The panel now suggests policy-only DMARC by default, lets operators configure a default and per-domain report address, and DNS-checks hub _report._dmarc records. Future in-panel report ingestion is tracked as dmarc-reports in the roadmap.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Codeberg is being retired as the project's public site, so every reference now
points at GitHub. That includes the Go module path (codeberg.org/mix/selfpost →
github.com/mixeme/selfpost): leaving an import path on a host that is going
away would break `go get` and `go install`, so this is not only a docs change.
Touches go.mod, test/e2e/go.mod, all imports, Makefile MODULE, the -ldflags
version stamp in build/Dockerfile and docs/development.md, the licence headers
in the SVG/HTML assets, and README (no more primary/mirror pair).
Comments no longer cite the archived specification. "spec 7.6.1", "spec 5.1"
and friends pointed into docs/archive/specification-v1.0.md, which is marked as
not a source of truth; each is now a reference to the live document that owns
the subject — architecture.md (with section), product.md, security.md or the
README. The review only asked for the 7.x refs (code-review.md § 4), but 4/5/6/
8/9 had the same defect, so they went too. Comments only, no behaviour change.
Also closes the remaining review items: architecture.md gained a Code layers
section with the layer diagram (A2), and TestParseDelivery gained the exotic
mail.log cases (§ 3).
Fixes a bug that last test found: the delivery-line pattern matched status=
greedily, taking the *last* occurrence on the line. Postfix appends the remote
server's reply verbatim, so a rejection whose reply quoted "status=sent" was
filed as a delivered message in the send log. It now takes the first status=
after the recipient, which is the real field.
R7 (CONTRIBUTING.md) moved to roadmap 2.x — one developer, no external PR flow,
so the file would have no audience yet. R1 (compose image tag) and the git tag
stay in roadmap § v1.x as the release-commit steps.
gofmt/go vet clean on both modules; go test ./... green except the three known
Windows-only failures (file perms, backslash paths, renaming an open file).
Not exercised on the dev server — no Docker locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both secret-bearing downloads can now be sealed with a password. Unticked, the
forms produce exactly the files they did before.
- internal/secretfile: envelope format — magic/type/scrypt params/salt/nonce
prefix header, then 64 KiB AES-256-GCM chunks each authenticated with the
header, its counter and an end-of-stream flag, so truncation, reordering and
tampering fail to open instead of restoring a plausible prefix. Streams both
ways, so a full backup never sits in memory.
- Panel: "Encrypt with a password" checkbox on the full-backup and
domain-export forms (shared partial, toggled from panel.js — no inline
script); domain import detects an encrypted export by magic bytes, not by
extension, and asks for the password.
- selfpost-backup: writes .spbk when given a password and converts one back
with -decrypt, which a restore needs. The password comes from
SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never argv.
- Docs: README, security.md (+ accepted risk: encryption stays opt-in),
architecture.md, progress.md, CHANGELOG.
Verified locally: panel-encrypted archive decrypts through the CLI and unpacks;
wrong password and password mismatch are refused; UI checked in a browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the
OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10).
internal/domain:
- Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the
published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source
of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation.
- KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every
add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile:
with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses
any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4).
- Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through
supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no
shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never
overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid.
- Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with
rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps
via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries.
Infra:
- Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim
(reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit
the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design.
- opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s).
- entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership,
setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing
after a restore.
- supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel
can request the reload.
web/store:
- Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2
labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2).
- Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE
CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the
DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade
before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12,
OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5).
- Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard
patterns.
Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering +
injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain,
DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and
tables persist across a restart).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mix