test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of a59e3d4..cb5a4a2;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing critical, high or medium; no
outright bug. Fixed:
- F2, F3 (0008 backfill, before it runs on the live database): rows are
filled by the rule new rows follow - the application's domain, then the
name's - and only by a domain and application that existed when the row
was written (created_at); the inbound log likewise. Test: the migration's
UPDATEs re-run on prepared rows (before the domain, after, null sender,
application gone, a stranger's name). Dry run on a copy of the live
database: 68/68 and 10/10 rows filled, none disagreeing with its login's
domain, integrity ok.
- V2, F4: an application's statistics and level-2 count are its login's
rows of its domain (appByLogin), and StatsWindow starts no earlier than
the entity's creation; the message page's "may send as" only for a login
still of the row's domain. Test: a login taken again in another domain
starts at zero.
- F7: MAIL FROM:<> is held to the domain limit of its login
(ApplicationByLogin fills DomainName).
- V3: an imported DKIM selector is held to DNS labels (validate.Selector).
- F5, F6: an imported auto limit's numbers are dropped and recalculated
right after the import; its mode is stored trimmed.
- V6: the store refuses a role that is neither global nor domain.
- F9: SaveUser keeps the stored hash when no new password is given (the
form no longer writes back the hash it read). F10: a reach naming a
domain deleted meanwhile is ErrNoSuchDomain, answered on the form.
- V4, F12: from-lines-other.txt - lines naming another sender ({other}) in
a quoted string, a quoted pair, capitals, a comment, an encoded word, a
quoted local part; the unit test wants each refused, the e2e
(lines_naming_another_sender_never_signed_for_it) wants each refused and
none signed for it. The passed list gained a.{DOMAIN}, a comment after
the angle address, a quoted local part, and "b@ {other}" - passed by
design (security.md), and the e2e shows it signed for the own domain.
- F13: e2e login_in_other_capitals_does_not_authenticate - AUTH with the
login upper-cased gets 535.
Not changed, written down: V1/F1 - L8 is half closed (refused or passed
still tells an application which domains are hosted here); security.md's
accepted risks and the CHANGELOG say so, and the owner is asked whether to
refuse every foreign address in a display name (changes the 2.4.0 rule).
F11 - deleting a domain rewrites its rows' domain_id (seconds at 1e5 rows),
accepted at this size. F8 (test cannot tell write-first from read-first;
the reviewer verified it with two stores, 30/30), V5, V7, P2: noted.
Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23
packages ok, make e2e exit 0 with the three new cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
111 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package milter
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import (
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"log"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// overLimit reports whether the message currently being received should be
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// refused under a level-2 differentiated limit (guide § Rate limiting).
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//
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// When an application has an active limit, it overrides the domain limit for
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// that login (the ceiling may be higher or lower than the domain). Otherwise
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// the domain ceiling applies when configured; if neither is set, only level 1
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// applies.
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//
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// It is deliberately fail-open: any store error, or the absence of a usable
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// limit, is treated as "not over limit" so a malfunction of the level-2
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// limiter can never block mail — Postfix's level-1 anvil limit
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// (architecture.md § Mail path) remains the backstop, and it does not depend
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// on this milter at all. Only a clean count at or above a configured ceiling
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// returns true.
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//
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// A message that passes reserves a slot per applicable limit, released once it
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// reaches the send log (or is abandoned) — see inflight for why the stored
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// count alone is not enough.
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func (s *session) overLimit() bool {
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// A ceiling is on a domain or an application, whatever address the mail
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// comes from, so the client address is not asked for here. It used to be,
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// and a message that arrived without one was let through uncounted.
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if s.login != "" {
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rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup application %q: %v (fail-open)", s.login, err)
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} else if ok && rl.Active() {
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return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login, rl)
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}
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}
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domain := domainOf(s.from)
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if domain == "" && s.login != "" {
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// MAIL FROM:<> has no domain to read; the login has one. A null
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// sender is held to its application's domain like any other message
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// of it (review of audit stage 2).
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if a, err := s.rec.ApplicationByLogin(s.login); err == nil {
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domain = a.DomainName
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}
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}
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if domain == "" {
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return false
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}
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rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup domain %q: %v (fail-open)", domain, err)
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return false
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}
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if !ok || !rl.Active() {
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return false
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}
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return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain, rl)
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}
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// enforceLimit counts recent messages for scope/ref and refuses when at or
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// above the ceiling. The stored count and the in-flight slots are weighed and
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// the admitted message's own slot is taken in one atomic step (tryAdmit), so
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// two sessions racing at MAIL FROM cannot both claim the last free slot.
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func (s *session) enforceLimit(scope, ref string, rl store.RateLimit) bool {
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since := time.Now().Add(-time.Duration(rl.WindowSeconds) * time.Second)
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stored, err := s.rec.CountMessages(scope, ref, since)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit count %s %q: %v (fail-open)", scope, ref, err)
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return false
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}
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r, n, ok := s.flight.tryAdmit(scope+"|"+ref, since, stored, int64(rl.MaxMessages))
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if !ok {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: %s %q over limit: %d/%d in %ds from %s — refusing 4xx",
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scope, ref, n, rl.MaxMessages, rl.WindowSeconds, s.clientIP)
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return true
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}
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s.reserved = append(s.reserved, r)
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return false
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}
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// releaseReservations gives back every slot this message holds. It runs once
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// the message is in the send log (where the stored count sees it), and whenever
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// the transaction ends without getting there.
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func (s *session) releaseReservations() {
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for _, r := range s.reserved {
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s.flight.release(r)
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}
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s.reserved = nil
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}
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// recordRejected writes a send-log row for a message refused by a level-2
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// limit (guide § Rate limiting — refusals are recorded too) or for its client
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// address, so the rejection shows up in the monitoring screen with its reason
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// (store.Reason*). Only MAIL-stage fields are known; the write is best-effort
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// and never affects the response.
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func (s *session) recordRejected(reason string) {
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err := s.rec.InsertRejected(store.SendLogEntry{
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Domain: domainOf(s.from),
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AppLogin: s.login,
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From: s.from,
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Reason: reason,
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})
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: record rejected %s: %v", s.from, err)
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}
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}
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