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selfpost/docs/architecture.md
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mix 60addd56c8 docs: trim implementation-plan to open release gate
Leave only pre-release security review (section D) in implementation-plan.md. Move closed B.1-C.4 as-built detail to architecture.md and development.md; document accepted risks in security.md; optional send-log follow-ups in roadmap.md.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-05 00:50:13 +03:00

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# SelfPost — architecture (as-built)
**Source of truth:** the code tree, not historical specs. Synchronise this file
when env keys, routes, or mail-path behaviour change. Verification method:
[documentation-plan.md](documentation-plan.md) §2.
User install/operations: [README.md](../README.md). Product boundaries:
[product.md](product.md).
---
## Image and processes
Single Debian slim image. `entrypoint.sh` (root) fixes `/data` ownership and
milter socket directories, **requires** `SELFPOST_HOSTNAME` (FQDN with at least
one dot; no scheme, port, or spaces — invalid or empty value → `exit 1` before
Postfix config or supervisord), then execs `supervisord` as PID 1.
The hostname is not a tunable default: it must match PTR/rDNS, TLS CN/SAN, and
SASL realm together. Soft fallbacks (`localhost` in the panel vs container ID in
Postfix) split realms and break SMTP AUTH with a silent `535` in clients while
the panel looks healthy. Shipped `docker-compose.yml` already requires the
variable; the entrypoint gate catches `docker run`, custom compose, and k8s.
Managed programs ([build/supervisord.conf](../build/supervisord.conf)):
| Program | User | Priority | Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| `opendkim` | opendkim | 100 | DKIM signing milter |
| `panel` | panel | 200 | HTTP UI + journal-milter + log-tailer goroutine |
| `postfix` | root (wrapper) | 300 | MTA — started only after both milter sockets exist |
| `postfix-reload` | root | — | On-demand `postfix reload` (autostart off) |
| `cert-reload` | root | 400 | Daily `postfix reload` for renewed TLS certs |
| `logrotate` | root | 400 | Periodic `mail.log` rotation |
Start order: OpenDKIM → panel (opens journal-milter socket) → Postfix wrapper
polls unix sockets (timeout `MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT`, default 30s) then
`postfix start-fg`.
`crashexit` event listener exits the container on any managed process FATAL so
Docker `restart: unless-stopped` recreates a broken instance.
**Liveness:** `GET /healthz` (unauthenticated) returns 200 when opendkim,
panel, and postfix are RUNNING; Docker `HEALTHCHECK` uses the same probe.
---
## Mail path
```
Client ──TLS+SASL──► Postfix (465 smtps, optional 587 submission)
├─► OpenDKIM milter (sign, tempfail on failure)
├─► journal-milter (send log + L2 rate limits, fail-open)
└─► outbound MX delivery (port 25 client)
```
### Postfix ([build/postfix-config.sh](../build/postfix-config.sh))
- **465/smtps** — implicit TLS, SASL required; primary listener.
- **587/submission** — only when `SUBMISSION_ENABLE=true`; STARTTLS with
`smtpd_tls_security_level=encrypt`.
- **No open relay** — `permit_sasl_authenticated`, `reject_unauth_destination`;
`smtpd_sender_login_maps` + `reject_sender_login_mismatch`.
- **Level-1 rate limit** — `smtpd_client_message_rate_limit` /
`anvil_rate_time_unit` from `RATE_LIMIT_*` env vars; independent of milter.
- **Chroot disabled** for all services (DNS/TLS inside container).
- **TLS certs** — read-only mount at `TLS_CERT_FILE` / `TLS_KEY_FILE`; daily
reload via `cert-reload`.
### OpenDKIM
Per-domain keys under `/data/opendkim/keys`; `KeyTable` / `SigningTable` maintained
by the panel. Socket `/run/opendkim/opendkim.sock`.
### Panel binary ([cmd/panel](../cmd/panel))
One process, three roles:
1. **HTTP server**`:8080` (`PANEL_HTTP_ADDR`); HTTPS terminated by reverse
proxy only.
2. **journal-milter** — unix socket `JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET`; records From/To/
Subject/SASL user at DATA; enforces level-2 rate limits; **fail-open**
(`default_action=accept`) so milter failure does not stop mail.
3. **log-tailer** — follows `MAIL_LOG`, updates send-log delivery status by
queue-id. Send-log `queued → sent` transitions depend on this goroutine alone
(`UpdateStatus` is only called from [internal/logtail](../internal/logtail/logtail.go)).
Milter chain in Postfix: OpenDKIM (tempfail) then journal (accept on failure).
### Log tailer and `mail.log` rotation
`mail.log` lives under `/var/log` (not in `/data`). Rotation uses rename +
`postfix reload` ([build/logrotate-mail.conf](../build/logrotate-mail.conf)), not
`copytruncate` — the latter can drop `status=sent` lines and leave send-log rows
stuck at `queued`. After rename, logrotate runs `create 0644 root root` (Postfix
recreates the file lazily on first write as mode `0600`, which the unprivileged
panel user cannot read). `follow()` drains the old inode once more before
switching descriptors; the panel treats a missing log file as an empty tail, not
an error.
**Known gaps (same class of loss, not fixed by rename rotation):**
- **Panel restart** — `follow()` starts at end-of-file; lines written while the
panel was down are never parsed; in-flight send-log rows may stay `queued`.
- **Container recreate** — `/var/log` is ephemeral; the log is lost with the
container.
Possible follow-ups if these become painful: persist read offset across restarts,
mount mail log under `/data`, or reconcile stuck rows via `postqueue`.
---
## Panel HTTP surface
Route table: [internal/web/web.go](../internal/web/web.go). Authenticated
unless noted.
| Route | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `/healthz` | Liveness (no auth) |
| `/setup/*` | One-time admin bootstrap |
| `/login`, `/logout` | Session auth |
| `/status` | Process, cert, socket, PTR checks |
| `/domains`, `/domains/*` | Domain and application CRUD, DKIM, L2 limits |
| `/deliveries` | Send log with filters |
| `/mail-queue` | Postfix queue view |
| `/system-log` | `mail.log` tail |
| `/reload` | Reload OpenDKIM + Postfix maps |
| `/backup` | Full backup download, domain import |
| `/account` | Admin username/password |
HTMX polling refreshes monitoring fragments; polling does not extend session
idle timeout (only non-`HX-Request` GET and mutating requests count as activity).
### Sessions
Stored in SQLite (`sessions` table, migration `0002`): cookie holds a random
token; the database stores **SHA-256 of the token**, not the token itself — a
stolen DB or backup archive does not alone grant login, but a browser that still
holds the cookie works after process restart, redeploy, or full backup restore.
- **Idle timeout** — sliding window, `PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS` (default 7); no
absolute cap (regular use keeps the session alive indefinitely).
- **Renewal** — DB `last_seen` and cookie `Max-Age` update at most once per hour
(`renewThreshold` in [internal/web/session.go](../internal/web/session.go)).
- **Password change** — all other sessions are deleted; the current session stays
active ([internal/store/sessions.go](../internal/store/sessions.go),
[handlers_account.go](../internal/web/handlers_account.go)).
Restoring an **older** backup also restores session rows: a session invalidated
after that backup was taken can become valid again if the browser still has the
cookie and idle timeout has not expired.
---
## Persistence (`/data` bind mount)
| Path | Contents |
|---|---|
| `selfpost.db` | SQLite: domains, apps, admin, sessions, send log, L2 limits |
| `setup-token` | First-run setup token file |
| `opendkim/` | DKIM keys + tables |
| `sasl/sasldb2` | Application SASL credentials |
| `postfix/sender_login_maps` | Login → From binding |
| `manifest.json` | Backup version stamp (consumed on restore) |
Not in `/data`: TLS certificates (reverse-proxy mount), Postfix queue
(transit mail not migrated by design).
**Rotation:** send-log retention `SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS` (default 90);
`mail.log` via logrotate (14 rotated files, check every 6h, rename +
`postfix reload` in `postrotate` — see § Log tailer above).
**Backup:** panel button or `selfpost-backup` CLI — SQLite snapshot + tar of
`/data` tree; version check on restore. Stopped-container `tar` of `./data` is
safe (see README).
---
## Security (summary)
Mandatory checklist: [security.md](security.md). Accepted trade-offs (CSRF
origin check, no CSRF tokens) are documented there separately.
---
## Configuration
Public and internal env vars: [README § Environment variables](../README.md#environment-variables).
Regression test: [cmd/panel/envdoc_test.go](../cmd/panel/envdoc_test.go).