their send-log rows no longer
stay "queued" forever. Fingerprint mismatch (rotated/recreated while
down) reads the file from the start — re-parsing is idempotent; a
first-ever start with nothing stored still begins at end-of-file.
Writes are throttled to one per 5s, forced on rotation and shutdown.
- milter: count messages that passed the level-2 check but have not
reached the send log yet (internal/milter/inflight.go), so concurrent
SMTP sessions cannot each spend the same last slot. A literal
count+insert transaction, as the review suggested, is not possible:
the count happens at MAIL FROM and the insert at end-of-message.
Reservations are released after the insert, on ABORT, and after a
10-minute TTL — a client that drops mid-transaction must not be able
to hold a slot, since the limiter is fail-open by design.
Docs: architecture.md (log tailer, persistence, L2 counting),
security.md and roadmap.md (restart gap closed, container recreate
remains), CHANGELOG, progress.md, code-review.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sessions move from an in-memory map (absolute 12h TTL) to a `sessions`
table (migration 0002), storing only the SHA-256 of the token. Expiry is
now a sliding idle window (PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, default 7, no
absolute cap), extended at most once an hour and never by the
monitoring screens' background polling (GET + HX-Request), so a
forgotten open tab doesn't keep a session alive indefinitely. A login
now survives a container restart or redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mixandClaude Opus 5