Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.
Fixed
- M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
later created under that name, with that account's role. The
baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
- M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
It ends that user's other sessions only.
- L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
- L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
- L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
- I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
that is not a known asset is a 404.
Consequences
- The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
since, too.
- dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
everyone signs in again after the transfer.
- docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.
Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
- L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
- L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
- L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
- Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
only), the domain form's validation messages.
Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.
go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
ok (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
66 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package view
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"io/fs"
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"net/http"
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"path"
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)
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// staticETags maps each /static/ URL path to a strong ETag over the asset's
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// bytes, computed once at startup from the embedded FS.
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//
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// The assets are baked into the binary, so their FS modification times are the
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// zero value and http.FileServer sends no Last-Modified. Without an ETag either,
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// a response carries no validator at all and the browser is free to guess how
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// long to keep it — which is how a replaced favicon keeps showing the old mark
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// long after a deploy. Hashing the content gives every asset a validator that
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// changes exactly when the asset does.
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var staticETags = buildStaticETags()
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func buildStaticETags() map[string]string {
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etags := make(map[string]string)
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// An error here would mean the embed directive and this walk disagree, which
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// is a build-time defect rather than a runtime condition; the assets still
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// serve correctly without a validator, so skip what can't be read.
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_ = fs.WalkDir(assetsFS, "static", func(name string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
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if err != nil || d.IsDir() {
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return nil
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}
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b, err := fs.ReadFile(assetsFS, name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil
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}
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sum := sha256.Sum256(b)
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etags["/"+name] = `"` + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:16]) + `"`
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return nil
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})
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return etags
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}
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// StaticHandler serves the embedded assets under /static/ with a content ETag.
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// A path that is not one of those assets — the folder itself included — is a
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// 404: the file server would otherwise answer the folder with a listing of
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// everything the binary embeds.
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//
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// Cache-Control is no-cache rather than a max-age: it lets the browser keep the
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// copy but requires it to revalidate, so an asset that changed is picked up on
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// the next page load while an unchanged one costs a 304 with no body. For a
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// handful of small files on a single-operator panel that trade is the right way
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// round — correctness after a deploy matters more than saving the round trip.
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// http.ServeContent answers the conditional request from the ETag we set here.
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func StaticHandler() http.Handler {
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files := http.FileServer(http.FS(assetsFS))
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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etag, ok := staticETags[path.Clean(r.URL.Path)]
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if !ok {
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("ETag", etag)
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
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files.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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