e6910c2c2d
The domain page generated and displayed the DKIM record but said only "also configure SPF and DMARC for the domain (see the documentation)". The concrete example existed — buried in the check's remediation text, and only visible once the check had already failed. Show both records up front, host and value with a Copy button, the way the DKIM record is shown, plus the two things that actually bite: a domain may carry only one SPF record (add the mechanism to the existing one rather than publishing a second), and p=none is safe to publish immediately. The SPF value names the addresses SELFPOST_HOSTNAME resolves to, taken from the hostname check the page already runs, and falls back to an "a:" mechanism when it does not resolve. New dnscheck.SPFExample/DMARCExample are the single source for both the page and the checks' advice, so the two cannot drift into recommending different records; dnscheck.Query gains Hostname for the fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
286 lines
8.3 KiB
Go
286 lines
8.3 KiB
Go
package dnscheck
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/health"
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)
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// spfLookupBudget caps how many DNS lookups one SPF evaluation may spend on
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// a/mx mechanisms. RFC 7208 allows a receiver ten; staying under the same
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// ceiling keeps a hostile or careless record from turning a page view into a
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// long chain of queries.
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const spfLookupBudget = 10
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// checkSPF reports whether the domain's SPF record authorises this server.
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//
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// This is deliberately a shallow check (documented as such in the README): it
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// looks for a mechanism that literally covers the server's address —
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// ip4:/ip6:, or a/mx resolving to it — and does not recurse into include: or
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// redirect=, nor evaluate the record the way a receiver would. That is why a
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// record which does not obviously cover us but does use include: is reported as
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// a warning ("cannot tell") rather than a failure.
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func (c *Checker) checkSPF(ctx context.Context, q Query) Result {
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ips := parseIPs(q.ServerIPs)
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if len(ips) == 0 {
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusUnknown,
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Detail: "The server's own address is not known (its hostname does not resolve), so SPF coverage cannot be checked. Fix the hostname/PTR check first.",
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}
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}
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txt, found, err := c.lookupTXT(ctx, q.Name)
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if err != nil {
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return lookupFailed("the SPF record", err)
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}
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var records []string
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for _, rec := range txt {
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if isSPF(rec) {
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records = append(records, strings.TrimSpace(rec))
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}
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}
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switch {
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case !found || len(records) == 0:
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusError,
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("No SPF record is published for %s. Publish a TXT record such as %q — without it receivers have nothing authorising this server to send as the domain.", q.Name, SPFExample(q.Hostname, q.ServerIPs)),
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}
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case len(records) > 1:
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusError,
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("More than one SPF record is published for %s. RFC 7208 allows exactly one; receivers treat several as a permanent error and the domain gets no SPF pass at all. Merge them into a single record.", q.Name),
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Records: records,
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}
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}
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matched, unfollowed := c.evaluateSPF(ctx, records[0], q.Name, ips)
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switch {
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case matched == "+all" || matched == "all":
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusWarn,
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Detail: "The SPF record ends with \"+all\", which authorises every server on the internet to send as this domain. Replace it with an explicit ip4:/ip6: or a mechanism plus \"-all\".",
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Records: records,
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}
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case matched != "":
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusOK,
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("The SPF record authorises this server through its %q mechanism.", matched),
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Records: records,
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}
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case len(unfollowed) > 0:
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusWarn,
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("No mechanism in the SPF record lists %s directly, but the record uses %s, which this check does not follow — the server may still be authorised through it. Verify with an external SPF validator, or add \"ip4:%s\" to be sure.",
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ips[0], strings.Join(unfollowed, ", "), ips[0]),
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Records: records,
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}
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default:
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return Result{
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Status: health.StatusError,
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("The SPF record does not authorise %s, so mail sent from this server fails SPF. Add \"ip4:%s\" (or an \"a\" mechanism resolving here) to the record.", ips[0], ips[0]),
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Records: records,
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}
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}
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}
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// evaluateSPF walks the record's mechanisms, returning the first one that
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// covers one of the server's addresses, plus the mechanisms this shallow check
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// cannot resolve (include:/redirect=/exists:/ptr and anything past the lookup
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// budget) so the caller can say "cannot tell" instead of "fails".
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func (c *Checker) evaluateSPF(ctx context.Context, record, domainName string, ips []net.IP) (matched string, unfollowed []string) {
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budget := spfLookupBudget
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seenUnfollowed := make(map[string]bool)
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note := func(kind string) {
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if !seenUnfollowed[kind] {
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seenUnfollowed[kind] = true
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unfollowed = append(unfollowed, kind)
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}
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}
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terms := strings.Fields(record)
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if len(terms) > 0 {
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terms = terms[1:] // drop the v=spf1 version token
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}
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for _, term := range terms {
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qualifier, mech := splitQualifier(term)
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lower := strings.ToLower(mech)
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name, hasArg := mechanismArg(mech)
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switch {
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case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ip4:"), strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ip6:"):
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if qualifier != '+' {
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continue
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}
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if coversAny(mech[4:], ips) {
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return term, unfollowed
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}
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case lower == "a" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "a:") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "a/"):
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if strings.Contains(mech, "/") { // prefix-length form: not evaluated
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note("a/<prefix>")
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continue
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}
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target := domainName
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if hasArg {
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target = name
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}
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if budget <= 0 {
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note("further lookups")
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continue
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}
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budget--
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if qualifier == '+' && c.resolvesTo(ctx, target, ips) {
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return term, unfollowed
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}
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case lower == "mx" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "mx:") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "mx/"):
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if strings.Contains(mech, "/") {
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note("mx/<prefix>")
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continue
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}
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target := domainName
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if hasArg {
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target = name
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}
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if budget <= 0 {
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note("further lookups")
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continue
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}
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budget--
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if qualifier == '+' && c.mxResolvesTo(ctx, target, ips, &budget) {
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return term, unfollowed
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}
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case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "include:"):
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note("include:")
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case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "redirect="):
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note("redirect=")
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case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "exists:"):
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note("exists:")
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case lower == "ptr" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ptr:"):
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note("ptr")
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case lower == "all":
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if qualifier == '+' {
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return "+all", unfollowed
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}
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// "-all"/"~all"/"?all" terminates the record: nothing after it is
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// evaluated by a receiver either.
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return "", unfollowed
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}
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}
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return "", unfollowed
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}
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// resolvesTo reports whether name resolves to one of the server's addresses.
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func (c *Checker) resolvesTo(ctx context.Context, name string, ips []net.IP) bool {
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addrs, err := c.resolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, name)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, a := range addrs {
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if a.IP.Equal(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// mxResolvesTo reports whether any of name's MX hosts resolves to one of the
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// server's addresses, spending at most the remaining lookup budget.
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func (c *Checker) mxResolvesTo(ctx context.Context, name string, ips []net.IP, budget *int) bool {
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mxs, err := c.resolver.LookupMX(ctx, name)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, mx := range mxs {
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if *budget <= 0 {
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return false
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}
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*budget--
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if c.resolvesTo(ctx, strings.TrimSuffix(mx.Host, "."), ips) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// coversAny reports whether an ip4:/ip6: value — a bare address or a CIDR —
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// contains one of the server's addresses.
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func coversAny(value string, ips []net.IP) bool {
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value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
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if strings.Contains(value, "/") {
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_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(value)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if network.Contains(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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listed := net.ParseIP(value)
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if listed == nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, ip := range ips {
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if listed.Equal(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// splitQualifier peels the optional +/-/~/? qualifier off a mechanism,
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// defaulting to "+" (pass) as RFC 7208 does.
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func splitQualifier(term string) (byte, string) {
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if term == "" {
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return '+', ""
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}
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switch term[0] {
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case '+', '-', '~', '?':
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return term[0], term[1:]
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default:
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return '+', term
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}
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}
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// mechanismArg returns the ":" argument of a mechanism, if it has one.
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func mechanismArg(mech string) (string, bool) {
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_, arg, found := strings.Cut(mech, ":")
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if !found || arg == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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return arg, true
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}
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// isSPF reports whether a TXT record is an SPF record (the version token must
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// be the whole first term, so "v=spf10" is not one).
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func isSPF(record string) bool {
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rec := strings.TrimSpace(record)
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if len(rec) < 6 || !strings.EqualFold(rec[:6], "v=spf1") {
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return false
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}
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return len(rec) == 6 || rec[6] == ' ' || rec[6] == '\t'
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}
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// parseIPs converts the string addresses carried on a Query back into net.IPs,
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// dropping anything unparsable.
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func parseIPs(in []string) []net.IP {
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var ips []net.IP
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for _, s := range in {
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if ip := net.ParseIP(s); ip != nil {
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ips = append(ips, ip)
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}
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}
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return ips
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}
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