00e36df553
Invert level-2 semantics so domain limits apply to every client IP and application limits with trusted IPs raise the ceiling above the domain (still capped by level 1). Panel shows L1, validates maxima, and documents the model on Settings. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
223 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
223 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
package store
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import (
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Rate-limit scopes (guide § Rate limiting). A level-2 limit is attached
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// either to a domain (counted across all its applications and IPs) or to a
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// single application.
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const (
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RateLimitScopeDomain = "domain"
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RateLimitScopeApp = "application"
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)
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// RateLimit is a differentiated level-2 rate limit (guide § Rate limiting):
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// a message ceiling over a sliding window, attached to a domain or an
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// application. It is enforced in the journal-milter; level 1 (Postfix anvil,
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// architecture.md § Mail path) is the IP backstop that always applies even
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// when this is absent or the milter is down.
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//
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// Domain limits apply to every client IP once max and window are set. Application
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// limits additionally require AllowedIPs: those trusted addresses get the app
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// ceiling (above the domain) and skip the domain check; other IPs stay under
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// the domain limit or level 1 alone (guide § Rate limiting).
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type RateLimit struct {
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Scope string
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RefID int64
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AllowedIPs []string // trusted client IPs for an application override
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MaxMessages int
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WindowSeconds int
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}
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// Active reports whether the limit is fully configured and should be enforced.
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// Domain: max and window only. Application: also needs at least one trusted IP
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// (the privilege that raises the ceiling above the domain).
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func (r RateLimit) Active() bool {
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if r.MaxMessages <= 0 || r.WindowSeconds <= 0 {
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return false
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}
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if r.Scope == RateLimitScopeApp {
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return len(r.AllowedIPs) > 0
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}
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// Domain (and any unset/legacy scope treated as domain-style): no IP list.
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return true
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}
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// AllowsIP reports whether ip is one of the application's trusted client IPs.
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// Used only for application overrides; domain limits do not consult this list.
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// Equivalent textual forms of the same address match.
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func (r RateLimit) AllowsIP(ip string) bool {
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c := net.ParseIP(ip)
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if c == nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, a := range r.AllowedIPs {
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if p := net.ParseIP(a); p != nil && p.Equal(c) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// GetRateLimit loads the level-2 limit configured for a domain or application by
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// its id, for the panel's edit form. ok is false when none is configured.
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func (s *Store) GetRateLimit(scope string, refID int64) (RateLimit, bool, error) {
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row := s.db.QueryRow(
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`SELECT allowed_ips, max_messages, window_seconds
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FROM rate_limits WHERE scope = ? AND ref_id = ?`, scope, refID)
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rl, err := scanRateLimit(row)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return RateLimit{Scope: scope, RefID: refID}, false, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return RateLimit{}, false, fmt.Errorf("get rate limit: %w", err)
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}
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rl.Scope, rl.RefID = scope, refID
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return rl, true, nil
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}
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// SetRateLimit upserts the level-2 limit for a domain or application. The caller
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// (panel) has already validated the IPs and numbers (security.md); values are
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// stored via bound parameters and read back live by the milter.
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func (s *Store) SetRateLimit(rl RateLimit) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO rate_limits (scope, ref_id, allowed_ips, max_messages, window_seconds)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT(scope, ref_id) DO UPDATE SET
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allowed_ips = excluded.allowed_ips,
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max_messages = excluded.max_messages,
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window_seconds = excluded.window_seconds`,
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rl.Scope, rl.RefID, strings.Join(rl.AllowedIPs, ","), rl.MaxMessages, rl.WindowSeconds,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("set rate limit: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeleteRateLimit removes the level-2 limit for a domain or application, so the
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// admin can clear it and fall back to level 1 only.
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func (s *Store) DeleteRateLimit(scope string, refID int64) error {
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM rate_limits WHERE scope = ? AND ref_id = ?`, scope, refID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete rate limit: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeleteRateLimitsForDomain removes the domain's own limit and the limits of all
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// its applications in one statement. It is called on domain deletion, before the
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// application rows are cascade-deleted, to avoid leaving orphan limit rows.
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func (s *Store) DeleteRateLimitsForDomain(domainID int64) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(
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`DELETE FROM rate_limits
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WHERE (scope = 'domain' AND ref_id = ?)
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OR (scope = 'application' AND ref_id IN (SELECT id FROM applications WHERE domain_id = ?))`,
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domainID, domainID,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete domain rate limits: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// RateLimit resolves the level-2 limit that applies to a message, keyed by the
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// human-readable reference the milter has on the receive path: the sending
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// domain name (scope "domain") or the SASL login (scope "application"). ok is
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// false when no limit is configured for that reference.
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func (s *Store) RateLimit(scope, ref string) (RateLimit, bool, error) {
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var query string
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switch scope {
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case RateLimitScopeDomain:
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query = `SELECT rl.allowed_ips, rl.max_messages, rl.window_seconds
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FROM rate_limits rl JOIN domains d ON d.id = rl.ref_id
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WHERE rl.scope = 'domain' AND d.name = ?`
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case RateLimitScopeApp:
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query = `SELECT rl.allowed_ips, rl.max_messages, rl.window_seconds
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FROM rate_limits rl JOIN applications a ON a.id = rl.ref_id
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WHERE rl.scope = 'application' AND a.login = ?`
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default:
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return RateLimit{}, false, fmt.Errorf("unknown rate-limit scope %q", scope)
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}
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rl, err := scanRateLimit(s.db.QueryRow(query, ref))
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return RateLimit{}, false, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return RateLimit{}, false, fmt.Errorf("rate limit for %s %q: %w", scope, ref, err)
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}
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rl.Scope = scope
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return rl, true, nil
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}
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// CountMessages returns how many distinct messages the reference (a domain
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// name or an application login) has queued since t, for the level-2 sliding
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// window (guide § Rate limiting). It counts distinct queue-ids — one message
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// with many recipients is one message, matching level 1's per-message
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// semantics — and excludes rows that were themselves rejected by a limit (they
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// were never sent). It reuses the send log the journal already writes (README
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// § Rate limiting — the limiter reuses the send log).
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func (s *Store) CountMessages(scope, ref string, since time.Time) (int64, error) {
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var column string
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switch scope {
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case RateLimitScopeDomain:
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column = "domain"
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case RateLimitScopeApp:
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column = "app_login"
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default:
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("unknown rate-limit scope %q", scope)
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}
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var n int64
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// created_at is stored as RFC3339 UTC, so a lexical comparison against the
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// same format is chronologically correct (as in DeleteSendLogBefore).
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err := s.db.QueryRow(
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`SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) FROM send_log
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WHERE `+column+` = ? AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?`,
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ref, StatusRejected, since.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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).Scan(&n)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("count messages for %s %q: %w", scope, ref, err)
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}
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return n, nil
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}
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// scanRateLimit reads the three stored columns, tolerating NULL numeric columns
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// by leaving the corresponding field zero, which makes the limit inert via
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// Active() until max and window are both set.
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func scanRateLimit(r scanRow) (RateLimit, error) {
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var (
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ips sql.NullString
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maxMsgs sql.NullInt64
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windowSecs sql.NullInt64
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)
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if err := r.Scan(&ips, &maxMsgs, &windowSecs); err != nil {
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return RateLimit{}, err
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}
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return RateLimit{
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AllowedIPs: splitIPs(ips.String),
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MaxMessages: int(maxMsgs.Int64),
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WindowSeconds: int(windowSecs.Int64),
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}, nil
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}
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// splitIPs parses the comma-separated storage form back into a slice, dropping
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// empties so an empty column yields nil (an inactive limit).
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func splitIPs(s string) []string {
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if strings.TrimSpace(s) == "" {
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return nil
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}
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parts := strings.Split(s, ",")
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out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
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for _, p := range parts {
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if p = strings.TrimSpace(p); p != "" {
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out = append(out, p)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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