Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.
Fixed
- M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
later created under that name, with that account's role. The
baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
- M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
It ends that user's other sessions only.
- L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
- L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
- L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
- I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
that is not a known asset is a 404.
Consequences
- The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
since, too.
- dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
everyone signs in again after the transfer.
- docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.
Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
- L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
- L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
- L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
- Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
only), the domain form's validation messages.
Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.
go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
ok (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
110 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
110 lines
3.7 KiB
Go
package store
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import (
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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)
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// SessionRow is a persisted login session, keyed by the SHA-256 of its token
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// (see internal/web, which owns the token itself). It belongs to a user by id:
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// deleting the user deletes their sessions, and renaming them keeps them.
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type SessionRow struct {
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UserID int64
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ExpiresAt time.Time
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}
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// CreateSession inserts a new session row for a user.
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func (s *Store) CreateSession(tokenHash string, userID int64, expiresAt time.Time) error {
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now := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
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_, err := s.db.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, user_id, created_at, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)`,
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tokenHash, userID, now, expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
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)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("insert session: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// LookupSession returns the session for tokenHash, if any. It does not check
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// expiry itself — callers compare ExpiresAt against time.Now() and call
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// DeleteSession on an expired row, keeping the read side lock-free.
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func (s *Store) LookupSession(tokenHash string) (SessionRow, bool, error) {
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var (
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row SessionRow
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expiresAt string
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)
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err := s.db.QueryRow(
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`SELECT user_id, expires_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?`,
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tokenHash,
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).Scan(&row.UserID, &expiresAt)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return SessionRow{}, false, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return SessionRow{}, false, fmt.Errorf("lookup session: %w", err)
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}
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row.ExpiresAt, err = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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return SessionRow{}, false, fmt.Errorf("parse session expiry: %w", err)
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}
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return row, true, nil
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}
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// RenewSession pushes a session's expiry forward, implementing the sliding
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// idle timeout.
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func (s *Store) RenewSession(tokenHash string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
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_, err := s.db.Exec(
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`UPDATE sessions SET expires_at = ? WHERE token_hash = ?`,
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expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), tokenHash,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("renew session: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeleteSession removes a session row (logout, or a lookup finding it
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// expired).
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func (s *Store) DeleteSession(tokenHash string) error {
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?`, tokenHash); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete session: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeleteOtherSessions removes every session of the user except keepHash. It is
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// called when the user changes their password: a stolen cookie issued under the
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// old password must stop working, while the session performing the change
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// stays signed in. Other users' sessions are not touched.
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func (s *Store) DeleteOtherSessions(userID int64, keepHash string) error {
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ? AND token_hash != ?`, userID, keepHash); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete other sessions: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeleteUserSessions removes every session of the user, for when somebody else
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// has set their password.
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func (s *Store) DeleteUserSessions(userID int64) error {
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if _, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE user_id = ?`, userID); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("delete user sessions: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeleteExpiredSessions prunes rows whose expiry has already passed, so an
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// abandoned session (cookie never presented again) does not sit in the table
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// forever. It piggybacks on session creation rather than running as its own
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// background loop.
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func (s *Store) DeleteExpiredSessions(now time.Time) (int64, error) {
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res, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < ?`, now.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
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if err != nil {
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return 0, fmt.Errorf("prune sessions: %w", err)
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}
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n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
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return n, nil
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}
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