bf477f4e6a
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10). internal/domain: - Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation. - KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile: with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4). - Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid. - Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries. Infra: - Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim (reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design. - opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s). - entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership, setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing after a restore. - supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel can request the reload. web/store: - Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2 labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2). - Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12, OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5). - Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard patterns. Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering + injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain, DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and tables persist across a restart). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
39 lines
1016 B
Go
39 lines
1016 B
Go
package web
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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)
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type ctxKey int
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const usernameKey ctxKey = 0
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// requireAuth wraps a handler so only requests with a valid session cookie
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// reach it; everyone else is redirected to the login page. The authenticated
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// username is stashed in the request context for downstream handlers.
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func (s *Server) requireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
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if err != nil {
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
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return
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}
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username, ok := s.sessions.Lookup(c.Value)
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if !ok {
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http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusSeeOther)
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return
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}
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), usernameKey, username)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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// currentUser returns the authenticated username from the request context.
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func currentUser(r *http.Request) string {
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if v, ok := r.Context().Value(usernameKey).(string); ok {
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return v
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}
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return ""
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}
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