The level-2 limiter counted stored plus in-flight messages and reserved its own slot in two critical sections, so SMTP sessions that overlapped could each take the last free slot; tryAdmit now does both under one lock. A session that cannot be written no longer yields a cookie the browser would carry while every request bounced to /login. Deleting an application clears its SASL account before its registry row, matching domain delete, so a saslpasswd2 failure leaves a retryable application rather than an account that still authenticates.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Invert level-2 semantics so domain limits apply to every client IP and
application limits with trusted IPs raise the ceiling above the domain
(still capped by level 1). Panel shows L1, validates maxima, and documents
the model on Settings.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
security.md is linked from the README documentation table and now from
SECURITY.md, so a reader following either link landed in a Russian document
while everything around it was English. Translated in full; the requirements,
the accepted risks, and the CSRF ADR are unchanged in substance.
The reviewing model is no longer named in the text — that the pre-release
review ran, and when, is what a reader needs; who ran it is process detail
kept in development.md.
extract-cert.sh keeps its spec 10.3 quotation, translated. In sasl.go the
quotation from the closed plan is dropped rather than translated: rendered in
English it restated the sentence it hung off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeberg is being retired as the project's public site, so every reference now
points at GitHub. That includes the Go module path (codeberg.org/mix/selfpost →
github.com/mixeme/selfpost): leaving an import path on a host that is going
away would break `go get` and `go install`, so this is not only a docs change.
Touches go.mod, test/e2e/go.mod, all imports, Makefile MODULE, the -ldflags
version stamp in build/Dockerfile and docs/development.md, the licence headers
in the SVG/HTML assets, and README (no more primary/mirror pair).
Comments no longer cite the archived specification. "spec 7.6.1", "spec 5.1"
and friends pointed into docs/archive/specification-v1.0.md, which is marked as
not a source of truth; each is now a reference to the live document that owns
the subject — architecture.md (with section), product.md, security.md or the
README. The review only asked for the 7.x refs (code-review.md § 4), but 4/5/6/
8/9 had the same defect, so they went too. Comments only, no behaviour change.
Also closes the remaining review items: architecture.md gained a Code layers
section with the layer diagram (A2), and TestParseDelivery gained the exotic
mail.log cases (§ 3).
Fixes a bug that last test found: the delivery-line pattern matched status=
greedily, taking the *last* occurrence on the line. Postfix appends the remote
server's reply verbatim, so a rejection whose reply quoted "status=sent" was
filed as a delivered message in the send log. It now takes the first status=
after the recipient, which is the real field.
R7 (CONTRIBUTING.md) moved to roadmap 2.x — one developer, no external PR flow,
so the file would have no audience yet. R1 (compose image tag) and the git tag
stay in roadmap § v1.x as the release-commit steps.
gofmt/go vet clean on both modules; go test ./... green except the three known
Windows-only failures (file perms, backslash paths, renaming an open file).
Not exercised on the dev server — no Docker locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Removes ~30 stale "Phase N" / historical-staging comment references from
code and shell scripts now that v1.0 is done; fixes a stale dashboard
comment claiming applications/send-log were unimplemented; adds a CSRF ADR
to security.md documenting the Origin-check-over-tokens decision; resolves
docs/logo in roadmap.md (directory doesn't exist, criterion already met);
adds a gofmt -l check to CI so unformatted Go fails the build.
The known-limitations write-up for the log-tailer offset gap (the other
Phase 1 item) was already present in architecture.md § Log tailer, so no
change was needed there.
gofmt/go vet/go test clean on both Go modules (main + test/e2e), verified
on the dev server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fable review of the full diff from the v1.0 audit (Phase 11, 65a420d) to
HEAD plus a complete pass over the docs/security.md checklist (former spec
7.6). No exploitable findings. One defence-in-depth fix: the application
login is passed to saslpasswd2 behind a -- end-of-options marker so a
login starting with - can never be parsed as a flag. Accepted risks
unchanged; plan § D closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full server backup (spec 7.5.A): internal/backup produces a tar.gz of all of
/data — a consistent SQLite snapshot via VACUUM INTO, DKIM keys, sasldb2 and a
version manifest; TLS certs (tls/) and the Postfix queue are excluded. Two equal
paths: the panel button (POST /backup, no-store) and the selfpost-backup CLI via
docker exec (spec 11.6). CheckRestore runs before store.Open: a manifest version
mismatch refuses to boot with the image tag to use; a match consumes the
manifest so it only guards the first post-restore boot. Restore is not a
separate branch — Postfix/OpenDKIM regenerate from the restored SQLite as on any
start.
Domain export/import (spec 7.5.B): DomainExport carries the DKIM private key and
each application's working password. SASL secrets are read from sasldb2 via
db_dump (the userPassword property is plaintext) and, on import, re-keyed under
the local realm with saslpasswd2 — so credentials keep working on an instance
with a different hostname, with no DKIM DNS change. Import validates and rolls
back atomically on any failure. db-util (db_dump) is now an explicit image dep.
Verified on the server (selfpost:p9): gofmt/vet/test green; container e2e for
cross-realm domain export/import (SMTP AUTH 235 under the new realm), CLI and
panel backups, same-version restore, and version-mismatch refusal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The journal-milter, until now a pure monitor, now refuses a message with a
4xx tempfail (RespTempFail/451) at MAIL FROM when a per-domain or per-
application limit is exceeded. Key is the client IP; the count is
COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) over a sliding window reusing the send log; the
limit applies only when a non-empty IP binding matches the client (empty
binding => level-1 only, per spec 7.4). Enforcement is fail-open on the
milter's own errors — a limiter malfunction never blocks mail, and Postfix's
level-1 anvil limit stays the independent backstop. Refused messages are
recorded in send_log with status "rejected" for UI visibility.
- store/ratelimits.go: RateLimit type (+Active/AllowsIP), id-keyed get/set/
delete for the panel, name/login-keyed lookup + windowed distinct-message
count for the milter, DeleteRateLimitsForDomain. No migration — the
rate_limits table has existed since Phase 2.
- milter: enforce at MailFrom, fail-open helper overLimit, InsertRejected.
- web: server-side validated IP/ceiling/window forms on the domain page and
per application; routes POST /domains/{id}/ratelimit and
/applications/{aid}/ratelimit. Milter reads rows live, so no reload.
- domain/app services clear limits on deletion (rate_limits has no FK cascade).
Unit tests + container e2e (p8) green: refusal on both scopes, unregistered
IP ignored, fail-open with the panel stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in
sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit
list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create,
list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1,
7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in
plaintext (7.6.1).
- internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique
login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by-
domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup.
- internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a
whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password;
address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config
write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full
rollback on partial failure.
- internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of
the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write,
injection backstop (7.6.4).
- Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master,
so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs
the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the
unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in
mail.log.
- domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades,
then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both
OpenDKIM and Postfix.
- web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential
shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises
/data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal.
Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a
container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete
cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mix
mixeme