Groundwork for the Content-Security-Policy of phase 14.A. A policy that has to
allow inline script is not worth writing — script-src 'unsafe-inline' gives
back exactly the XSS foothold the policy exists to remove — so the three
inline constructs the templates still had are moved out first:
- the layout's <style> block becomes /static/panel.css;
- the one style="background:#b42318" attribute becomes the .danger class
that already existed for it;
- the four onsubmit="return confirm(...)" handlers become data-confirm,
handled by a delegated listener in panel.js. Delegation matters: the
application rows are also delivered by HTMX swaps.
htmx would otherwise inject a <style> of its own for the request-indicator
classes and become the single reason the policy needs an exemption; the panel
uses no hx-indicator, so the meta config switches it off.
A guard test keeps this from silently regressing later, which it otherwise
would: an inline handler added to a template does not fail, it just quietly
stops working in the browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 12 (UI/UX). The navigation bar now renders once from layout.html
instead of being copied into each content template, so it is present on
every authenticated page — including the domain page and its delete
confirmation, which had no links at all — and the current page is
highlighted via .Active rather than quietly dropping out of the list.
New /account page changes the administrator's username and/or password:
the current password is required and the attempt is throttled on the same
limiter as the login form, so this route cannot be used to brute-force
past that limit. A password change invalidates every other session while
keeping the one performing it; a rename carries that session over.
Backup and domain import move from a card in the middle of the domain
list to their own /backup page, one card each; the handlers themselves
are unchanged, only the page the import form renders its errors on.
The domain page gains a "Sending server settings" card (server, port,
encryption) so a client can be configured without reading the docs; 587
is listed only when SUBMISSION_ENABLE is true for this deployment, which
is a deploy-time flag the panel cannot verify at runtime.
Client-side (static/panel.js, no libraries): Copy buttons on the values
that get carried elsewhere (DKIM record, new application credentials,
server name), and the Addresses field is hidden while the address mode is
wildcard, where the server ignores it.
Verified in a container on the dev server: setup, login, every page's
nav and active item, domain and application creation, all account-form
paths including cross-session invalidation, import errors, full backup
download. gofmt/vet/test/docker build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the
OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10).
internal/domain:
- Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the
published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source
of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation.
- KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every
add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile:
with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses
any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4).
- Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through
supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no
shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never
overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid.
- Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with
rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps
via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries.
Infra:
- Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim
(reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit
the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design.
- opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s).
- entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership,
setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing
after a restore.
- supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel
can request the reload.
web/store:
- Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2
labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2).
- Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE
CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the
DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade
before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12,
OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5).
- Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard
patterns.
Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering +
injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain,
DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and
tables persist across a restart).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mix